2014 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Orthogonal Direct Sum Masking
A Smartcard Friendly Computation Paradigm in a Code, with Builtin Protection against Side-Channel and Fault Attacks
verfasst von : Julien Bringer, Claude Carlet, Hervé Chabanne, Sylvain Guilley, Houssem Maghrebi
Erschienen in: Information Security Theory and Practice. Securing the Internet of Things
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Secure elements, such as smartcards or trusted platform modules (TPMs), must be protected against implementation-level attacks. Those include side-channel and fault injection attacks. We introduce ODSM, Orthogonal Direct Sum Masking, a new computation paradigm that achieves protection against those two kinds of attacks. A large vector space is structured as two supplementary orthogonal subspaces. One subspace (called a code
$\mathcal{C}$
) is used for the functional computation, while the second subspace carries random numbers. As the random numbers are entangled with the sensitive data, ODSM ensures a protection against (monovariate) side-channel attacks. The random numbers can be checked either occasionally, or globally, thereby ensuring a detection capability. The security level can be formally detailed: it is proved that monovariate side-channel attacks of order up to
$d_\mathcal{C}-1$
, where
$d_\mathcal{C}$
is the minimal distance of
$\mathcal{C}$
, are impossible, and that any fault of Hamming weight strictly less than
$d_\mathcal{C}$
is detected. A complete instantiation of ODSM is given for AES. In this case, all monovariate side-channel attacks of order strictly less than 5 are impossible, and all fault injections perturbing strictly less than 5 bits are detected.