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2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

5. Finite Games with Incomplete Information

verfasst von : Hans Peters

Erschienen in: Game Theory

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

In a game of imperfect information players may be uninformed about the moves made by other players. Every one-shot, simultaneous move game is a game of imperfect information. In a game of incomplete information players may be uninformed about certain characteristics of the game or of the players. For instance, a player may have incomplete information about actions available to some other player, or about payoffs of other players. Incomplete information is modelled by assuming that every player can be of a number of different types. A type of a player summarizes all relevant information (in particular, actions and payoffs) about that player. Furthermore, it is assumed that each player knows his own type and, given his own type, has a probability distribution over the types of the other players. Often, these probability distributions are assumed to be consistent in the sense that they are the marginal probability distributions derived from a basic commonly known distribution over all combinations of player types.

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Literatur
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Metadaten
Titel
Finite Games with Incomplete Information
verfasst von
Hans Peters
Copyright-Jahr
2015
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_5

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