2009 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Credible Linear-Incentive Equilibrium Strategies in Linear-Quadratic Differential Games
verfasst von : Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Georges Zaccour
Erschienen in: Advances in Dynamic Games and Their Applications
Verlag: Birkhäuser Boston
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In this paper we characterize the credibility of linear-incentive equilibrium strategies for the class of linear-quadratic differential games. This class is widely used in applications of differential games in economics and management science. We derive a general condition for credibility and illustrate its use on two examples: one is a general homogenous linear-quadratic game and the second is an environmental-economics game.