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Erschienen in:
Impact of Privacy on Free Online Service Markets Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Multi-sided Advertising Markets: Dynamic Mechanisms and Incremental User Compensations

verfasst von : Moran Feldman, Gonen Frim, Rica Gonen

Erschienen in: Decision and Game Theory for Security

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Online advertising has motivated companies to collect vast amounts of information about users, which increasingly creates privacy concerns. One way to answer these concerns is by enabling end users to choose which aspects of their private information can be collected. Based on principles suggested by Feldman and Gonen (2018), we introduce a new online advertising market model which uses information brokers to give users such control. Unlike Feldman and Gonen (2018), our model is dynamic and involves multi-sided markets where all participating sides are strategic. We describe a mechanism for this model which is theoretically guaranteed to (approximately) maximize the gain from trade, avoid a budget deficit and incentivize truthfulness and voluntary participation. As far as we know, this is the first known dynamic mechanism for a multi-sided market having these properties.
We experimentally examine and compare our theoretical results using real world advertising bid data. The experiments suggest that our mechanism performs well in practice even in regimes for which our theoretical guarantee is weak or irrelevant.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Analysis and Computation of Adaptive Defense Strategies Against Advanced Persistent Threats for Cyber-Physical Systems
Nächstes Kapitel A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Adversarial Boyd-Kuramoto Model
Fußnoten
1
The use of mediators is necessary because it should not be possible to link an information portfolio offered for sell on the market to any particular user, which prevents users from interacting directly with the market.
 
2
Blum et al. [4] has multiple different objectives (maximizing profit, liquidity and welfare). We refer to the objective which is most relevant to our work.
 
3
Informally, an agent is truthful if he/she reports the information as it is known to him/her. A formal definition of what it means for a user, mediator or advertiser to be truthful is given in Sect. 2.
 
4
Here and throughout the paper, a reference to domination of strategies should always be understood as a reference to weak domination.
 
5
A mechanism is budget balanced if the amount it charges (from the advertisers) is at least as large as the amount it pays.
 
6
The mediators’ utility functions are independent of the amount of money transferred from the mediators to the users. This choice was made with the aim of balancing two of the mediators’ conflicting objectives: on the one hand, mediators want to make as much money as possible, and on the other hand, they want to acquire users and have them use their services rather than switch to another mediator who is known for paying more money to his users.
 
7
In some cases the assumption that the mechanism has a prior knowledge about the number of entities might be considered unnatural. The mechanism we present can be modified using standard techniques to work with an alternative assumption stating that each entity arrives at a uniformly random time from some range (for example, [0, 1]). See [11] for more details.
 
8
Our experiments are based on only a fraction of the entire data set, which significantly increased the market strength of the entities in the input. To compensate for this increase, and keep the market strength of each advertiser in the simulation similar to the market strength of the corresponding real world advertiser, we introduced a division by 100 into the capacity formula.
 
9
Note that the experiments did not simulate the information trading part of the model since they were intended to study the mechanism’s competitive ratio. However, information exchange can occur in our model in practice. Intuitively, one can think of the users in a single execution of the mechanism as the users who agreed to sell information that, if revealed, implies that they have one particular type t. Then, if an advertiser’s ad is shown to a user, the advertiser may learn that the user is of type t and the user is monetarily compensated for that.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Multi-sided Advertising Markets: Dynamic Mechanisms and Incremental User Compensations
verfasst von
Moran Feldman
Gonen Frim
Rica Gonen
Copyright-Jahr
2018
Buch
Decision and Game Theory for Security

Print ISBN: 978-3-030-01553-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-01554-1

Copyright-Jahr: 2018

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01554-1_13

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