Global Risk Governance

This document aims to guide the work of the International Risk Governance Council and its various bodies in devising comprehensive and transparent approaches to ‘govern’ a variety of globally relevant risks. Globally relevant risks include trans-boundary risks, i.e. those that originate in one country and affect other countries (such as air pollution), international risks, i.e. those that originate in many countries simultaneously and lead to global impacts (such as carbon dioxide emissions for climate change) and ubiquitous risks, i.e. those that occur in each country in similar forms and may necessitate a co-ordinated international response (such as car accidents or airline safety). To this end the document and the framework it describes provide a common analytic structure for investigating and supporting the treatment of risk issues by the relevant actors in society. In doing so, the focus is not restricted to how governmental or supranational authorities deal with risk but equal importance is given to the roles of the corporate sector, science, other stakeholders as well as civil society — and their interplay. The analytic structure will, it is hoped, facilitate terminological and conceptual clarity, consistency and transparency in the daily operations of IRGC and assure the feasibility of comparative approaches in the governance of risks across a broad range of hazardous events and activities. In particular, this document is meant to assist members of IRGC in their tasks to provide scientifically sound, economically feasible, legally and ethically justifiable and politically acceptable advice to IRGC's targeted audiences. It is also to support IRGC in its effort to combine the best available expertise in the respective field with practical guidance for both risk managers and stakeholders.

Risk managers like models; they use them to compartmentalise the world they operate in. Good models offer ways to better assess and cope with risks. Over the past decades, a multitude of risk management models has been proposed, some more useful than others. Among the most well known are the National Research Council's 1983 report Federal Risk Assessment-Managing the Process, which calls for separation of risk assessment from risk management (NRC 1983), the National Research Council's 1996 report Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society, which argues for a risk characterisation process to be implemented throughout the entire risk analysis process (NRC 1996) and the UK Royal Commission for Environmental Pollution 1998 report Setting Environmental Standards, which argues that the articulation of people's values should more or less be incorporated in risk management processes (RCEP 1998). Models for risk management are neither easy to develop, nor are they by definition useful for policy makers. Good risk management models need to be easily understood in order to be usable by risk management practitioners, while at the same time such models should reflect the scholarly state of the art. They are simplified versions of a complex body of knowledge. In other words, sound frameworks for risk management are both as sophisticated and as simple as possible. Developing a risk management model thus requires synthesis of available insights as well as simplification and translation into easy to understand schemes and recommendations. This is the challenge the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) took on in developing its risk governance framework.

Most of my professional life is spent addressing issues related to the unlawful, unintended, or completely unanticipated consequences of product, production or market activities. Many of my projects involve analysis of product liability and the interaction of the various private and public institutions that regulate, resolve disputes, compensate, or punish the relevant parties. The problems can be quite limited as in a simple insurance dispute regarding coverage for a single company's environmental damage at one site, or highly complex as in the long-term forecast of liability for asbestos risks at the national level over a 50 year time horizon. My consulting experiences have taught me that risk governance, even for a ‘simple’ risk problem, not only occurs on many different levels of society, but also must contend with the widely varying interests of the participants who influence choices and outcomes. That any single framework could begin to tame the messy assessment, appraisal and management tasks of complex and/or global risk problems with the hope of offering effective guidance for governance is certainly a bold claim. Nonetheless, the IRGC risk governance framework, in my view, moves us towards that goal by its attention to integrating key insights about risk from the social, behavioural, natural, and engineering sciences. At the very least, the integrated messages of the framework are important contributions to directing a high quality analysis to support risk governance planning, perhaps even more so at non-governmental levels, where risk governance is a relatively novel concept.

