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Erschienen in:
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2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Formal Treatment of Privacy-Enhancing Credential Systems

verfasst von : Jan Camenisch, Stephan Krenn, Anja Lehmann, Gert Læssøe Mikkelsen, Gregory Neven, Michael Østergaard Pedersen

Erschienen in: Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2015

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Privacy-enhancing attribute-based credentials (PABCs) are the core ingredients to privacy-friendly authentication systems. They allow users to obtain credentials on attributes and prove possession of these credentials in an unlinkable fashion while revealing only a subset of the attributes. In practice, PABCs typically need additional features like revocation, pseudonyms as privacy-friendly user public keys, or advanced issuance where attributes can be “blindly” carried over into new credentials. For many such features, provably secure solutions exist in isolation, but it is unclear how to securely combined them into a full-fledged PABC system, or even which properties such a system should fulfill.
We provide a formal treatment of PABCs supporting a variety of features by defining their syntax and security properties, resulting in the most comprehensive definitional framework for PABCs so far. Unlike previous efforts, our definitions are not targeted at one specific use-case; rather, we try to capture generic properties that can be useful in a variety of scenarios. We believe that our definitions can also be used as a starting point for diverse application-dependent extensions and variations of PABCs. We present and prove secure a generic and modular construction of a PABC system from simpler building blocks, allowing for a “plug-and-play” composition based on different instantiations of the building blocks. Finally, we give secure instantiations for each of the building blocks.

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Metadaten
Titel
Formal Treatment of Privacy-Enhancing Credential Systems
verfasst von
Jan Camenisch
Stephan Krenn
Anja Lehmann
Gert Læssøe Mikkelsen
Gregory Neven
Michael Østergaard Pedersen
Copyright-Jahr
2016
Verlag
Springer International Publishing
Buch
Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2015

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-31300-9

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-31301-6

Copyright-Jahr: 2016

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31301-6_1

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