Introduction
International policing involves the deployment of police officers from one or more countries to assist in another country. The scope of activities includes not only training, technical assistance, and working together to address transnational crime, but also activities that were traditionally outside the ambit of policing (Greener, 2011a; Harris, 2010). Police involvement has extended to a role in peace operations, police reform, and capacity development, often as part of broader state-building agendas that promote the maintenance of peace and sustainable development. These new roles for police have been dubbed ‘new international policing’ (Greener, 2009). Some scholars refer to these activities as ‘transnational policing’, with the emphasis on transcending or traversing national boundaries (Bowling & Sheptycki, 2012, 2015). Others define transnational policing more narrowly to refer to cross-border responses to transnational crime, such as the trafficking of people, wildlife, and illicit goods (Boister, 2003; Perras, 2017). Similarly, international policing can be defined narrowly, referring to instances when international law is invoked. Although war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity do not necessarily involve the crossing of borders, they impact the global community and require a collective (or international) response due to the scale of suffering involved (Perras, 2017). However, while these narrower definitions may be useful if the intention is to focus on relevant areas of law, international policing in its broadest sense is most fitting for the present focus on policing in the Pacific.
International policing is an inherently political process (Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007). The Honiara Declaration on Law Enforcement Cooperation, which was made by the South Pacific Forum (1992), recognised that for sustainable development to occur, it was first necessary to establish the rule of law. This necessity has since been supported empirically (see e.g., Murney et al., 2011). However, a lack of international consensus about best practices in policing raises questions about whose ideas of policing should be used in the international sphere. Police use law in non-neutral ways to achieve objectives, as is highlighted by the concept of ‘rule with law’ (Bowling & Sheptycki, 2015, p. 142). Reaching a consensus on international policing seems an unlikely prospect due to the range of policing practices used in different countries and within different cultural contexts, and guided by different values and norms—including ideas about the appropriate use of force (Hills, 2009). Despite a lack of consensus, the United Nations (UN) has promoted liberal democratic ideals of policing, which are drawn from developed countries of the global North (Bayley, 2005; Hills, 2009). Consequently, policing is often conceptualised as a centralised institution of the state, which has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and a democratic policing ethos. It is associated with the ideals of gender equality, human rights, transparency and accountability, and community policing partnerships (Dinnen & McLeod, 2009).
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For the countries of the global South, including Pacific Islands countries (PICs), it is reasonable to question how the same kind of policing model can be applied. The Pacific has been described as one of the most aid-reliant regions worldwide (Dornan & Pryke, 2017). Many PICs are typically categorised as small island developing states, with several additionally categorised as least developed countries (see Chapter 2). These classifications reflect a range of challenges and constraints for PICs in terms of small populations, vast expanses of ocean, remoteness and limited access to resources, as well as vulnerability to climate change and disasters. Additionally, some PICs have been described at different times as ‘weak’, ‘fragile’, or ‘failed’ states (Fraenkel, 2015, p. 400). In such contexts, concerns exist about the potential for international policing to act as a neo-colonial force. During the colonial period in PICs, the police were instrumental in enforcing and sustaining colonial orders. In many of these countries, now independent, the legacy of colonisation is evident in the existence of hybrid systems—including in the justice sector, where there exists a blend of state institutions, and non-state or customary ways and locally developed initiatives (Dinnen & McLeod, 2009). Interventions that support only state policing institutions are unlikely to be effective if other justice service providers receive only minimal attention (see Chapter 4). Indeed, the presence of non-state service providers reflects the strength and resilience (or tenacity: McDougall, 2015) of local communities, and opportunities to engage in culturally meaningful ways (Dinnen & McLeod, 2009).
Despite the challenges and ambiguities of international policing, PICs have been involved in the full range of these efforts, including peace operations, police reform as a component of state-building, targeted training and technical assistance, partnerships to prevent transnational crime, and disaster assistance. Their involvement has been both as host countries and contributors within and beyond the region.
