Developments in the Debate on Nanoethics: Traditional Approaches and the Need for New Kinds of Analysis

Mnyusiwalla and co-authors [100] analysed literature published between 1985 and September 2002, using survey databases and searching for articles containing ‘nanotechnology’ as a keyword. The articles were then screened for the keywords ‘ethics’ and ‘social implications’.

Discussion on the challenges posed by nano began in the USA with the publication of a National Science and Technology Council report on ‘Shaping the world atom by atom’ [106], which both anticipated utopian dreams of a better world and gave rise to fears and nightmares of a destructive future. The launch of a programme on ‘converging technologies for improving human performances’ was also particularly important [135]; this was followed by a response by the European Union [78].

A number of conferences and meetings were particularly important in this initial debate: a Nanoethics conference in March 2005 at the University of South Carolina, USA (see also [25]); a workshop on Converging Technologies organised by the European Commission ([78]; cf. also [26]); and a clustering ‘workshop on the ethics of nanotechnology’, held in Brussels in November 2006 with the aim of coordinating current European projects on the ELSA of nanotechnology. Further interesting groups are the ‘NanoCenter’ at the USC Columbia (since 2001) in the USA; the ‘Working Group for the Study of Philosophy and Ethics of Complexity and Scale (SPECS)’ at the University of South Carolina; the Nanooffice at the University of Darmstadt; the Nanoethics Network based at the Danish University of Aarhus; and the recently founded S.NET (Society for the Study of Nanoscience and Emerging Technologies).

For a precise explanation of the different notions of nanotechnology see [141, 108].

As a consequence of this generality, Schummer [144] considers the self-proclaimed common ground of the length scale as being too weak to enable different disciplines (such as chemistry, engineering, and material sciences) to integrate so as to achieve interdisciplinarity.

Keiper [91] describes, for example, the discipline of nanoethics as being modelled on the development of bioethics.

Susanne et al. [157] are, however, critical of current bioethical debate, and describe two typical pitfalls it falls into: a technical prejudice which argues for the solution of almost every question through new techniques; and a philosophical prejudice which tends to solve everything through speculative, a priori arguments.

Allhoff [1] points out that if we consider, for example, issues of distributive justice, we have first of all to figure out which account of distribution we want to follow, then establish whether that account would be violated by a particular application: in doing this there is nothing new with respect to other debates on technologies.

For Cameron [22], contemporary ‘bioethics’ is experiencing a crisis because it is withdrawing from substantive questions to focus on procedural concerns which concentrate strongly on individual autonomy and ‘informed consent’. In this way it leads to efforts to privatise ethical decision making and assume an atomistic view of society. Cameron sees in the twinning of bioethics and biopolicy the possibility of a “nanoethics that builds a vision for the common good—on the basis of shared convictions about ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’, and with a flipside in approaches to biopolicy that are not shy to encourage appropriate regulation” ([22], p. 294).

The principle ‘Verum et factum reciprocantur seu convertuntur’ or ‘verum esse ipsum factum’ (‘the true and the made are...interchangeable,’ or ‘the true is what is made’) was formulated for the first time in 1710 as part of Vico’s work De Italorum Sapientia, and then reformulated and applied in Scienza nuova seconda in 1730, where it is connected with the doctrine that the civil world (history) is made by man. This principle states that human beings can only truly know the things that they have made. Rejecting Descartes’ knowledge principles, which are constructed upon the idea that natural science and mathematics need a ‘metaphysical explanation’, Vico argues that these disciplines demand an analysis of the causes (the activity) through which things are made.

See also Bond’s speech, entitled ‘Responsible nanotechnology development’, at the SWISSRE Workshop [159] and quoted in [158].

In this respect, ethical and social issues associated with emerging nanotechnologies are characterised by the following distinctive features: they are determinate, distinct, immediate (because now is not too soon to consider them), significant and actionable—meaning that now is the moment for certain actors to take steps to address some of the issues ([138], p. 8).

This distinction is a working hypothesis similarly used by the European DEEPEN (Deepening Ethical Engagement in Emerging Nanotechnologies) Project, a EU Sixth Framework Programme funded project and Europe’s leading partnership for integrated understanding of the ethical challenges posed by nanotechnologies (see http://​www.​geography.​dur.​ac.​uk/​projects/​deepen). I would like to acknowledge productive discussions around this topic with the other DEEPEN partners.

On the one hand, general visions of what nanotechnology is and what it can provide (i.e. nanotechnology in the singular) inform discourse on each specific application and influence the framework for concrete questions in a specific area. On the other hand, the particular questions that emerge in contexts of application (nanotechnologies in the plural) also go back and re-shape global visions of these technologies.

