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Erschienen in:
2005 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Experimenting with Faults, Lattices and the DSA
verfasst von : David Naccache, Phong Q. Nguyên, Michael Tunstall, Claire Whelan
Erschienen in: Public Key Cryptography - PKC 2005
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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We present an attack on DSA smart-cards which combines physical fault injection and lattice reduction techniques. This seems to be the first (publicly reported) physical experiment allowing to concretely pull-out DSA keys out of smart-cards. We employ a particular type of fault attack known as a
glitch attack
, which will be used to actively modify the DSA nonce
k
used for generating the signature:
k
will be tampered with so that a number of its least significant bytes will flip to zero. Then we apply well-known lattice attacks on El Gamal-type signatures which can recover the private key, given sufficiently many signatures such that a few bits of each corresponding
k
are known. In practice, when one byte of each
k
is zeroed, 27 signatures are sufficient to disclose the private key. The more bytes of
k
we can reset, the fewer signatures will be required. This paper presents the theory, methodology and results of the attack as well as possible countermeasures.