Policies
aim to change something, and therefore they frame the problems to which they are seen as the solution (Bacchi
2009). Policies on extended working life
are, thus, not objective entities, rather, they are proactive by focusing on some aspects and playing down others (Bacchi
1999,
2009,
2012). Constructions of categories and key concepts are a central means in these processes, like policies, they carry basic assumptions (Ahmed
2007,
2012). As a consequence, categories such as
‘older workers’
and key concepts such as ‘gender
equality
’ are not neutral when used in policies, they construct something and has therefore real consequences. With this starting point, this section proceeds by placing emphasis on the groups of older people
that constitute the norm in European policy. Our discussion focuses on the arguments in the European Commission’s
white paper on
Adequate, Safe and Sustainable Pensions (2012) since it is a formal document containing proposals for the European Union (EU) and which aims to, based on a debate with stakeholders
including the European Parliament
and the European Council, create political consensus
on issues regarding retirement age
and the design of the pension system (Eur-lex
2018).
The Privileged Life Course as the Norm
In European policies, demographic changes
are used as a basis for the debate on retirement age
and pension systems, and the
ageing population
is described as a major challenge to pension systems, as one of the largest public expenditure items, and as a common concern amongst all member countries (e.g. European Commission
2012)
. Against this background, the linking of the retirement age
with increases in life expectancy and restriction of access to
early retirement
schemes and other early exit
pathways are presented as two central means to maintain an adequate income
in retirement. Member countries are, thus, recommended to link the retirement age
to gains in life expectancy since this “could result in budgetary savings
representing more than half of the projected increase in
pension expenditure
over
the next 50 years” (European Commission
2012:10)
. Consequently, many European countries have moved in this direction. During the period 2014–2017, Croatia
, Czech Republic
, Greece
, Finland
and Portugal
linked their retirement age
to life expectancy (European Commission
2018; see also chapters from Estonia
and Spain
in this volume). Other countries, e.g. the Netherlands
, have decided to implement this in the coming years (see chapter from the Netherlands
in this volume) and in some countries, such as Austria
and Sweden
, this measure has been raised in the political debate (see chapters from Austria
and Sweden
in this volume).
The reasoning for linking retirement age
to life expectancy is created through a homogenisation of the older population. An example of this can be seen in the European Commission
(
2012:2), which presents a merged future prognosis for the EU countries; ‘By 2060, the life expectancy at birth for males is projected to increase by 7.9 years and by 6.5 years for females
, when compared to 2010’. This homogenous construction also shows in the discussion about the necessity to balance time spent in work and retirement, where it is stated that ‘Currently, about one third of adult life is spent in retirement and, with unchanged policies, this share would increase in line with future gains in life expectancy’ (European Commission
2012:7)
.
The data on increased life expectancy are, in themselves, correct if we look at the aggregate level of older people
as a homogenous group. However, this type of homogenous group does not exist in reality. As has been recurrently noted, there is no uniform group of older people
; variations in the life course tend rather to deepen as people grow older, based on, for example, gender, education, finances and family situation (Bal and Jansen
2015). This also applies to life expectancy. The statement above for the large population of older people
in Europe therefore constitutes a disregard for the great differences in life expectancy that exist between countries (see for example Majer et al.
2011), and also downplay the differences in length of life that exist within countries based on for example profession, education or social class
(see for example Tarkiainen et al.
2013; Statistics Sweden
2018a,
b; Marmot
2010)
. Whilst’open methods of coordination’ allow EU countries to take into account their own specificities, opening up the possibility that linking life expectancy rates to retirement ages
could vary from place to place, the argument feeds into the ‘common sense’ argument that we are all living longer in contrast to previous generations. A later report in 2018, whilst moderating the argument slightly sustains the view that life expectancy is increasing and hence people will need to work for longer and does little to suggest remedies for those unable to continue working: “Although the duration of working life
is increasing, the duration of retirement is expected to grow even faster, as life expectancy continues to increase.” and this is framed as a bad outcome for all countries: “As life expectancy improves, longer working lives will be vital to enable men
and women to acquire adequate pensions” (European Commission
2018:15–17).
