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2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Access Control Encryption: Enforcing Information Flow with Cryptography

verfasst von : Ivan Damgård, Helene Haagh, Claudio Orlandi

Erschienen in: Theory of Cryptography

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

We initiate the study of Access Control Encryption (ACE), a novel cryptographic primitive that allows fine-grained access control, by giving different rights to different users not only in terms of which messages they are allowed to receive, but also which messages they are allowed to send.

Classical examples of security policies for information flow are the well known Bell-Lapadula [BL73] or Biba [Bib75] model: in a nutshell, the Bell-Lapadula model assigns roles to every user in the system (e.g., public, secret and top-secret). A users’ role specifies which messages the user is allowed to receive (i.e., the no read-up rule, meaning that users with public clearance should not be able to read messages marked as secret or top-secret) but also which messages the user is allowed to send (i.e., the no write-down rule, meaning that a malicious user with top-secret clearance should not be able to write messages marked as secret or public). To the best of our knowledge, no existing cryptographic primitive allows for even this simple form of access control, since no existing cryptographic primitive enforces any restriction on what kind of messages one should be able to encrypt. Our contributions are:

Introducing and formally defining access control encryption (ACE);
A construction of ACE with complexity linear in the number of the roles based on classic number theoretic assumptions (DDH, Paillier);
A construction of ACE with complexity polylogarithmic in the number of roles based on recent results on cryptographic obfuscation;

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Vorheriges Kapitel Designing Proof of Human-Work Puzzles for Cryptocurrency and Beyond

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Note that the sanitizer has to send the ciphertext to all receivers – both those who are allowed to decrypt and those who are not. A sanitizer who could decide whether a particular receiver is allowed to receive a particular ciphertext would trivially be able to distinguish between different senders with different writing rights.

The number of senders equals the number of receivers only for the sake of exposition.

The security model, formalized in Definitions 2 and 3, is more general than this.

Note that it is possible to reduce the trust on the sanitizer in different ways: in a black-box way, one could imagine several parties emulating the work of the sanitizer using MPC. In a more concrete way, it is possible to have a chain of sanitizers, where the senders send their encryptions to sanitizer 1, the receivers receive ciphertexts from sanitizer n, and sanitizer $i+1$ further sanitizes the output of sanitizer i. We note that all definitions and constructions in this paper can be easily generalized to this scenario but, to keep the presentation as simple as possible, we do not discuss this solution further and stick to the case of a single sanitizer.

We note that this is a relaxation of re-randomizability for FE, in the sense that we do not require sanitized ciphertexts to be indistinguishable from fresh encryptions, but only independent of the randomness used in the original encryption. However, to the best of our knowledge, no re-randomizable FE scheme for all circuits exist.

Similar to a re-randomizable encryption scheme, where we do not require sanitized ciphertexts to look indistinguishable from fresh encryptions.

We use the convention that all other algorithms take pp as input even if not specified. Formally, one can think of the pp as being part of msk and all other keys ek, dk, sk.

To make notation more compact we define two special identities: $i=0$ representing a sender or receiver with no rights such that $P(0,j) = 0 = P(i,0)$ for all $i,j \in [n]$; $i=n+1$ to be the sanitizer identity, which cannot receive from anyone but can send to all i.e., $P(n+1,j)=1 \ \forall j\in [n]$ and $P(i,n+1)=0 \ \forall i\in [n]$

Note that the adversary is allowed to ask for any senders’ key in the post-challenge queries.

Recall that we defined $ek_0=pp$.

There exists some encoding function that takes a message m from the message space of the $\mathsf {ACE}$ scheme and encodes it into a message of each of the $1$-ACE message spaces. The ciphertext spaces of the $\mathsf {ACE}$ scheme are the crossproduct of all the $1$-ACE ciphertext spaces, thus $\mathcal {C}= \mathcal {C}_1^\mathsf {1ACE}\times \cdots \times \mathcal {C}_n^\mathsf {1ACE}$ and $\mathcal {C}' = {\mathcal {C}'_1}^\mathsf {1ACE}\times \cdots \times {\mathcal {C}'_n}^\mathsf {1ACE}$.

Here $c_j^\mathsf {1ACE}\leftarrow _\$ \mathcal {C}_j^\mathsf {1ACE}$ is a shorthand for $c_j^\mathsf {1ACE}\leftarrow \mathsf {1ACE}.\mathsf {Enc}(pp_j^\mathsf {1ACE}, \bot )$.

Formally $\mathsf {MDec}$ is a shortcut for $\mathsf {Dec}(\mathsf {Gen}(msk,f_{id}),\mathsf {San}(pp,c))$, where $f_{id}$ is the identity function.

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Titel: Access Control Encryption: Enforcing Information Flow with Cryptography
verfasst von: Ivan Damgård
Helene Haagh
Claudio Orlandi
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Buch: Theory of Cryptography
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-53643-8

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-662-53644-5

Copyright-Jahr: 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53644-5_21

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