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Erschienen in:
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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

1. Introduction

verfasst von : Kaushik Basu, Tito Cordella

Erschienen in: Institutions, Governance and the Control of Corruption

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This book is the outcome of a roundtable organized by us and held in Montevideo, Uruguay, on May 26–27, 2016. It is an ambitious project because of the breadth of its reach. There is increasing recognition, albeit with a long history of forays into this, from the time of Karl Polanyi (1944), through the writings of Mark Granovetter (1985), to the emergence of new institutional economics (see North 1990; Williamson 2000), that economics cannot be viewed in isolation. It is a discipline embedded in institutions, politics, and the law and, if we are to be more effective in terms of the impact of economic policy, we have to recognize this embeddedness and design our interventions with this in mind. Further, the perpetrators of corruption often work, hand in hand, with the functionaries of government, who, ironically, are supposed to enforce the law (see, for instance, Kugler et al. 2005). The World Bank’s most-recent World Development Report on Governance and the Law (World Bank 2017) is a recognition of the significance of these perspectives. And our roundtable assembled some of the finest minds that have contributed to this multidisciplinary venture to do a stocktaking of the best ideas and how they can be put to action on the ground. It was an engaging two days of discussion and debate.

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Fußnoten
1
See Basu (2000) for an analysis of how to situate economics within sociology and politics.
 
2
It is arguable that the (high) predictability and the (contained) size of bribes may have also played a role. In addition, China has used a strategy of asymmetric punishment which may have contributed to keeping corruption within limits (Berlin and Spagnolo 2015).
 
3
An emblematic case is Singapore that fares extremely high both in anti-corruption and in crony capitalism indexes.
 
4
See Schelling (1980).
 
5
A less benign interpretation is that in Italy prosecution is mandatory but because of the malfunctioning of the judiciary indictment is random. This would sustain the same set of equilibria with a less favorable view of the judiciary.
 
6
Measured by difference in the luminosity per capita in the homelands of the different ethnic groups, using both Alesina et al. (2016), and the Growup dataset from Girardin et al. (2015).
 
7
See Ferraz and Finan (2008).
 
8
More precisely, they compare the outcome of municipalities that have been audited twice versus those that have only been audited once.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Introduction
verfasst von
Kaushik Basu
Tito Cordella
Copyright-Jahr
2018
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65684-7_1

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