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Erschienen in:
2013 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
ReDABLS: Revisiting Device Attestation with Bounded Leakage of Secrets
verfasst von : Jun Zhao, Virgil Gligor, Adrian Perrig, James Newsome
Erschienen in: Security Protocols XXI
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Many commodity operating systems and applications become infested with malicious software over time, primarily due to exploits that take advantage of software flaws and operator errors. In this paper, we present the salient features of a system design which allows remote-device authentication by a verifier, reaching malware-free memory states, and trusted application booting in the presence of malicious software that is controlled by a network adversary. Our system design revisits the notion of
device attestation with bounded leakage of secrets
(DABLS), and illustrates both the significant challenges of making it work in practice and how to overcome them.