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2013 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

PROTECT in the Ports of Boston, New York and Beyond: Experiences in Deploying Stackelberg Security Games with Quantal Response

verfasst von : Eric Shieh, Bo An, Rong Yang, Milind Tambe, Craig Baldwin, Joseph DiRenzo, Ben Maule, Garrett Meyer, Kathryn Moretti

Erschienen in: Handbook of Computational Approaches to Counterterrorism

Verlag: Springer New York

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Abstract

The global need for security of key infrastructure with limited resources has led to significant interest in research conducted in multiagent systems towards game-theory for real-world security. As reported previously at AAMAS, three applications based on Stackelberg games have been transitioned to real-world deployment. This includes ARMOR, used by the Los Angeles International Airport to randomize checkpoints of roadways and canine patrols [16]; IRIS, which helps the US Federal Air Marshal Service [22] in scheduling air marshals on international flights; and GUARDS [17], which is under evaluation by the US Transportation Security Administration to allocate resources for airport protection. We as a community remain in the early stages of these deployments, and must continue to develop our understanding of core principles of innovative applications of game theory for security.

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Fußnoten
1
Or the attacker may be sufficiently deterred and dissuaded from attacking the protected target.
 
2
Creating optimal Stackelberg defender strategies that increase the attacker’s difficulty of surveillance is an open research issue in the literature; here we choose to maximize unpredictability as the first step.
 
3
In general these types of security games are non-zero-sum [21], though for Boston as a first step it was decided to cast the game as zero-sum.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
PROTECT in the Ports of Boston, New York and Beyond: Experiences in Deploying Stackelberg Security Games with Quantal Response
verfasst von
Eric Shieh
Bo An
Rong Yang
Milind Tambe
Craig Baldwin
Joseph DiRenzo
Ben Maule
Garrett Meyer
Kathryn Moretti
Copyright-Jahr
2013
Verlag
Springer New York
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5311-6_20

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