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Erschienen in:
Introduction: Mistakes and Failures in International Relations Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

6. Private Governance Failures and Their Consequences: Towards Enhanced Legal Control of Private Authorities in Finance and Security?

verfasst von : Andreas Kruck

Erschienen in: Political Mistakes and Policy Failures in International Relations

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Focusing on credit rating agencies (CRAs) and private military and security companies (PMSCs), this chapter explores when and to what extent private governance failures subsequently lead to enhanced legal control of private authorities. While private governance failures create a functional demand for regulatory reform, the establishment and extent of enhanced legal control mechanisms are contingent on (1) the political net benefits that more legalised private provision of governance entails for public policy-makers in the aftermath of private governance failures and (2) public policy-makers’ (continued) dependence on failing but essential private authorities. This approach captures why regulation and legal oversight of CRAs and PMSCs have increased after their governance failures but are plagued with limitations and entail unintended consequences.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Policymaking in the Pub: New Labour’s European Policy Failure
Nächstes Kapitel The ‘Get Out of Jail Card’: The Immunity Risk Provides Financial Markets and Regulators from the Consequences of Their Mistakes
Fußnoten
1
Authority refers to recognised, albeit not necessarily legitimate, power. The concept of authority implies that addressees recognise that an actor can make competent judgements and binding decisions. Actors can be (put) ‘in authority’ and/or they can be ‘an authority’. Political actors, including private commercial firms, exercise authority in that they successfully claim the right to perform governance functions like the formulation of rules and rule monitoring, implementation or enforcement (Zürn et al. 2012: 70, 86; see Cutler et al. 1999).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Private Governance Failures and Their Consequences: Towards Enhanced Legal Control of Private Authorities in Finance and Security?
verfasst von
Andreas Kruck
Copyright-Jahr
2018
Buch
Political Mistakes and Policy Failures in International Relations

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-68172-6

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-68173-3

Copyright-Jahr: 2018

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68173-3_6

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