This chapter provides a brief overview of how international policing has developed in the Pacific context, with a focus on the roles of Australia and New Zealand as long-term partners in the policing, security, and development space. It then explores examples of different types of international policing in the Pacific region, highlighting the challenges inherent within them and the benefits achieved. The chapter suggests that international policing is an integral part of policing in the Pacific for all countries involved. It shapes and is shaped by domestic, regional, and international politics, and historical relationships, as well as evolving nuances in the development and security agendas.
Historical Development of International Policing
International policing evolved out of various types of military operations (Sismanidis, 1997). These included multinational military action against the Barbary pirates in the nineteenth century, colonial interventions (Goldsmith & Sheptycki, 2007), US occupational military forces in Germany and Japan after World War II (Greener, 2009), and disaster assistance and riot control (Sismanidis, 1997). Some of these military operations even contained elements of civilian policing (Sismanidis, 1997). Sometimes police were deployed to countries within the Pacific region to support policing, as with New Zealand’s involvement in the Cook Islands from 1909 and Niue from 1951 (Brennan, 2015). However, the advent of international policing as it is now understood is largely associated with the UN. In 1960 ‘civilian police’, as they were known at the time, were first deployed under the UN banner—to the UN Operation in the Congo (Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO], 2011a). This was followed by the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus in 1964, which included police from Australia and New Zealand.
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The Cold War period saw police and military interventions by both the United States of America and the Soviet Union (USSR) in affiliated states (Goldsmith & Sheptycki, 2007). For the Pacific, concerns arose about a potential threat to trade routes if the United States and the USSR began to compete for influence in the region. In Australia, fears about foreign powers—which were heightened during World War II as PICs became battle sites—continued to influence foreign policy (Dibb, 2012). The period was also characterised by a post-colonial turn; former colonies of large powers gradually gained independence (Goldsmith & Sheptycki, 2007). Australia had been the colonial administrator in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Nauru, and New Zealand had been the colonial administrator in Samoa. These twentieth-century colonial relationships reflected anxiety about foreign interests in the region and the consequent desire for a ‘British Oceania’ (Lawson, 2017).
The Pacific Islands Forum was established in 1971, with independent PICs as members, along with Australia and New Zealand (Lawson, 2017). The inclusion of Australia and New Zealand has been contentious at times—in recent years because of their slowness to act on climate change, and previously because of their early dominance of the forum and colonial history in the Pacific region (Fry, 2019; Lawson, 2017). As PICs gained independence, Australia and New Zealand continued to maintain interest in the region through programs that have provided substantial aid, with a strong focus on promoting and strengthening good governance (Dziedzic, 2018; Lowy Institute, 2019).1 Australian and New Zealand influence in policing in the Pacific was primarily through bilateral development assistance (McLeod & Dinnen, 2007).
Following the unexpected collapse of the USSR in 1989, fears of anarchy within post-colonial states and former Soviet satellites paved the way for greater urgency in international policing. Stabilisation of ‘collapsed’, ‘failing’, and ‘fragile’ states was on the agenda (Goldsmith & Sheptycki, 2007, p. 9). This perception of urgency was felt in the Pacific region. In Australian political circles, the Pacific region was described as an ‘arc of instability’ (Dibb, 2012; Dobell, 2012). Following a series of incidents, including two coups in Fiji in 1987 and growing instability in other Melanesian countries (Dinnen & McLeod, 2009), the focus shifted to the potential for weak states to pose a threat to regional stability (Dibb, 2012). In 1989, despite instability within the country, Fiji began sending police officers on UN peacekeeping missions,2 having begun contributing military troops to such missions in 1978 (Wyeth, 2018).