My overall reaction to the IRGC risk governance framework is extremely positive. However, I have concerns that it may be misinterpreted as a ‘how-to-do-it’ manual, a check list, or a catalogue of what IRGC considers the ‘approved’ set of analytical tools and methodology. Such interpretations could be restrictive and impede progress in improving risk analysis and risk governance. The IRGC framework should be viewed as a broad summary of what risk analysis is, and why risk analysis is needed in support of improving risk governance. It provides a useful taxonomy and an overview of how risk analysis can be effectively accomplished and communicated, through an iterative process of work by trained analysts and dialogue with political leaders and the interested/affected parties on risk issues. The framework should not be regarded as rigid, that is, defining a set of methods for risk analysis practice, but rather it should be regarded as an overview of the potential for risk analysis to assist in improving risk governance. In particular, it should not be interpreted as restricting methods and analytical tools for dealing with uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. Selection of such methods should be consistent with best practices from the scientific and engineering disciplines supporting risk analysis, as these practices evolve through further research and further experience.

This chapter provides a synthesis of informal comments, remarks, and statements by as many as 42 individuals received by IRGC following the publication of the risk governance framework.1 Many comments were given to IRGC in the form of e-mails and short correspondence. More input was received from transcribed oral statements from participants during the discussion periods at numerous conferences and symposia where the framework had been presented. Our objectives for the chapter were to put them in a consistent format, to organise them by topic and to link them to the four phases of the risk governance framework. In so doing, we want both to express our appreciation for the thoughtful comments received and to begin to identify the recurring issues that may require work in subsequent versions of the framework.

This chapter has three major sections. The first presents general comments associated with the conceptual basis and structure for the framework. The second summarises the more specific comments and suggestions with respect to each governance phase. The final section summarises the major recurring themes among the all comments received, both formal and informal.

Genetically Modified (GM) crops occupy a unique place in the evolution of risk governance approaches to dealing with modern, path-breaking technologies. They were the first such technology to be regulated on a precautionary basis, in a generic sense, from the earliest stages of a technology development process that began in the 1980s and is still evolving.

Today, distinctively different risk governance processes are in place in the European Union (EU) and the USA and the roots of these differences can also be traced back to the 1980s. The European regulatory process is more complex and demanding than that for any other technology; as a result, few GM crops are grown in or imported into Europe. And yet, although GM crops are grown on millions of hectares in the rest of the world, and GM foods are consumed on a daily basis by millions of people, under much less demanding regulatory regimes, there is so far no evidence of environmental or health risks associated with approved products based on this technology, and considerable evidence of their benefits.

Tourism is the largest industry in the world according to figures on employment and expenditures. Over 800 million people, the equivalent of roughly 12% of the world's population, travel internationally each year — with many more travelling within their countries of residence. Airlines, the hotel and restaurant business, and outdoor equipment manufacturers and vendors are among the supplier industries that are highly dependent on a successful tourism sector. Tourism furthermore relies on and provides income to national infrastructures such as airports, rail systems, road networks, electric power systems, agricultural production, and water supply systems. On a more personal dimension, travelling provides individuals with the opportunity to escape temporarily from the humdrum of every-day life, to experience the novel or unknown and, possibly, to make a long-time ‘dream come true’. ‘Discovering the world’ arguably figures amongst the top life goals for many people in developed countries. Consequently, the tourism sector as a whole seems to be fairly resilient to disruptions from economic downturns, political crises, extreme weather events, or even natural disasters (UNWTO press release of 24 January 2006).

The fastest growing element of tourism is ‘nature-based’ tourism, often involving excursions to national parks and wilderness areas, to developing countries where a large portion of the world's biodiversity is concentrated (Olson et al. 2001: 936; WWF 2001; Christ et al. 2003: 5). It may also include an ‘adventure tourism’ element that may carry physical risks. More and more people are living an urban life and the amenities and conveniences that come with globalisation increasingly lead to a near complete disconnect from nature: the living creatures behind the neat slices of fish and meat that we consume or behind the clothes that keep us warm are no longer visible to us; the seasonality of fruit and vegetables virtually has ceased to exist; and the furniture in our homes is impossible to picture as the trees from which it came. Yet at the same time we may have more intimate insight into the mystery of a giant sequoia, the hibernating habits of a grizzly bear or the hatching behaviour of a hummingbird than our rural ancestors could ever hope to have had - insights that are brought to us in breathtaking close-up pictures via the many media channels that cater daily to our information needs. For many people, ‘getting back in touch with nature’ thus provides the ultimately different holiday experience. Indeed, from snow-covered mountains to earth-coloured savannas teeming with exotic wildlife, lush rain forests, vast desert landscapes and pristine coastal strips offering spectacular bird and marine life, the opportunities for immersing oneself in nature seem countless.

