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2016 | Buch

Saudi Arabia and Iran

Friends or Foes?

verfasst von: Banafsheh Keynoush

Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan US

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The mesmerizing story of two countries caught in history whose rivalry can destroy the world or restore its peace, this is the first book to untangle the complex relationship of Saudi Arabia and Iran by rejecting heated rhetoric and looking at the real roots of the issue to promise pathways to peace.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Introduction

Introduction
Abstract
In November 2001, I shared a ride in an elevator in the United Nations building with Iran’s former reformist president, Mohammad Khatami. I was his interpreter in New York, had received a master’s degree in international affairs, and was preparing for my PhD oral exams. Iran’s president inquired what my research interest was. I replied vaguely that I wanted to write about Iran’s foreign policy in the Persian Gulf. Years earlier, during the course of the Iran-Iraq war, I had made the decision to write about this topic someday. Yet even back then, Iraq did not fascinate me as much as Saudi Arabia, which seemed a world apart. I knew very little about the Kingdom and it felt strange that the rare first-hand accounts of it that I received from Iranian pilgrims or politicians focused on one narrow experience or interaction. In fact, in all the years that I lived in Iran, not once did I hear a traveler speak about Saudi Arabia’s people, culture, or natural environment, or present a holistic opinion of Saudi society and politics.
Banafsheh Keynoush

A Historical Overview of Saudi-Iranian Relations

Frontmatter
Chapter 1. Overview of Saudi-Iranian Relations
Abstract
Before World War II, Saudi Arabia and Iran had limited exchanges, except over the regulation of the annual pilgrimage to the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah in the Hijaz region of western Arabia. The pilgrimage encouraged small-scale trade of Persian goods, mainly carpets, and the settlement of a small Persian community in Jeddah. Meanwhile, boundary disputes, which included several joint oilfields, remained dormant when the challenge of internal state security was a more urgent concern.1
Banafsheh Keynoush
Chapter 2. How Religion Shaped the Saudi-Iranian Relations
Abstract
Iran is a center of Shi’i theology; since overthrowing the Pahlavi monarchy, it has also aimed to export its Islamic revolution to other countries in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has custodianship of Islam’s two holiest cities, Makkah and Madinah, and thus unrivaled power and prestige in the Islamic world along with an equal determination to preserve it; Iran challenges this dominant Saudi position. But religion is not a key determinant of the important political and strategic circumstances informing Saudi-Iranian ties, despite the obstacles it creates. It is but one determining variable that often acquires influence within the context of advancing political goals.
Banafsheh Keynoush

Early, Middle, and Post Mid-Twentieth Century Saudi-Iranian Relations

Frontmatter
Chapter 3. Saudi Arabia and Iran in Early Twentieth Century
Abstract
The relative weakness of state authority in early twentieth-century Gulf history made the task of stabilizing the region arduous. This barred Saudi Arabia and Iran from retaining lasting ties of major significance, which was further complicated by Iran’s foreign policy outlook. Whereas the leaders in the Arabian peninsula preferred to persuade foreign powers as they fought amongst themselves (out of which process the Saudi state was formed), Iran’s more advanced and cohesive state structure, vibrant civil society, and long history of battling colonial influences placed it at odds with external powers in the region.
Banafsheh Keynoush
Chapter 4. Early Diplomatic Relations
Abstract
In December 1925, months after Persia placed a three-year ban on the haj because of tribal war in Hijaz, Reza Khan established the Pahlavi dynasty and became Reza Shah. Abd al-Aziz sent a message congratulating him, and vowed to protect Persian pilgrims.1 As Persia did not recognize Abd al-Aziz’s newly established Kingdom of Najd and Hijaz, Reza Shah was advised not to send a formal reply. He decided to maintain communications with the new ruler of Hijaz, under pressure from Shi’i clerics who wished to resume the haj despite their opposition to the Wahhabi takeover of Makkah and Madinah. A delegation was sent to Hijaz to thank Abd al-Aziz, and to stress that Persia wished to maintain close ties with the government of Hijaz.2
Banafsheh Keynoush
Chapter 5. Diplomatic Relations: 1955–1963
Abstract
In May 1955, the Baghdad Pact—launched to connect the US geographic spheres of influence in the Middle East—polarized the region into eastern and western blocs and marginalized the Saudi regional role. The pact was designed as a bilateral defense agreement between Iraq and Turkey; it was extended to include Pakistan and also Britain, who was the protector of the southern Persian Gulf. Iran was the last state to join the Baghdad Pact, on October 11, 1955, after the shah’s persistent efforts to bring the country into the western sphere of influence. He did so against the advice of the British who believed that the Iranian economy could not sustain the military costs of the pact. More likely, Britain did not wish Iran to compete with it through the pact.
Banafsheh Keynoush
Chapter 6. Epoch of Saudi-Iranian Cooperation and Rivalry
Abstract
In November 1964, Faisal assumed full power in Saudi Arabia. His rule, made in part possible through the alignment with the clerical establishment, was marked by a commitment to Islam as a unifying force in Saudi domestic and foreign policies. When the shah had earlier dispatched his foreign minister Abbas Aram to convey to Faisal his hope for improved Saudi-Iranian relations, Faisal urged support for Saudi initiatives across the Muslim world to fight communism. The shah was convinced that his ambitious modernization programs would make Iran the most stable country in the Middle East, and he insisted only on promoting Islamic values that were compatible with modern times. Faisal was weary of the shah’s assertions about Iran’s regional standing. But in December 1965, he stopped in Iran on the first leg of a tour of Islamic states he was making after leading two conferences on Islamic unity in Makkah in May 1962 and April 1965. The initiatives led to the establishment of the Muslim World League (rabitat al-alam al-islami) and the Organization for the Islamic Conference (OIC). Iran actively participated in the proceedings of the Makkah conferences, became a founding member of the league and helped establish the OIC, which was inaugurated by Faisal and the shah in Morocco in 1969.1
Banafsheh Keynoush