Exceptions include an anthology edited by Walker and Ivanhoe [164] and recent efforts to develop virtue ethics arguments in the context of environmental discussion (see for example [139]).

See, among others, [165, 104, 173].

The work of Poortinga and Pidgeon [122], which refers to technologies in general, is interesting with regard to this. A number of other publications refer to the field of biotechnology [123, 85].

The first international endorsement of the Precautionary Principle is contained in the World Charter for Nature 1982, which was successively ratified in the famous Rio Declaration, in which, in article 15, the Precautionary Principle is defined in the following terms: “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation” (http://​www.​unep.​org/​Documents.​Multilingual/​Default.​asp?​DocumentID=​78&​ArticleID=​1163). In 2000 the European Commission developed a communication on the precautionary principle (http://​ec.​europa.​eu/​environment/​docum/​20001_​en.​htm), in which two aspects were distinguished: on the one hand the political decision to act or not to act, which is linked to the factors which trigger recourse to the precautionary principle; on the other the affirmative aspect—i.e. the measures which result from application of the precautionary principle. There is a very broad literature of this topic; for an overview, see [75].

The principle offers a basis for a different kind of decision-making process to that traditionally proposed by risk assessment: whereas the latter is based upon the idea of balancing harm and benefit, in a precautionary decision-making structure evidence regarding alternatives and of the magnitude of possible harm from an activity are also considered (cf. [160]). In this sense, the principle can be defined as proposing a ‘state of mind’ that may help decision-makers avoid false negatives [119] and as a “salutary spur to greater humility” which draws attention to a broader range of non-reductive methods and which reveals the normative and contestable basis for decisions ([154], p. 312).

Hull [80] distinguishes three kinds of critique of the precautionary principle: the claim that the principle is not scientific; that it ignores the risks of regulation; and that people make irrational decisions.

Sunstein [156] argues, for example, that the principle is incoherent “not because it leads in bad directions, but because read for all its worth, it leads in no direction at all. The principle threatens to be paralyzing, forbidding regulation, inaction, and every step between. It provides help only if we blind ourselves to many aspects of risk-related situations and focus on a narrow subset of what is at stake” ([156], pp. 14–15).

Perhaps an idea from the virtue ethics approach would be helpful in framing this differently: in virtue ethics the rightness of the action is determined by the character traits of the person performing it, or by their intentions.

On 14th and 15th July 2005 a meeting exploring ‘responsible’ research and development, organised by the European Commission and held in Brussels, took place in order to discuss and further develop the 2004 dialogue launched by the European Commission Communication “Towards a European strategy for nanotechnology” and the June 2004 international meeting held in Alexandria (USA) and organised by the National Science Foundation (see ftp://​ftp.​cordis.​lu/​pub/​nanotechnology/​docs/​intldialogue_​background.​pdf). In the 2004 NSF meeting it was stated that an ongoing dialogue should enable and maximise beneficial contributions of nanotechnologies to society as well as addressing the concerns of the public in reducing risks. However, this appeal to ‘responsible development’ is ambiguous in its description of risk as the only public concern and in its avowed effort towards the maximisation of benefit.

In 2004 the European Union called for a dialogue with the public on scientific issues (European Commission [50], and under the 6th Framework Programme extensive projects were funded to explore ways of involving citizens in dialogue and participation (see Science and Society program, http://​ec.​europa.​eu/​research/​science-society/​index.​cfm?​fuseaction=​public.​topic&​id=​356). In the UK, partly as a result of recommendations by the Royal Society [137], large numbers of ‘upstream public engagement’ activities (involving constructive and proactive debate on the future of nanotechnologies) have taken place (including Nanojury UK, Nanodialogues, and initiatives organized by the Nano Engagement Group; cf. [63]).

On the Code of Conduct see: http://​ec.​europa.​eu/​nanotechnology/​index_​en.​html (cf. [103]). In the US there is a similar voluntary measure, the US Nanoscale Materials Stewardship Program (NMSP): http://​www.​epa.​gov/​oppt/​nano/​stewardship.​htm.

The consultation process was open from July 2007 to September 2007 and was based on 10 sets of questions (the consultation Paper can be found here: http://​209.​85.​129.​132/​search?​q=​cache:​3at3mqRFs2kJ:​ec.​europa.​eu/​research/​consultations/​pdf/​nano-consultation_​en.​pdf+responsible+​development+nano​technology+gover​nance&​hl=​de&​ct=​clnk&​cd=​1&​gl=​de&​client=​firefox-a). From that a draft was formulated, which was again opened to public consultation from September to November 2007 (see http://​www.​responsiblenanoc​ode.​org/​documents/​ResponsibleNanoC​odeConsultationD​raft17September0​7.​doc).