The 1990s saw a rise in UN Police numbers as civilian police were increasingly included in peacekeeping missions. Specifically, the number of UN Police deployed grew from 1600 in 1994 to 4600 by the end of the decade (UN Police, 2017). The role of UN Police in peace operations was largely to support policing that promoted human rights. The relevant activities were summarised by the acronym ‘SMART’, which referred to supporting human rights, monitoring performance of local law enforcement agencies, advising local police on humane effective law enforcement, reporting on incidents to the UN, and training local police in best practices and human rights (Hartz, 1999, p. 31). However, UN Police came to adopt more active roles, such as executive policing and police reform, when local governance mechanisms had ceased to function (Greener, 2009). In 1999, the first UN peacekeeping mission took place in East Timor (now known as Timor-Leste). Among the participants were police officers from Samoa, Vanuatu, Australia, and New Zealand, and military personnel from Fiji, Australia, and New Zealand.
Since the 1990s, the Australian Government has increasingly perceived a responsibility to contribute to the stability of the Pacific (Dobell, 2012). Australian and New Zealand Governments have aligned increasingly in their explicit focus on the Pacific region, although they have adopted a generally cautious stance on intervention in independent countries. A turning point occurred in response to the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. Since then, a new security agenda—namely, the war on terror—has been witnessed in many countries of the global North. For Australia, the Bali bombings in 2002 and Jakarta bombings in 2003 and 2004 contributed to this agenda (Dinnen, 2004/2005; 2012). Further, it has been argued that failed states can become a haven for international criminal and terrorist groups with a destabilising effect on a region (McDougall, 2004; Wainwright, 2003). This argument provided a powerful rationale for intervention. Australia’s international engagement with its Pacific Island neighbours shifted in ways described as ‘the new interventionism’ (Dinnen & McLeod, 2008, p. 25).
A range of UN-based and non-UN-based international police missions commenced during the 2000s. Many PICs not only hosted international policing efforts, but also contributed to contingents during the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) between 2003 and 2017, as discussed below: see ‘Peace Operations in Solomon Islands—RAMSI’. Acting on the recommendations of a report by the Panel of UN Peace Operations (2000), known as the Brahimi Report, in 2004 the Australian Federal Police (AFP) established the International Deployment Group. The International Deployment Group involved a standing force, comprising members of the AFP and of Australian state and territory police organisations, which could be deployed as needed.3 The AFP also established a purpose-built training facility in Canberra to meet the demand for international deployment and training to the relevant UN doctrine and standards (Bellamy, 2009). Similarly, in 2005 New Zealand established the International Service Group. Its aim was to facilitate communication between the agencies involved in international operations, and to coordinate New Zealand Police staff involved in deployments (Greener, 2011b). These efforts to support police deployment reflected the compatibility of international policing with whole-of-government policies in Australia and New Zealand (Greener, 2008, 2011b; Hameiri, 2009).
The number of deployed UN Police reached almost 14,000 in 2010 (DPKO, 2011b) and decreased to approximately 11,000 in 2018 (DPKO, 2018a). To help achieve consistency of policing under its banner, the DPKO has published manuals, frameworks, and guidelines (e.g., DPKO, 2018b). One of its most prominent initiatives, launched in 2009, is the global effort to increase the participation of female police officers in both national policing organisations and UN peace operations (DPKO, 2011c; UN Police, 2015). The largest contingents of international police are now primarily from countries of the global South in Africa and Asia (DPKO, 2018a), for whom the remuneration is most attractive. Inequities exist in deployment contributions, with developed countries focusing on financial contributions and deploying only small numbers of police officers to provide leadership and expertise (see e.g., Bellamy, 2012; Durch & Ker, 2013; Greener, 2017).
Despite the influence of the UN, international policing deployments in the Pacific region have not typically been UN-affiliated missions (although such missions have taken place in Timor-Leste). Instead, they have long been based on bilateral, trilateral, multilateral, or regional agreements, and have varied in their legal basis and levels of formality (Watson et al., 2011). In recent years, the focus of emerging threats has been the influence of globalisation, connectivity, and transnational crime. This is set against a backdrop of both renewed commitment to Pacific regionalism and geopolitical posturing in the region, with increased interest from China.4 What is clear is that the nature and emphasis of international policing—and its particular forms in the Pacific region—continue to evolve.
