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2021 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

2. Corporate Boards

verfasst von : Luca Pirolo

Erschienen in: Corporate Governance and Diversity in Boardrooms

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter aims to set the ground, providing a brief definition of the corporate governance according to worldwide practices and focusing on the role and the functions of the board of directors. To reach this goal, a punctual review of the different theoretical frameworks coping with this topic is provided, putting in evidence the main differences as well as the principal points in common. Specifically, the agency theory, the stakeholder theory, the stewardship theory, the resource dependence theory, and the institutional theory are analysed. Moreover, the role of BoDs is analysed together with the features and the overview of “good” corporate governance practices according to existing literature and practice.

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Titel: Corporate Boards
verfasst von: Luca Pirolo
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Corporate Governance and Diversity in Boardrooms
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-56119-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-56120-8

Copyright-Jahr: 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56120-8_2

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