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Erschienen in: Public Choice 3-4/2016

31.08.2016

Seeing the forest through the trees: a meta-analysis of political budget cycles

verfasst von: Andrew Q. Philips

Erschienen in: Public Choice | Ausgabe 3-4/2016

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Abstract

Despite a vast number of articles, the political budget cycle literature contains many conflicting theories and empirical results. I conduct the first ever meta-analysis of this literature in order to establish whether a link between elections and government budgets exists. Using data on 1198 estimates across 88 studies published between 2000 and 2015, I find evidence of a statistically significant—yet substantively small—increase in government expenditures and public debt around elections, and reductions in revenues and fiscal balance. Using meta-regression analysis combined with Bayesian model averaging, I find support for some of the context-conditional theories in the literature. Although the findings of political budget cycles are robust to publication bias as well as some of the methodological- and study-specific choices authors are forced to make, they also shed light on how certain decisions may affect a study’s findings. This has implications for current and future research on political budget cycles.

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Fußnoten
1
Further details are in the Supplemental Materials.
 
2
As have others (Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu 2008), I did not include unpublished results. I address potential publication bias in the Supplemental Materials.
 
3
Standard errors and p values were converted into t statistics if they were reported.
 
4
These results are available in the Supplemental Materials.
 
5
I recoded studies that examined deficit spending as their dependent variable, so that a positive partial correlation indicates an increase in fiscal surplus for all models.
 
6
In fact, fixed effects often overstate our confidence in the coverage probability of the true effect (Sánchez-Meca and Marín-Martínez 2008; Borenstein et al. 2011). This is formally tested through the Q test; I was able to reject the null hypothesis of no heterogeneity.
 
7
A detailed breakdown of these categories is in the Supplemental Materials.
 
8
Debt has only 22 model-study observations and is excluded.
 
9
There are two important priors to specify. The first is how many variables should be included in the “true” model. Since I have no prior expectation as to how many variables should be included, I chose a diffuse beta-binomial model prior (Ley and Steel 2009). The second set of priors concern the coefficients. I chose uninformed coefficient priors (Fernandez et al. 2001), although the findings remain robust to alternative priors, as detailed in the Supplemental Materials.
 
10
These are a regression of journal quality on precision, the precision-effect/funnel asymmetry (PET-FAT) test, and the precision effect estimate with standard error (PEESE).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Seeing the forest through the trees: a meta-analysis of political budget cycles
verfasst von
Andrew Q. Philips
Publikationsdatum
31.08.2016
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Public Choice / Ausgabe 3-4/2016
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0364-1

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