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2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

1. Introduction

verfasst von : Hans Peters

Erschienen in: Game Theory

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

The best introduction to game theory is by way of examples. This chapter starts with a global definition in Sect. 1.1, collects some historical facts in Sect. 1.2, and presents examples in Sect. 1.3. Section 1.4 briefly comments on the distinction between cooperative and noncooperative game theory.

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Fußnoten
1
See Nasar (1998) for a biography, and the later movie with the same title A Beautiful Mind.
 
2
Feyerabend’s (1974) ‘anything goes’ adage reflects a workable attitude in a young science like game theory.
 
3
The numbers in this table are the total payoffs to coalitions and not the net payoffs compared to the coalition members staying alone instead of cooperating. These would be, respectively, 0, 0, 0, 7, 12, 0, and 13.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Introduction
verfasst von
Hans Peters
Copyright-Jahr
2015
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_1

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