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2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Thinking Local but Acting Global? The Interplay Between Local and Global Internalization of Externalities

verfasst von : Karen Pittel, Dirk Rübbelke

Erschienen in: The Theory of Externalities and Public Goods

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

The paper analyzes the implications of local and global pollution when two types of abatement activities can be undertaken. One type reduces solely local pollution (e.g., use of particulate matter filters) while the other mitigates global pollution as well (e.g., application of fuel saving technologies). In the framework of a 2-country endogenous growth model, the implications of different assumptions about the degree to which global externalities are internalised are analysed. Subsequently, we derive policy rules adapted to the different scenarios.

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This is of course an approximation which seems, however, justifiable when comparing the degradation rates of, e.g., SO₂ induced pollution to CO₂.

Exponents⁽ⁱ⁾, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 refer to the respective scenarios for comparison purposes.

Please note that this unambiguous result is due to the fact that damages have a direct negative effect on production and not, for example, on utility in our model.

This case represents the majority of empirical estimates of intertemporal substitution elasticities, see e.g. Havránek (2015).

Alternatively, we could also consider all other combinations of internalization scenarios between the two countries, for example, the case in which one country internalizes only domestic externalities from P _G while the other internalizes the global externality perfectly. As, however, the basic implications remain the same, we focus on the above described combination of scenarios.

Alternatively, we could assume that country h does consider international spill-overs (in which case it would maximize the Hamiltonian of Sect. 3.3). Yet—comparable to the results of Scenarios 2 and 3 presented previously—no additional qualitative effects would arise as only the magnitude of the effects would change.

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Titel: Thinking Local but Acting Global? The Interplay Between Local and Global Internalization of Externalities
verfasst von: Karen Pittel
Dirk Rübbelke
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: The Theory of Externalities and Public Goods
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-49441-8

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-49442-5

Copyright-Jahr: 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49442-5_14