Saudi-Iranian Relations after the 1979 Iranian Revolution

Frontmatter
Chapter 7. Saudi Arabia and Revolutionary Iran
Abstract
From its inception in the spring of 1979 following a national referendum, Iran’s Islamic republic was the antithesis to the Saudi monarchy. Khomeini called for the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy, and argued that Muslims should unite as one nation (ummah) to administer the holy sites of Makkah and Madinah. The ayatollah gained a small following with Saudi Shi‘is who looked up to Iran as a center of the Shi‘i world, and inspired disgruntled Saudis who admired Iran’s ability to overthrow a powerful king.
Banafsheh Keynoush
Chapter 8. Saudi-Iranian Détente
Abstract
In June 1991, Saudi Arabia and Iran resumed diplomatic relations. Abdul Latif Abdullah Al Meymani and Mohammad Ali Hadi, a former member of parliament and Rafsanjani aide in his secret arms deals with the United States during the Iran-Iraq war, assumed their posts as ambassadors to Tehran and Riyadh. Hadi announced that Saudi Arabia and Iran were “two wings of the Muslim world,” which eased concerns in Riyadh that radical groups in Tehran might sabotage the new relationship. In June 1990, radicals barred Rafsanjani’s government from thanking the kingdom for the delivery of relief to victims of an earthquake in Zanjan; when Saudi envoy Gaafar Al Lagany reopened the Saudi embassy in Tehran the following year, they attacked Saudi diplomats.
Banafsheh Keynoush

How Current Conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Iran Impact the State of the World

Frontmatter
Chapter 9. Saudi Arabia’s and Iran’s Quest for Stability after 9/11
Abstract
With fears of a new regional war looming, Saud al-Faisal and Kamal Kharrazi condemned 9/11, but warned Washington against taking hasty action. Doubtful if a US attack against the Afghan Taliban could guarantee victory over the group, Riyadh had briefly attempted to reconcile the Taliban with the pro-Iranian Afghan Northern Alliance before the outbreak of the war. Tehran had welcomed the initiative although it was quickly stalled due to the pending war.
Banafsheh Keynoush
Chapter 10. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Gulf Geopolitics: The Case of Iraq
Abstract
Despite initial hesitations about Iraq’s invasion in March 2003, Tehran quietly felt blessed by it. Saddam Hussein’s quick downfall removed pervasive fears in Iran about his alleged arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Tehran could also now influence Iraq’s new developments. That prospect, as I witnessed in Tehran at the time, encouraged its politicians to reject feeling concerned by the war drums in Washington which called for attacking Iran. In the wake of Iraq’s invasion, Tehran in fact turned down Saddam’s secret overtures for an alliance against Washington, and encouraged the Iraqi clerics, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Ayatollah Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, to aid Washington to work with the underrepresented Iraqi Shi‘is.
Banafsheh Keynoush
Chapter 11. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Levant Geopolitics: The Cases of Lebanon, Syria, Palestine
Abstract
In 1992, while still viewed by Washington as a terrorist group, Hizbullah won 12 seats in the Lebanese parliament after vowing to free occupied Lebanese territories from Israel. Hizbullah received substantial aid from Iran as well as Syrian support to build an armed front against Israel. By May 2000, Israel had announced that it would withdraw its troops from southern Lebanon after an occupation of almost 20 years. The withdrawal offered Iran and Syria new opportunities to influence Lebanon. However, after Iraq’s 2003 invasion, the US administration under President George W. Bush decided that Syria, which sabotaged US operations in Iraq by granting a safe haven to ex-Baathists and Iraqi terrorists, should withdraw from Lebanon. By containing Syria, Washington also aimed to control Hizbullah and Iranian actions in Lebanon.
Banafsheh Keynoush
Conclusion
Abstract
Since 2011, the Arab Spring has turned into a prime example of how divided the Saudi-Iranian relationship has become in the face of regional instability. For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which has faced Arab disunity since its inception, the Arab Spring is hardly a promising sign of reform. Instead, Riyadh sees the spring as a disturbing trend which could break the Arab world apart and grant Iran chances to expand its interventions. Tehran asserts that the spring is partly modeled after its revolution, and that regional conditions are now ripe to build a new Islamic Middle East in which power will shift away from the United States and its Arab allies, including Saudi Arabia, into the hands of groups that aim to see a far more reduced American role in the region. This implies that Iran will be more powerful in the new paradigms that will shape the Middle East. It further implies that faced with rapid regional changes, the United States will be less able to depend on Saudi Arabia to contain Iran.
Banafsheh Keynoush
Backmatter
Metadaten
Titel
Saudi Arabia and Iran
verfasst von
Banafsheh Keynoush
Copyright-Jahr
2016
Verlag
Palgrave Macmillan US
Electronic ISBN
978-1-137-58939-2
Print ISBN
978-1-349-99536-3
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-58939-2

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