One of the major difficulties, in the case of nanotechnologies, is a lack of appropriate regulation at governmental level, so that ‘voluntary measures’ such as Codes of Conduct involving private companies have become more and more important. These include the UK Responsible NanoCode, promoted by the Royal Society, Insight Investment and the Nanotechnology Industries Association (cf. also [136]); the Code of Conduct developed by BASF; the Nanocare Initiative promoted by a number of chemical companies; the Code of Conduct developed by the Swiss retailer’s association IG DHS; and the ‘Nano Risk Framework to Aid in Responsible Development of Nanotechnology’ developed by Dupont and the NGO Environmental Defense (EDF; [35] and cf. for paragraph 4.2). For an overview of this governance landscape see [89].

The term ‘stakeholder’ (which literally means a person or organisation that has a legitimate interest in a project or entity, in our case a technology) comes from business ethics and the debate on corporate social responsibility. Interestingly, the exercises which identify different stakeholders in a particular situation—in our case the development of a technology—imply that a person has particular interests which are different from those of others, depending on his or her specific role in society: it seems that a consumer has different interests from an entrepreneur or scientist. However, this fragmentation of societal roles can be considered fundamentally problematic, in that an individual in a society always takes a number of different roles and positions (an entrepreneur, for example, is also a consumer and a citizen).

This report sketches a particular regime of the economics of technoscientific promises (ETP), characterised by taking public opinion into account, whereas the development of dialogue on benefits and concerns ends up taking the form of polarised interactions between those for or against these technoscientific promises [52].

It is not possible, in this article, to further investigate the implications of this new regime of responsible development. For further analysis of this topic see [103, 132,133].

However, already in its first call for a moratorium the ETC Group highlighted the tension between, on the one hand, a lack of research on the toxicity of nanoproducts, and, on the other, the rapid commercialisation of these products: “No one expects the scientific community to have all the answers at this early stage; every consumer would expect, however, that scientists and regulators get it right before nanoproducts are sold or released in the environment and before they potentially endanger the health of workers in labs” (ETC Group [46], p. 6).

These principles are abbreviated in the acronym CHISEL: criticality, holism, interaction, self-organisation, emergence and long-termism [82].

Dupuy [37] proposes abandoning the traditional metaphysics of time typical of modern science, which has its highest rational expression in Leibniz’s philosophy and which underpins the theory of rational choice ([37], p.162 ff). In contrast, he highlights the importance of Bergsonian metaphysics of time.

They argue that if, on the one hand it is not credible to be too optimistic, on the other we will end by undergoing the catastrophe if we close ourselves off in cognitive paralysis. In this sense the methodology of ongoing normative assessment can be seen as a conjunction of inverse prescription [42].

The notion of a metaphysical research programme goes back to the theories of Karl Popper, who highlighted that every scientific theory relies on a set of values and worldviews which are built on general presuppositions about the structure of the world. In his work, ‘metaphysical’ assumptions are ones which are non-falsifiable, i.e. those which cannot undergo empirical testing. In the ‘Metaphysical Epilogue’ to his work Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics (originally 1982), Popper pointed out that, in almost every phase of the development of science, metaphysical ideas not only determine which problems of explanation we choose to attack, but also the kinds of answers we consider satisfactory additions to our knowledge ([124], p. 161). Popper followed the lead of Emile Meyerson’s De l’explication dans les sciences, originally published in 1927 (see [98]). The fact that he chooses the word ‘programme’ serves to stress the fact that these metaphysical ideas tend to cluster together and support each other in various ways. He then uses this notion to identify and criticise ideas within rival theories such as determinism, justificationism, subjectivism and essentialism. In Popper’s opinion, these rival metaphysical research programs are basic categories of thought that operate as invisible boundaries, dictating the types of problems that scientists choose to work on, the way that they are formulated, and the kinds of solutions that are accepted.