Between 1980 and 1996 there were 30 known and reported outbreaks of foodborne illness associated with cheese consumption in the United States, Canada, Europe, and Scandinavia (Cody et al. 1999), and 16 of these outbreaks were associated with cheese produced using unpasteurised milk contaminated with one or more of the following pathogens—Brucella sp., Escherichia coli, Listeria monocytogenes, Salmonella spp., and Yersinia enterocolitica (Teuber 2000). In this chapter, we will focus on only one of these pathogens—Listeria monocytogenes (Lm). Of the above outbreaks, three were caused by Lm, which resulted in 284 reported illnesses and 86 deaths (Teuber 2000). Periodic outbreaks of listeriosis from cheese have continued to occur; at least another six Lm outbreaks in the US, four in Europe, and two in Canada have been associated with cheese consumption since 1996 (de Valk et al. 2005; Food Safety Network 2005; Pagotto et al. 2006; US Food and Drug Administration Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition [FDA CFSAN] et al. 2003).

Listeria is a genus of bacteria that includes six separate species that can be found throughout the natural environment, for example, in the feces of mammals, on vegetation, and in silage. The Lm strain was first identified in 1926 following an outbreak in rabbits (CFSAN 1992), but has only gained significant interest by the US federal regulatory bodies in the past 20 years (Woteki and Kineman 2003). Lm is commonly found in the gastro-intestinal tract of several animal species and humans. It has been found in at least 37 mammal species, 17 species of birds, and both fish and shellfish; and is believed to be present in up to 10% of humans (CFSAN 1992). Lm is the primary causative agent of listeriosis. Listeriosis can be distinguished as two types: invasive and non-invasive. Invasive listeriosis is the severe form of the disease which typically has a two to three week incubation time, but can extend up to three months. Adverse outcomes can include septicemia, meningitis, encephalitis, abortion or stillbirth, endocarditis, cutaneous infections, and, though rare, it may cause focal infections, such as endophthalmitis, septic arthritis, osteomyelitis, pleural infection, and peritonitis (FDA CFSAN et al. 2003). Non-invasive listeriosis causes gastrointestinal illness, which may result in chills, diarrhea, headache, abdominal pain and cramps, nausea, vomiting, fatigue, and myalgia. The frequency of contracting non-invasive Lm is unknown because most of the cases are not reported to public health officials (FDA CFSAN et al. 2003).

This case study is an application of IRGC' s risk governance framework to an actual water resources management problem which challenged the disaster risk governance system in Japan, the construction of the Nagara River Estuary Barrage. It represents an example of a problem in which decision-makers were faced with difficult tradeoffs between protection of public safety and important water resources on the one hand, and concerns about adverse socio-economic and environmental impacts of the barrage on the other. This problem also illustrates the evolving nature of conflicts over time, where the values that dominated the decisions in the early planning stages were not those that drove public opinion toward the end.

The Nagara River Estuary Barrage was planned at the mouth of the Nagara River by the Ministry of Construction of the Japanese Government in order to develop water resources and mitigate flood disasters. The Nagara river runs through the Nagoya metropolitan region which is the third largest metropolitan area in population and a very important industrial area for Japanese economy, especially, automobile and machinery industries. However, local fishermen and eventually became opposed to the plan, and were joined in their opposition by an emerging new group of environmentalists. Crucial conflicts occurred among government officials, local people and societal groups holding diverse values. The conflicts have become compounded, evolved and lasted from 1968 to now, though some tentative resolution seems to have been reached.

