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2001 | Buch

Technology Investment: A Game Theoretic Real Options Approach

verfasst von: Kuno J. M. Huisman

Verlag: Springer US

Buchreihe : Theory and Decision Library C

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SUCHEN

Über dieses Buch

This chapter is organized as follows. The economic problem on which this book focuses is motivated in Section 1. The two tools used to study this economic problem, which are real options theory and game theory, are discussed in Sections 2 and 3, respectively. Section 4 surveys the contents of this book. In Section 5 some promising extensions of the research presented in this book are listed. 1. TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT Investment expenditures of companies govern economic growth. Es­ pecially investments in new and more efficient technologies are an impor­ tant determinant. In particular, in the last two decades an increasing part of the investment expenditures concerns investments in informa­ tion and communication technology. Kriebel, 1989 notes that (already) in 1989 roughly 50 percent of new corporate capital expenditures by major United States companies was in information and communication technology. Due to the rapid progress in these technologies, the tech­ nology investment decision of the individual firm has become a very complex matter. As an example of the very high pace of technological improvement consider the market for personal computers. IBM intro­ duced its Pentium personal computers in the early 1990s at the same price at which it introduced its 80286 personal computers in the 1980s. Therefore it took less than a decade to improve on the order of twenty times in terms of both speed and memory capacities, without increasing the cost (Yorukoglu, 1998).

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Introduction

Chapter 1. Introduction
Abstract
This chapter is organized as follows. The economic problem on which this book focuses is motivated in Section 1. The two tools used to study this economic problem, which are real options theory and game theory, are discussed in Sections 2 and 3, respectively. Section 4 surveys the contents of this book. In Section 5 some promising extensions of the research presented in this book are listed.
Kuno J. M. Huisman

Decision Theoretic Models

Frontmatter
Chapter 2. Constant Investment Cost
Abstract
The literature on technology adoption can be divided into two classes: the first class is called decision theoretic models and the second class game theoretic models. See Bridges et al., 1991 for an overview of literature from both classes. In a decision theoretic model the profit of the firm is only influenced by its own technology adoption decisions, whereas in a game theoretic model the profit of the firm is also influenced by the decisions of its rivals. In the second and third chapter we study decision theoretic models of technology adoption. This implies that either the firm is a monopolist or a price taker on its output market. From Chapter 4 onwards strategic interactions are incorporated in the technology investment problem.
Kuno J. M. Huisman
Chapter 3. Decreasing Investment Cost
Abstract
We consider a firm whose profit is only influenced by its own technology choice. There are two differences with the model of Chapter 2. First, it is assumed that the efficiency improvements of the new technologies are known. In practice this does not seem to be a very restrictive assumption. For example, when Intel launched the Pentium processor everyone knew that one day they would come up with a processor that is twice as fast as the Pentium processor. The only thing not known for sure was when this processor would become available. Second, the prices of new technologies are assumed to drop over time, implying that a firm needs to invest less in case it decides to buy a new technology at a later point of time. The reason for this price decrease is that, as time passes, the demand for a particular technology declines because of market saturation and the invention of newer technologies that are better than this particular one.
Kuno J. M. Huisman

Game Theoretic Adoption Models

Frontmatter
Chapter 4. One New Technology
Abstract
A feature of the last decade is that firms more and more face competition on their output markets. One reason is the abolition of monopolistic markets created by government. In the Netherlands examples are the opening of the markets for telecommunication, railway and power supply. Another reason is the, still ongoing, process of mergers, which due to legislation will not end with a market with only one supplier. The result is that markets with only one supplier and markets with many suppliers seem to disappear. Thus, in its own investment decision, a firm should take into account the investment behavior by its competitors, which is dealt with in this paper.
Kuno J. M. Huisman
Chapter 5. Two New Technologies
Abstract
One of the features of the models concerning the investment of new technologies considered in the previous chapter is that only one new technology was available. The availability of more consecutive new technologies complicates the technology investment decision considerably, since every time the firm evaluates an investment in a new technology it has to take into account that at a later point of time a more efficient technology will be invented.
Kuno J. M. Huisman
Chapter 6. Multiple New Technologies
Abstract
In this chapter we extend the models of Chapters 4 and 5 by adding uncertainty to the innovation process and by considering multiple new technologies. The new technologies are invented at previously unknown points of time. A comparable framework is considered in the duopoly model by Gaimon, 1989. The difference is that in that paper a continuous stream of new technologies arrives over time, which is known beforehand by the firms.
Kuno J. M. Huisman

Game Theoretic Real Option Models

Frontmatter
Chapter 7. One New Technology and Symmetric Firms
Abstract
This chapter considers a framework with two identical firms which both have the possibility to make an investment that increases their payoff. By how much this payoff is raised is not known beforehand, since the future market conditions for the firm’s products are uncertain. Both firms operate on the same output market which implies that the investment decision of one firm affects the payoff of the other firm. By analyzing this model uncertainty is combined with strategic aspects.
Kuno J. M. Huisman
Chapter 8. One New Technology and Asymmetric Firms
Abstract
In Nielsen, 1999 and in Chapter 7 it is shown that, in a strategic investment new market model, competition by an identical firm precipitates investment. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the same issue, namely the effect of introducing another firm on the original firm’s investment decision, in an asymmetric setting. We introduce asymmetry by letting the firms have different investment costs, but the methods and results should be extendable to other types of asymmetry as well.
Kuno J. M. Huisman
Chapter 9. Two New Technologies
Abstract
A firm that buys a new technology today faces the risk that a much better technology becomes available tomorrow. The fact that this can happen provides an incentive to delay the investment. To include this kind of mechanism, the chapter extends the models of Chapters 7 and 8 by incorporating an additional technology that becomes available at an unknown point of time in the future. This means that our model contains two different technologies that can be adopted, which are the currently available technology and a more efficient technology that becomes available at a future point of time. At the moment a firm invests, it enters the market, so, like in Chapter 8 we are considering a new market model. The reason is that we want to keep the model as simple as possible such that we are still able to point out the effects of adding an extra new technology. In this framework the possible invention of a more efficient technology raises the option value of waiting to invest in the current technology, but on the other hand the presence of a competitor may induce the firm to invest quickly, and thus forget about future technological progress.
Kuno J. M. Huisman
Backmatter
Metadaten
Titel
Technology Investment: A Game Theoretic Real Options Approach
verfasst von
Kuno J. M. Huisman
Copyright-Jahr
2001
Verlag
Springer US
Electronic ISBN
978-1-4757-3423-2
Print ISBN
978-1-4419-4911-0
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3423-2