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2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Lightweight Interactions for Reciprocal Cooperation in a Social Network Game

verfasst von : Masanori Takano, Kazuya Wada, Ichiro Fukuda

Erschienen in: Social Informatics

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

The construction of reciprocal relationships requires cooperative interactions during the initial meetings. However, cooperative behavior with strangers is risky because the strangers may be exploiters. In this study, we show that people increase the likelihood of cooperativeness of strangers by using lightweight non-risky interactions in risky situations based on the analysis of a social network game (SNG). They can construct reciprocal relationships in this manner. The interactions involve low-cost signaling because they are not generated at any cost to the senders and recipients. Theoretical studies show that low-cost signals are not guaranteed to be reliable because the low-cost signals from senders can lie at any time. However, people used low-cost signals to construct reciprocal relationships in an SNG, which suggests the existence of mechanisms for generating reliable, low-cost signals in human evolution.

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Vorheriges Kapitel A Diffusion Model for Maximizing Influence Spread in Large Networks
Nächstes Kapitel Continuous Recipe Selection Model Based on Cooking History
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Fußnoten
1
Players can acquire a few points for a lottery, which provides a card when the players sent messages to each other at the beginning of each day. However, the players had to pay 200 points to enter the lottery and the effect of the card is small, i.e., the points do not increase the players’ abilities.
 
2
Players can acquire a few points for a lottery, which provided a card when the players sent messages to each other at the beginning of each day. However, the players had to pay 200 points to enter the lottery and the effect of the card was small, i.e., the points did not increase the players’ abilities.
 
3
The enemy only has hit points as an attribute, meaning that players cannot be attacked by enemies. A player must attack an enemy to acquire event points at the expense of attack points.
 
4
This is one of the basic actions in SNGs. A player may encounter an enemy on performing certain action.
 
5
The length of the disable time is set between one and two hours. It is too long to complete the rankings for middle- and higher-rank players, because other players progress in the rankings during their disabled time.
 
6
If a player sequentially attacks an enemy then the attack is not count for the “combo attacks.” In addition, if players do not attack during ten minutes then their chain of combo attacks are reset to 0.
 
7
In addition, it does not mean that the relationship between the payoffs is constant. If a player is about to go to sleep, then S is larger than T, because the attack points replenish the next morning.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Lightweight Interactions for Reciprocal Cooperation in a Social Network Game
verfasst von
Masanori Takano
Kazuya Wada
Ichiro Fukuda
Copyright-Jahr
2016
Buch
Social Informatics

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-47879-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-47880-7

Copyright-Jahr: 2016

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47880-7_8

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