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The Review of International Organizations

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01.06.2013 | Introduction

Informal governance in international organizations: Introduction to the special issue

verfasst von: Randall W. Stone

Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations | Ausgabe 2/2013

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International organizations have proliferated in recent decades. Virtually every issue of broad international concern is the subject of an international agreement that is administered by an international organization. Broad powers are delegated to some of these international agents, many of which exercise significant discretion and authority. International courts with broad jurisdiction and hundreds of more specialized judicial organs have been established to interpret a rapidly expanding body of international law. The organizational capacity of international governance has increased, while the capacity of domestic governance has declined in a range of failed states and contested territories. Meanwhile, the depth of policy coordination demanded by international agreements has led to an unprecedented level of international policy activism by some of the leading international organizations, including the IMF, the WTO, and the EU. Given the importance of what international organizations do, it is increasingly important to understand how international organizations actually work. …

Nächster Artikel What’s left out and why? Informal provisions in formal international law

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The discussion in this section is based on Stone (2011). The book lays out the argument in considerably more detail, formalizes it in a game-theoretic model, and presents case studies and statistical tests of hypotheses.

IMF governance has been reformed to some degree in recent years and has made great strides in making lending conditions more transparent to the wider public, but this has not affected the weakness of the Executive Board or the non-transparency of decision making vis-à-vis the membership.

WTO dispute resolution is not legally binding, but follows a transparent, legal procedure based on case law and precedent.

In this sense, the G-8 never really supplanted the G-7, because Russia was not included in the most delicate financial deliberations. Indeed, even after the rise of the G-20, important IMF lending decisions have still been preceded by conference calls involving the G-7 deputy finance ministers, so some essential informal functions have not changed.

The argument is consistent with modeling IO influence as a cheap-talk signaling game, as in Fang and Stone (2012).

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Titel: Informal governance in international organizations: Introduction to the special issue
verfasst von: Randall W. Stone
Publikationsdatum: 01.06.2013
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations / Ausgabe 2/2013
Print ISSN: 1559-7431
Elektronische ISSN: 1559-744X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-013-9168-y

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Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 2/2013

“The silent revolution:” How the staff exercise informal governance over IMF lending

Non-compliance by design: Moribund hard law in international institutions

Membership no longer has its privileges: The declining informal influence of Board members on IDA lending

Knowing your limits: Informal governance and judgment in the EU

Informal governance and participation in non-democratic international organizations

What’s left out and why? Informal provisions in formal international law

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