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Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations 3/2013

01.09.2013

The impact of preferential trade agreements on governmental repression revisited

verfasst von: Gabriele Spilker, Tobias Böhmelt

Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations | Ausgabe 3/2013

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Abstract

Previous research suggests that most treaties are ineffective in ensuring countries’ compliance with human rights standards. It has been argued, however, that preferential trade agreements (PTAs) including ‘hard’ human rights standards can withhold economic benefits and, thus, can have a real potential to substantially reduce human rights violations. The following article questions this as existent work on the effects of PTAs on human rights standards neglects a selection process underlying the implementation of these treaties. Countries being aware of the ‘shadow of the future’ already take into account what may happen at the succeeding enforcement stage when establishing a particular PTA. This implies that states agree on ‘hard’ human rights standards in PTAs only if they have a general propensity to abide by human rights in the first place. For testing the empirical implications of their argument, the authors collected new data on PTAs in 1976/77-2009, and employ genetic matching techniques. The results support the theoretical argument that PTAs are unlikely to affect human rights compliance when controlling for the outlined selection problem.

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Fußnoten
1
The term ‘hard human rights standard’ (hard law) implies that non-compliance can be sanctioned by withholding trade benefits. ‘Soft human rights standards’ (soft law), on the other hand, refer to the simple mentioning of human rights practices in a treaty, while an enforcement mechanism is not given.
 
2
Although our study empirically focuses on the compliance with human rights standards, the theoretical argument can be applied to other policy issue areas such as environmental degradation, labor standards, or the impact of any international institution in general. For example, Bechtel and Tosun (2009) examine the impact of PTAs in the field of environmental protection. Due to the availability of data, however, we exclusively focus on PTAs and human rights compliance in this study.
 
3
However, Simmons and Hopkins (2005) criticize von Stein’s (2005) methodological approach. They show that even if one accounts for the screening effects of Article VIII of the IMF treaty, there is still significant constraining power to the treaty. We will come back to this methodological disagreement in our research design section below.
 
4
Note that this also supports Downs et al.’s (1996) notion that the high levels of compliance we usually observe in international governance do not necessarily mean that a deep level of cooperation has been reached.
 
5
While previous research has already demonstrated that it is crucial to control for the factors that lead countries to join an institution when analyzing the institution’s effectiveness (Hill 2010; Landman 2005; von Stein 2005) our approach differs from previous research in at least one important way. The aim of these previous studies was to show that countries’ decision to join an existing institution and compliance with this institution’s regulations are related. Our research takes this argument one step further and shows that countries design institutions, in our case PTAs, in a way that takes future compliance already into account.
 
6
Hafner-Burton (2005a) seems to be aware of this potential selection effect. She argues that this should not affect her results since countries with both good and bad human rights records tend to ratify PTAs with hard law human rights standards. However, in another paper she shows that factors, such as a democratic political system, significantly affect the likelihood of countries to enter into PTAs with hard human rights standards (Hafner-Burton 2005b). Since democracies tend to have a higher respect for human rights, this clearly supports our conjecture that those factors that lead countries to include hard human rights standards are also the factors that are responsible for their compliance with these standards.
 
7
An objection to our argument could be that some states are eager to include hard human rights standards in order to coerce their partner countries to respect human rights. However, this seems implausible, since including tough human rights standards in a PTA, while knowing that the counterpart is unlikely to abide by these standards, poses a severe challenge to a state. It can either choose not to enforce the standard, thereby suffering from reputational costs or it can decide to enforce the standard, which is likely to result in losing out on the gains of trade. Similar to the argument above then, actors should simply avoid this enforcement dilemma by including hard human rights standards only in those cases in which their counterparts are likely to abide by these standards anyway.
 
8
1977 constitutes the ‘effective’ starting year for the time period under study, since all our explanatory variables are lagged by one year.
 
9
This includes treaties, protocols, and other forms of amendments.
 
10
This approach does not take into account that countries can ratify a human rights treaty while exempting itself from certain obligations by using reservations (Landman 2005; Neumayer 2007). However, in order for our results to be closely comparable to the study of Hafner-Burton (2005a) we decided to use a simple ratification measure and not a weighted ratification measure that takes reservations into account.
 
11
Missing values pertaining to microstates were replaced with data from Gleditsch (2008). More specifically, the original Polity IV data omit values of microstates. Gleditsch (2008), however, collected these data.
 
12
Although political stability should address temporal dependencies due to its operationalization as a yearly count item, some of these dependencies might persist. We therefore also estimate a model with a torture-years variable (i.e., time in years elapsed since a country scored the value 3 or higher on political repression) and different sets of cubic splines (Beck et al. 1998).
 
13
In order to address this mechanism, Hafner-Burton (2005a: 617) also considers a variable on countries’ inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment. We decided to drop this ‘FDI investment’ variable due to three reasons. First, it theoretically addresses the same concerns as trade, which we do include. Second, Hafner-Burton’s (2005a) variable is statistically insignificant throughout any of her model estimations, rendering it unlikely that this item will crucially affect our results. Finally, the World Bank Development Indicators as the source for the investment variable suffer from missing values.
 
14
Despite several attempts, unfortunately, we were unable to obtain Hafner-Burton’s (2005a) original data.
 
15
One could argue that there is another selection process that already occurs at the stage when countries decide to enter into a PTA and, hence, that we should model first which countries form a PTA (Hafner-Burton 2005b). Although we do see that there might be a selection process that drives which countries form a PTA, we refrain from modeling this process here, since it is unlikely that it affects countries’ decisions on whether to include hard human rights standards or not therein. Put differently, states should enter into PTAs because of reasons pertaining to their trading relationship – and not because of reasons pertaining to their compliance with human rights. Therefore, ignoring this first selection process in our analysis should not bias our results.
 
16
With regard to the included control items in Models 4–7, note that a common interpretation is generally not possible, since the matching technique seeks to address and control for the imbalances of those variables between the treatment and control group in the first place. Hence, we only include those items in our models in order to control for any remaining imbalances.
 
17
The online appendix and the replication material for the empirical analysis in this article can be found at the journal’s website: http://www.springer.com/social+sciences/journal/11558 .
 
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Metadaten
Titel
The impact of preferential trade agreements on governmental repression revisited
verfasst von
Gabriele Spilker
Tobias Böhmelt
Publikationsdatum
01.09.2013
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
The Review of International Organizations / Ausgabe 3/2013
Print ISSN: 1559-7431
Elektronische ISSN: 1559-744X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-012-9155-8

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