The risk governance framework of the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) provides an analytical structure within which to handle risks, from assessment to management. This chapter is a case study of the the events in Germany connected with the discovery of acrylamide in foodstuffs. A central question the case study hoped to answer was whether the framework could help deal with such situations as newly arising hazards from harmful substances in foodstuffs.

Advances in science and technology have led to the emergence of new sources of risk. At the same time, they have offered improved opportunities for identifying existing risks. For instance, modern measurement methods can detect substances in our air, water, and food at concentrations in the parts per billion (ppb) or even parts per trillion (ppt) range. With these improved analytical methods it is very likely that some undesirable compounds, in some cases unintended chemical by-products of production, will be detected in our foods. Since it is hardly feasible to test all foodstuffs for the approximately 100,000 known chemical substances (UBA 2001), it follows that there is some chance that some of them will be detected by chance, and these findings will then reach the public unfiltered. Prompt and careful reactions by scientific and government authorities can prevent the public from being unduly alarmed and such situations from developing into communication crises. What is important in such cases is to find solutions which meet legal health protection requirements and are acceptable to as many parties as possible.

Since the events of January 2006, in which natural gas supplies to Ukraine and Georgia were interrupted, energy security for Europe has become a ‘hot issue’, with many national leaders calling for changes in policies and actions (see Appendix 1). Achieving energy security for the Baltic region is particularly difficult because of the way this region has evolved with the end of the Cold War. The energy infrastructure was created when this region was part of the Soviet Union. Now Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are independent nations that have joined the European Union. As part of the process that led to its membership in the European Union, Lithuania has agreed to shut down the two nuclear power plants at Ignalina (3000 MW of installed capacity) that have been providing most of the electric generation for Lithuania and a large amount for export to neighbouring countries. Unit #1 was shut down at the end of 2004, and the agreement specifies that Unit #2 will cease to operate by the end of 2009. While proposals have been made for expanded use of renewable energy supplies, it seems clear that most of the replacement for this nuclear generation will, in the near term, have to come from fossil fuel generation, such as use of natural gas from Russia, plus perhaps some limited use of heavy oil (‘orimulsion’) from Venezuela.

The ‘White Paper on Nanotechnology Risk Governance’ is the product of a collaborate effort for which input was provided on two initial workshops in May 2005 and January 2006 and which was advised by the IRGC's Nanotechnology Working Group and a number of external experts. In addition, the results of four stakeholder surveys undertaken as part of the project in the second half of 2005 are incorporated The surveys were concerned with the role of governments, industry, research organisations and NGOs and have been published as separate volumes on the IRGC website http://​www.​irgc.​org/​irgc/​projects/​nanotechnology/​. On the same page, the full White Paper can be downloaded as well.

The IRGC risk governance framework presented in Chapter 1 is a work in progress, a new model in Löfstedt's and van Asselt's words. Like any new model, its intellectual rigor and ultimately, its progression from the theoretical to the practical are indebted to open debate and constructive criticism. The many contributors to this volume provided a large variety of critical yet constructive comments and suggestions for improving the IRGC framework (Part 2). The diverse case studies in which the framework was applied retrospectively provided valuable insight to the practical utility of the framework (Part 3).

In the following sections, we would like to address first the conceptual issues that were raised in the formal comments because they are fundamental to the purpose of the framework. We then address comments about specific crucial components and phases of the risk governance framework, drawing on both the formal comments and observations from the case studies. In our response to comments, our goal at this point is time is to acknowledge where we may have fallen short and to provide clarification using language that will be more accessible to our readers. We know that there are some substantive issues that will clearly require additional theoretical and practical work but these are beyond the scope of this chapter.