The construction of a uniform life expectancy age for the large collective of older people in Europe does not, however, mean that there is a lack of awareness regarding the great differences that exist between groups of older workers. In parallel with the homogenised statistics, the Commission’s White Paper (2012), for example, emphasises the need for ‘taking into account the fact that the ability to work—and to find employment—differs widely between individuals, and that life expectancy and health status at age 60 or age 65 tends to be lower for manual workers who started working at a young age’ (2012:7). This comment is, however, neither followed up in the document, nor is it problematised in relation to the overall argument of the Commission that life expectancy ought to affect the retirement age. Thus, the latter can continue being used as a building block in the rhetoric of the Commission in support of extended working life, while the varying life expectancy of different groups is turned into a non-question in this line of reasoning.
The homogenous descriptions of life expectancy are particularly important to emphasise from a gendered class
perspective, since research indicates that life expectancy also declines for gendered groups of older people
. For example, a decline in male life expectancy is reported, most likely due to stress and negative health
lifestyles, in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan (Cockerham
2012). Swedish
statistics follow the same line, showing a declined life expectancy among groups of people with a low level of qualifications. During the period 2012–2017 the remaining average life expectancy at the age of 30 dropped from 51.2 to 51 years for women with only compulsory education. At the same time, the remaining life expectancy increased from 53.3 to 54.3 years for men
of the same age. During the same period, the remaining life expectancy at age 65 also decreased from 17.8 to 17.5 years for single persons with only compulsory education, while it increased from 21.9 to 22.7 years among cohabiting persons with post-secondary education
. Overall, the difference between the groups with the highest and lowest average life expectancy increased at age 65 from 4.1 years in 2012 to 5.2 years in 2017 (Statistics Sweden
2018a,
b)
. The gaps in life expectancy are even greater in some other countries, for example in the UK
there is a ten year gap in male life expectancy between men
born in some parts of the south of England and those born in central Glasgow in Scotland (Office for National Statistics
2018). The development in Sweden
should be seen in the light of the fact that pensions there are calculated based on both life income and life expectancy for each cohort. Those who live a shorter life than the estimated length of life and thereby only use a portion of their estimated pension, are not compensated for the fact that they live off their pension during a shorter period of time. This means that people with a shorter life expectancy indirectly subsidise those with longer life expectancy in the same cohort, which primarily increases the gap between blue-collar and white-collar workers (Lindberg
2017).
The focus on life expectancy also neglects the rates for healthy life expectancy
which have not improved at the same pace. There are also gender differences
in so far as women typically live longer than men
and have more years in poor health
. There has been no discussion of pegging pension ages to healthy life expectancy
. To take England as an example, 2013–15 data on the healthy life expectancy
at birth for men
was 63.4 years and for women 64.1 years; at this point state pension age
was in the process of rising to 66 for both women and men
(Public Health England
2017).
The discussion above shows the central role which the construction of a uniform life expectancy plays in policies on extended working life
and how they neglect differences between groups of older people
. The argument that retirement age
ought to be linked to gains in life expectancy does not take into account groups where life expectancy de facto is decreasing. It also ignores that there already is, in the countries where pensions are based on life expectancy, an injustice in the form of groups with lower average life expectancy subsidising those who are able to take out their pension over a longer period of time (Lindberg
2017). This line of reasoning connects to Hughes’ (
1995) argumentation that categorisations (e.g. “older workers”
)
reproduce notions of uniform well-demarcated categories, which, by extension, construct some groups as a norm and others as subordinate. In the above discussed rhetoric, homogenisation contributes to creating an object, the imaginary collective of older people
, around which a policy agenda can be created, in this context, towards an extended working life
.
