1. Introduction: Competing Explanations for the Underdevelopment of China’s Nuclear Doctrine

Jeffrey Lewis argues that Chinese political leaders were influenced by P.M.S. Blakett’s optimistic view of nuclear balance (Lewis 2007: 13).

The first French nuclear test took place on February 13, 1960, and the first Chinese test was on October 16, 1964.

Both countries developed their nuclear arsenal without significant foreign assistance.

The submarine component of the French nuclear triad entered service in December 1971.

This is the classic action-reaction logic: the US and Soviet arsenals spurred the development of China’s bomb, which spurred the development of India’s bomb, which then spurred the development of Pakistan’s bomb.

“As long as each side has thermonuclear weapons that could be used against the opponent, even after the strongest possible preemptive attack, existential deterrence is strong, and it rests on uncertainty about what could happen” (Bundy, quoted in Freedman 1988: 184).

“All that is required is the availability of some nuclear weapons that could be used in anger” (Freedman 1988: 184).

The concepts of minimum deterrence and existential deterrence are similar (Sauer 2009).

This is not the position of all neorealist theories but only of the offensive variant (Mearsheimer 2001).

The American administration also envisaged the possibility of destroying China’s infant arsenal in the early 1960s (Burr and Richelson 2000/2001). It even toyed with the idea of a collaboration with Moscow to curb China’s nuclear program. Averell Harriman wrote to Kennedy on January 23, 1963: “To may mind, the most important matter in the interest of our security which you touched upon was the question of attempting to prevent Red China from obtaining nuclear capability, and the possibility of working with the Soviets to this end”. Letter, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman to President John F. Kennedy, 23 January 1963, Secret, enclosed with letter from Harriman to Evelyn Lincoln, 23 January 1963 (National Security Archive, hereafter NSA: http://​nsarchive.​gwu.​edu/​NSAEBB/​NSAEBB38/​document5.​pdf). A few days later, General Curtis LeMay recommended the following list of direct measures to strangle China’s nuclear programme: “(1) Conduct covert aerial reconnaissance flights over Communist China. (2) Support infiltration, subversion, and sabotage by Chinese nationalists throughout Communist China and by South Koreans against North Korea. (3) Conduct increasingly severe maritime control measures up to and including blockade. (4) Support a Nationalist Chinese invasion of mainland China. (5) Support a South Korea invasion of North Korea. (6) Conduct small scale conventional air attacks against CHICOM’s [Communist China] nuclear or other facilities. (7) Deliver a tactical nuclear weapon on a selected CHICOM target”. General Curtis E. LeMay, Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Secretary of Defense, “Study of Chinese Communist Vulnerability,” 29 April 1963, with report on “Chinese Communist Vulnerability” attached, Top Secret (NSA: http://​nsarchive.​gwu.​edu/​NSAEBB/​NSAEBB38/​document6.​pdf).

For an in-depth analysis of this incident, see Lewis and Xue (2006: Chapter 3).

The Seven Military Classics are Sun Zi’s Art of War, written in approximately 500 BC; Wu Qi’s Art of War, written not long after by the student of a disciple of Confucius; Sima Rangju’s Methods, written by a military officer of the state of Qi, dated from approximately the third century BC; Wei Liao’s Art of War, whose date is uncertain but probably dates from the end of the fourth century BC; Jiang Ziya’s (Tai Gong) Six Secret Teachings, from the last Warring States period (late third century BC), although according to Ralph Sawyer, it may date from a much earlier period of the Chou dynasty; Huang Shi Gong’s Three Strategies, dating from a period roughly similar to that of the previous text; and Questions and Replies between Tang Tai Zhong and Li Wei Gong, dating from the tenth century AD (Sawyer 1993).

This section draws on Rosa (2014).

The idea that China is characterized by a strategic culture that is strongly marked by a realist conception of international politics is shared by many scholars. See, among others, the works of Johnston (1995, 1996a), Christensen (1996), Nathan and Ross (1997), Swaine and Tellis (2000), and Wang (2011).

The defensive nature of China’s strategic culture is symbolized by the Great Wall. The conflict with Vietnam in 1979, even if initiated by Beijing, was labelled as a counter-offensive triggered by Vietnam’s attack of Cambodia, which was an ally of China. Another example is the commitment of the PRC to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons in case of conflict. See Scobell (2003).

In Sawyer’s translation of Sun Zi, the sentence is: “Warfare is the way [Tao] of deception” (Sawyer 1993: 158).

In the period from 1945–2013, China conducted 45 nuclear tests, the US exploded 1054 nuclear devices, the USSR 715, the United Kingdom 45 and France 210 (http://​www.​ctbto.​org/​nuclear-testing/​history-of-nuclear-testing/​nuclear-testing-1945-today/​).

This section draws on Rosa (2010: Chapter 5).

On Mao Zedong’s thoughts about atomic weapons, see the classic study by Alice Langley Hsie (1962). A more in-depth analysis of Mao’s ideas and role in the development of China’s nuclear program is in Chapter 3.

“The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the US reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn’t. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapon” (Mao, Various years, 100).

On the symbolic dimension of the nuclear option, see Sagan (1996/1997).

In a speech in January 1961, Marshal Ye Jianying stated: “Although atomic bombs are very powerful, they can only be used to destroy centres and the economic reserves of the opponent during the strategic bombing phase. After that, they are used principally as fire-power preparations for assault. However, the army and regular weapons are necessary to terminate war, to destroy the enemy, to occupy positions, and to win a victory. To rely on the army and regular weapons is to rely primarily on man. The final conclusion thus rests on man” (quoted in Hsie 1964: 83–84).

“Some people abroad say that technology decides everything. Don’t place blind faith in that. Of course, we cannot afford to neglect technology. However, the notion that electronic computers can take over all the command functions is absurd—then men would have no active role at all. Experience shows that, even if the enemy were to come now, we would be able to fight him with our present weapons and eventually win the war, provided we persevered in the people’s war. With such a huge population, once our people and army unite as one, no enemy can destroy us”. Speech at a plenary meeting of the military commission of the Central Committee of the CPC, December 28, 1977 (Deng, Various years).

For a recent study that combines different types of variables to explain China’s nuclear posture, see Fravel and Medeiros (2010). The main limitation of Fravel and Medeiro’s analysis—whose conclusion is largely consistent with present book—is that it lacks a clear theoretical framework to link and rank the different variables (ideational and structural, international and domestic) taken into consideration.