The expression ‘ethics without ontology’ is taken from a series of lectures by Hilary Putnam [127]. Putnam argues that ‘ontology’ is not meant as a synonym of ‘metaphysics’ but rather is a part of it: that concerning the ‘science of Being’. Putnam then distinguishes the so-called ‘inflationary ontologists’, such as Plato or Moore, and ‘deflationary ontologists’, who are further distinguished as reductionists and eliminationists. Putnam, who here refers clearly to the nature of discursive entities, rejects every kind of Ontology (with a capital ‘O’, as he writes) and defends “what one might call pragmatic pluralism, the recognition that it is no accident that in everyday language we employ many different kinds of discourses, discourses subject to different standards and possessing different sorts of applications, with different logical and grammatical features—different ‘language games’ in Wittgenstein’s sense—no accident because it is an illusion that there could be just one sort of language game which could be sufficient for the description of all of reality!” ([127], p. 20).

Dupuy [40] sees many of the same tensions, contradictions, paradoxes, and confusions as he found in cybernetics and within cognitive science in the philosophical foundation of converging technologies—in particular within the NBIC’s conception of these, although he sees, in this new project, more far-reaching and dangerous consequences because it is an entire programme founded upon acting upon nature and mankind.

[145] points out, for example, that the trend of patenting DNA sequence databases similarly has doubtful benefits.

For this reason, in analysis of possible impacts of these technologies on a global scale the race for control of patents and the question of consumption of material resources (since the economies of developing countries largely depend on mining and exporting these materials to industrialised countries) are of fundamental importance (cf. [145, 146]). The latest changes in intellectual property rights are in the field of materials—since 2000, all existing and aspiring member countries of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have to sign the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPs). Such legislation seems to have particularly negative side effects on developing countries, because the impact of property rights now depends on the imitation/innovation capacity of developing countries. Whereas the know-how gap between rich and poor countries was certainly large enough previously, and developing countries could neither imitate the products of developed countries nor compete with their innovations, before the development of nanotechnological materials TRIPs was not especially influential on the economy of these countries. Now, its impact on welfare is expected to produce clearly negative effects, especially for the least developed countries with little innovation but some imitation potential [145]. Furthermore, for Schummer [145, 146] many nanotechnologies promote the substitution of material resources for more expensive and ‘technological’ ones and are clearly following a long-term trend—begun in the late 19th century—which has been proven to have drastic effects on national economies.

In particular this idea is highly visible in those papers which try to manage the tension between unexpected developments in science and technology and the necessity of preventing and minimising side-effects (see for example [65]). The problem with such thinking is that it refuses to analyse the development of new technologies in a historical manner, for example by comparing them with earlier, similar technologies or with technologies developed in a similar socio-economic context.

See [49, 69]; [61, 102] and IUF [84].

As already mentioned, in 2007 the ETC Group changed its strategy on its call for a moratorium on nano-products.

For an analysis of the Framework proposed by Dupont and Environmental Defense see [89].

It therefore requires “democratic involvement for the entire range of processes by which nanotechnologies are developed and used and is necessary at each stage of development on a continuing basis to ensure that public concerns, values and preferences inform and guide nanotechnology oversight” (NanoAction p. 9).

For Nordmann and Rip [115], the implications for this relationship are more concrete and urgent than questions about personalised medicine, an idea which, due to the difficulties of establishing causal links between genetic data and disposition to disease, still seems too speculative.

In the USA, for example, positive promises and great visions for nanotechnology have been a matter for political support, first under Clinton [107] and then under Bush (who signed the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act in December 2003), and have been seen as constituting powerful economic motors. The US debate on nanotechnology is characterised by an alliance between ‘visionary engineers’, science-fiction authors, business people and transhumanists. It takes technology to be a “given mysterious and autonomous force with one way impact on the society” [143], and sees cultural and social scientists as marginal actors in the debate.

See for example the initiatives of the European Commission in [81]; in the USA the US Nanotechnology Initiative (http://​www.​nano.​gov/​). See also, amongst others, the project Observatory Nano which has prepared an ELSA literature on nanotechnology (http://​www.​observatorynano.​eu/​project/​filesystem/​files/​Literature.​doc) and the Nanoethics Bank (http://​ethics.​iit.​edu/​NanoEthicsBank/​popular_​search.​php?​cmd=​search&​words=​ethics&​mode=​normal).

To summarise: for some authors, these issues are extraordinarily new because they involve new technological possibilities, but do not need a new framework of reflection [11, 70, 71, 73, 74, 159]. For others, these issues are new and therefore need new ethical insights because of the extraordinary transformative technological power of both nature and the human being [14]. For others again, these issues are old because they touch traditional ethical questions raised by technological development and so can be fruitfully analysed using established frameworks such as approaches in bioethics [43]. Finally, for some these issues are old problems which need new kinds of reflection, because traditional ethical frameworks do not appear to satisfyingly capture the issues at stake (see [172, 40]).