Contradictory Definitions of Gender Equality
Gender
equality
is defined in many different ways depending on the context. It can be understood as both ideological and as a political concept to describe equality between women and men
. With reference to working life
, the concept is often used to emphasise women’s and men’s equal participation and it has mainly been used as a starting point to highlight a lower proportion of women in different organisational contexts. This type of quantitative gender
equality
has, however, been discussed from several different starting points, where Hernes (
1987) distinguishes three central arguments: The resource argument, which is based on women being expected to have specific resources and experiences that differ from those of men
and therefore are assumed to complement men
; the justice argument, which concerns democracy and emphasises that women, since they constitute half of the population, should be represented to the same extent; and the interest argument, where women and men
are assumed to have different, and also contradicting interests, and thus women need to represent themselves. In contemporary gender
equality
research, it has been pointed out that the resource argument has been transformed into a profitability argument, where gender
equality
in the sense of equal participation is justified also by it contributing to increased productivity
for organisations since women are assumed to contribute with other skills than men
(Skjeie and Teigen
2005). Gender
equality
in work organisations has also been described as an issue which concerns qualitative aspects, with a focus on gender relations in organisations and on men
and masculinity
as the norm (Rönnblom
2011). Further, Ahmed (
2007,
2012; see also Krekula et al.
2019) argues that key concepts, such as gender
equality
discourses, circulate via the documents of organisations, and that in this circulation they are associated with additional ideas, which leads to new meanings. There are, therefore, reasons to emphasise how gender
equality
is understood in policies on extended working life
and the strategies which develop as a result, and how much room for change the different definitions create for organisations and for the individuals within them.
When the European Commission’s
White paper (2012) discusses gender in relation to extended working life
, it is women as a category that is highlighted. This is done explicitly by stressing that sustainable pension systems are dependent on raising employment rates
among groups where this is regarded as low, ‘such as women, migrants and youths’ (European Commission
2012:6).
In the White paper, the concept of gender inequality is used in two contradictory ways. It is portrayed as an obstacle to extended working life
and the paper emphasises that increasing pension eligibility ages depends on better opportunities for older women
and men
to stay in the labour market. As examples of measures to move in this direction, the paper mentions the adaptation of work places, the promotion of lifelong learning
, policies aiming at reconciling work, private and family life, and the need to combat ‘gender inequalities and
age discrimination’
(European Commission
2012:7)
. However, there is no clarification as to what types of gender inequalities within work organisations they are referring to; nor is there any mention of whether the inequality is assumed to affect women or men
. This relates to previous remarks that gender
equality
is often seen as an obvious and common political objective, which means that gender inequality tends to be understood as something that ‘is’ rather than something that is ‘done’ (Rönnblom
2011).
The reconciliation of work
and family life as a prerequisite for labour force participation
among older people
is, however, emphasised clearly, which also can be found in discussions on the differences in employment rates
for women and men
in the age group
55–64 years. Here, the importance of shedding light on gender aspects of extended working lives is mentioned, ‘including measures that facilitate the reconciliation of work
and
care responsibilities
and reduce gender
gaps
in employment and pay’ (European Commission
2012:12)
. The goal to increase labour force participation
among women correlates with national government strategies, including from Sweden
, where it is stated that participation in working life
on equal terms is a core area for the promotion of gender
equality
in the labour market (Government Bill
2005/
06:155, for a discussion see Krekula
2012,
2014). These formulations on gender
equality
as dependent on
caring responsibilities
are in accordance with comprehensive international research which has shown that women’s possibilities to take part in paid employment depend on their
caring responsibilities
(Korabik et al.
2008). They also relate to studies which have illustrated that older people’s
ability to work is related to whether an individual is caring
for close family members
or not (Lewis
2006; Dewilde
2012; see also corresponding discussions in several of the more in-depth country chapters).
By not stating the aspects in workplaces that are assumed to contribute to inequality which counteracts an extended working life, the White paper inhibits the development of strategies to fight inequality and to create prerequisites for increased labour force participation among both women and men. In these arguments, (in)equality appears as a vaguely defined phenomenon, which has to do with factors both within and outside the work organisation.
