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2017 | Supplement | Buchkapitel

3. Fundamental Structure of Our Model and the Result in the Case with no APR Violations

verfasst von : Hiroyuki Seshimo, Fukuju Yamazaki

Erschienen in: Priority Rule Violations and Perverse Banking Behaviors

Verlag: Springer Singapore

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Abstract

In this chapter, we explain the structure of our basic model and present the benchmark result when the APR is rigorously preserved in the liquidation of the defaulted firm. We consider the model with two periods. In the first period, the firm makes an initial efficient investment and at the end of that period the firm obtains the returns on the investment. Given such a situation, we explore whether the firm makes the inefficient additional investment by fundraising from either outside creditors or the initial creditors. The additional investment yields its returns at the end of the second period. Then, we demonstrate that if the APR is retained, no inefficiency arises in the financial contract, that is, such inefficient additional investment cannot be fundraised, but efficient initial investment can be financed by the investors. The former implies that loan evergreening never occurs, while the latter implies that a credit crunch never arises when the APR is retained. Importantly, the outside creditor cannot finance the additional investment under the APR in this setting. Thus, the initial creditor does not have any incentive to finance inefficient additional borrowing. Hence, there is no inefficiency in the lending behavior of the initial lender.

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Fußnoten
1
See Peek and Rosengren (2003) regarding the “evergreening” hypothesis for the inefficient Japanese banking behavior in the 1990s. Following the authors, we use the term “loan evergreening” to represent inefficient additional lending by Japanese banks.
 
2
In Chap. 6, we extend this model to a case with efficient and inefficient additional investment opportunities.
 
3
This assumption is only to simplify the explanation. Our previous version allowed more general yield sharing among firms and creditors.
 
4
Further, according to banking regulations in Japan, banks cannot hold over 5% of companies’ stock. Such regulation limits the use of the stock by banks.
 
5
See Peek and Rosengren (2003) regarding the “evergreening” hypothesis for inefficient Japanese banking behavior in the 1990s. Following the authors, we use the term “loan evergreening” to represent inefficient additional lending by Japanese banks.
 
6
This may be justified by Bertrand competition between existing creditors and new outside creditors.
 
7
In this book, we do not consider outcomes at time 1 from the additional investment. Even when the additional outcome is strictly positive at time 1, as long as the expected value of the outcome is less than ΔI, our basic argument is unaffected, and there is no loss of generality.
 
8
The discount rate is normalized at 0.
 
Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Gale, D., & Hellwig, M. (1985). Incentive-compatible debt contracts: The one-period problem. The Review of Economic Studies, 52(4), 647–663. doi:10.2307/2297737.CrossRef Gale, D., & Hellwig, M. (1985). Incentive-compatible debt contracts: The one-period problem. The Review of Economic Studies, 52(4), 647–663. doi:10.​2307/​2297737.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Longhofer, S. D. (1997). Absolute priority rule violations, credit rationing, and efficiency. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 6(3), 249–267.CrossRef Longhofer, S. D. (1997). Absolute priority rule violations, credit rationing, and efficiency. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 6(3), 249–267.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
Fundamental Structure of Our Model and the Result in the Case with no APR Violations
verfasst von
Hiroyuki Seshimo
Fukuju Yamazaki
Copyright-Jahr
2017
Verlag
Springer Singapore
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5852-3_3