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The Review of International Organizations

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15.08.2017

Issue linkage across international organizations: Does European countries’ temporary membership in the UN Security Council increase their receipts from the EU budget?

verfasst von: Christoph Mikulaschek

Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations | Ausgabe 4/2018

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Abstract

What explains the outcome of interstate negotiations in international organizations (IOs)? While existing research highlights member states’ power, preference intensity, and the IO’s institutional design, this paper introduces an additional source of bargaining power in IOs: Through issue linkage members of an IO leverage privileged positions in other IOs to obtain more favorable bargaining outcomes. Specifically, European Union members are more successful in bargaining over the EU budget while they hold a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Inside the UNSC EU members can promote security interests of other European countries, and they can use their influence to secure side-payments from the EU budget. The study tests this argument by investigating new EU budget data, and it shows that EU members obtain 1.7 billion Euro in additional net receipts during a two-year UNSC term, on average. Thus, bargaining processes in the EU and the UN are intricately linked.

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This is because they are not “sure to vote against the donor in the absence of a vote-aid trade, but could be swayed to vote differently by an enticement” (Vreeland and Dreher 2014, 35). Even in the absence of vote-buying, EU members that temporarily serve on the Council are more likely to vote with potential vote-buyers (United States, United Kingdom, and France) than any other Council member (see Voeten 2000 and Lai and Lefler 2017 on UN voting).

For instance, the European Security Strategy stresses that “the fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” (European Council 2003, 9) The Council imposed sanctions or established field missions in many crisis theaters in the EU and its neighborhood, such as in Cyprus, the former Yugoslavia, Georgia, Libya, Morocco, and Ukraine. It also provided the legal basis for numerous EU military missions and placed Kosovo under UN administration.

Author’s phone interview with a Belgian diplomat on 8/4/2015. See also United Nations (2010).

Repeated interaction between a moderate number of governments over a long period of time encourages reputational sanctions and norms of mutual trust, which render such non-simultaneous issue linkage possible (Aksoy and Rodden 2009, 625; Rodden 2002, 160).

In contrast, specific reciprocity consists in the exchange of items of equivalent value in a strictly delimited sequence through issue linkage (Keohane 1986, 4). Specific reciprocity would thus involve a trade of a specific action (e.g., a vote) in the UN Security Council in exchange for economic side-payments.

This assumption is consistent with the observation that some time-invariant characteristics of countries (such as size) influence both their likelihood of serving as a non-permanent Security Council member (Dreher et al. 2014) and their success in EU budgetary bargaining (Mattila 2006; Aksoy & Rodden 2009).

The ten non-permanent seats on the Security Council are allocated to specific world regions. Two non-permanent Council seats are always filled by states in the ‘Western Europe and Others’ caucus, which includes the fifteen EU members prior to the 2004 enlargement, Malta, Western European states that are not in the EU, as well as Australia, Canada, Israel, and New Zealand. While Cyprus forms part of the Asian group, most states that have joined the EU since 2004 are members of the Eastern European group, for which one non-permanent seat on the Security Council is reserved. In the ‘Western Europe and Others’ and the Eastern European groups the number of candidate countries typically exceeds the number of open seats. Therefore, candidates campaign for election to the UN Security Council for several years (Malone 2000).

Structural funds and agricultural funding account for the vast majority of EU member states’ receipts from the EU budget; these are unrelated to the UN Security Council’s agenda. Serving as a temporary member of the UN Security Council does not entail financial or military obligations that could be shared with other EU member states (see below).

Following the previous literature on EU budget allocation (Schneider 2011; Aksoy & Rodden 2009; Kauppi & Widgrén 2004) the dependent variables are not logged; log transformation of net receipts is impossible since it can take negative values.

The latter are included since the EU budget has grown over time while the EU’s representation on the UN Security Council has also grown stronger (see Table 1).

These are the first years of Austria’s first term as an EU member, Denmark’s second term, Germany’s fifth term, Italy’s fourth term, and Spain’s first term.

These results are robust to adding data for 1976 to 2014 on receipts that preceded six terms that started shortly after 2013 or ended just before 1975 (see Fig. 1 in the Supporting Documentation).

E.g., a campaign poster against the Nice Treaty read ‘Hello NATO, good-bye UN’ (Doyle 2004, 74).

I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis.

Three out of Germany’s five Council terms between 1976 and 2014 followed a non-competitive election, as did both Belgian and both Danish terms, two of Italy’s four terms, one of Spain’s two terms, and Greece’s and Slovakia’s terms.

See Aksoy & Rodden (2009), Schneider (2013), and Gehring & Schneider (2017).

While the effect on receipts is consistently significant in the Prais-Winsten models, the effect on net receipts only becomes significant after adding covariates, because the model without covariates is less efficiently estimated.

This dynamic is similar to the logic Vreeland and Dreher (2014, 17) ascribe to vote-trading in the UN Security Council in exchange for development aid to developing countries.

E.g., Belgium created five additional diplomatic positions at its permanent mission to the UN in New York while it served on the Security Council in 2007 and 2008 (Genin and Fischer 2007, 18).

The data was extracted from the EU’s Interinstitutional/Official Directory, which was published once a year between 1994 and 2014, except in 2008 and 2013; data is missing for these two years and unavailable prior to 1994.

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Titel: Issue linkage across international organizations: Does European countries’ temporary membership in the UN Security Council increase their receipts from the EU budget?
verfasst von: Christoph Mikulaschek
Publikationsdatum: 15.08.2017
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations / Ausgabe 4/2018
Print ISSN: 1559-7431
Elektronische ISSN: 1559-744X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-017-9289-9

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