However, the document also points out the need to equalise pensionable ages for women and men
since it can contribute to raising the labour force participation
among
older workers
and to increasing income for women
(European Commission
2012:12). Even though it is not stated more specifically what is meant by this type of equalisation of retirement ages
for women and men
, it may be assumed that it refers to a raise in women’s retirement age
to the same age as men
in the countries where women today have a lower retirement age
than men
. It is, thus, men
who constitute the norm that women are expected to strive to imitate. Even though it is reasonable that the higher retirement age
sets the baseline in policies designed
to encourage extended working life
, the underlying assumptions contribute to the life styles and life courses that relate to the higher retirement age
constituting a norm. This accords with the discussion in many of the country chapters here, which emphasises that women’s
early retirement
means a financial loss for them. In these arguments, women’s and men’s different retirement ages
appear as the gender inequality that both needs to be and can be solved by changing current pension systems, where the implicit rhetoric is that this will raise women’s income. The unspoken starting point seems to be that women and men
have the same prerequisites to work later in life. As pointed out by Nentwich (
2006), this discourse of sameness ignores differences which may exist between men
and women. Using sameness as a starting point runs directly counter to the above-mentioned definition which, on the contrary, stresses differences between women and men
and how gendered conditions in personal as well as professional life create challenges for gender
equality
in relation to an extended working life
.
The two definitions of gender
equality
also relate to two different strategies. The first mentioned definition of gender
equality
is based on the assumption that women and men
have different prerequisites to work later in life and highlights the need to change the conditions in work organisations as well as in other social contexts that limit these. The second definition which is based on sameness between women’s and men’s conditions, is instead used to justify changes in pension systems and, thus, in women’s retirement actions. It has, in other words, a disciplining function (Foucault
1991). In the first definition, it is practices and processes in working life
and social organisation that are the problem seen from the perspective of raised retirement age
, in the second it is women’s behaviour.
Another starting point in the reasonings quoted above on how women’s income can be raised through changes in the retirement age, is that changed pension systems affect/constrain individuals’ retirement age. Even though this receives some support in research, retirement trends from several countries do, however, point towards the relationships between pension systems and current retirements being more complex. In some countries, research shows that raised general retirement age changes women’s and men’s retirement behaviour to different extents. The examples from the country chapters also indicate that early retirement might continue to be the norm after the retirement ages have changed.
In this section, we have illustrated that there are intended target groups behind formulations of homogeneity among older people
in the discussed document in the form of privileged older people
and men
, as opposed to women, not as a large collective. It is the same groups that also, in several research studies, have been emphasised as those with the best prerequisites to live up to the goals of extended working life
(for example see Lain and Loretto
2016). The political ambitions of connecting retirement age
to life expectancy are, thus, based on a form of privileged ageing and turn this into a rhetorical and political norm. It relates to what has also been noted in national documents, for example, in Swedish
policies aimed towards extended working life
where the policies are adapted to those who are willing and able to continue working later in life (Krekula et al.
2017). Against this background, it comes as no surprise that comprehensive research has shown that an extended working life
does not come in ‘one size fits all’, but rather creates inequality among groups of older people
(for example Lain et al.
2019). Consequences in the form of precarious conditions
for groups of older people
and greater inequality between older people
are instead a result of the starting points of the document in question, where the privileged older people
constitute the intended target group of the policy actors.
The formulation of retirement ages
has effects far beyond a secure
income when leaving working life
. Arza and Kohli (
2008) have argued that they also regulate labour markets by facilitating an ordered transition out of employment and enable employers
to manage their work force by offering instruments for the shedding or replacement of workers. It also contributes to biographical planning by creating a predictable sequence and timing between work and retirement, and provides workers with a legitimate claim to compensation for their “lifelong” work and thus with a stake in the moral economy
of work societies. Our discussion above illustrates that retirement ages
, in both rhetoric and practice, also construct social categorizations such as homogenous
older workers
and which has the effect of privileging some older adults over others.