Examples of International Policing in the Pacific
International policing in the Pacific region aims to address a broad range of needs and interests. Table 5.1 outlines the main categories of international policing and the types of activities that they encompass. Given the complexity of international policing, the boundaries between categories are not always clear and overlaps occur in practice.
Table 5.1
Broad categories and roles of international policing
Category | Role |
|---|---|
Peace operations and stabilisation missions | • After a conflict, military and police personnel are involved to disarm combatants, protect civilians, promote human rights, and restore the rule of law • Peacekeeping missions support the implementation of a peace agreement • If the local police organisation has collapsed, is untrustworthy, or lacks the capacity to perform necessary policing functions, international police may have an executive policing role to perform local policing duties until the local police organisation is re-established |
Long-term police capacity development projects (in conflict-affected countries and developing countries) | • Large-scale police capacity development (or capacity building) programs involve the building or rebuilding, restructuring, or reform of a local police organisation. This may occur as part of a broader state-building process that involves contributions from government and non-governmental organisations and private companies • In a conflict-affected country, this work necessitates long-term engagement to re-establish the local police organisation, and to recruit, train, and mentor staff. Similarly, in a developing country, engagement is long-term and multi-faceted. Whether in a conflict-affected or developing country, international police officers may be embedded within the organisation temporarily • International deployments are gradually decreased once the requisite competencies have been achieved sustainably (i.e., they can be maintained) |
Discrete police capacity development initiatives | • Discrete police capacity development initiatives in partnership with developing countries are designed to strengthen the rule of law and specific areas of policing capacity. They involve deploying a small number of police officers to the host country, and focus on training, technical assistance, and mentoring • In addition to in-country programs, personnel can be offered opportunities to participate in training in the region or in a provider country. Alternatively, selected personnel may participate in a secondment or an exchange program, in which they spend time observing or serving in another country |
Cross-border cooperation | • In response to transnational crime, different forms of cross-border partnerships have evolved. Joint operations may be undertaken to target transnational crime, such as drug trafficking • Additionally, various policing networks have developed to promote cooperation and share information and intelligence to prevent transnational crime. Police liaison officers who are posted overseas can act as a first point of contact for communication between the policing organisations of partner countries and can facilitate the exchange of information |
Post-disaster assistance | • In the aftermath of a disaster, a wide range of international assistance can be called upon. This can include the provision of generalist and specialist personnel from medical and health services, emergency services (e.g., fire, search, and rescue), policing organisations (including forensic science), and military organisations • Depending on the available skills and resources of the sending country and the needs of the receiving country, police assistance may include victim support, disaster victim identification, technical assistance, mentoring, training, investigative support, restoring safety, and rebuilding |
Peace Operations and Stabilisation Missions
Several peace operations and stabilisation missions have been undertaken in the Pacific region. These include peacekeeping missions to Bougainville (1997–2000) and a stabilisation mission to Tonga following riots in 2006. These operations typically involve larger numbers of military than police personnel, both with important roles. While peace operations have often been linked explicitly with attempts to achieve and implement a peace agreement, stabilisation missions aim to restore and maintain order in the absence of a peace agreement through various means, including using force, and political and developmental means (to address the perceived causes of conflict and instability). The language used to describe these missions shifts in response to changes in thinking and policy. RAMSI, which consisted of peace operations followed by capacity building, was a classic ‘liberal peace’ intervention within the region from 2003 (Allen & Dinnen, 2010; Barbara, 2008). It formally concluded in 2017.
RAMSI not only provides a key example of peace operations, but also is important for understanding the relationships in the region and the context in which the Solomon Islands Government requested assistance in 2021 following unrest in the island of Malaita, the largest of the nine provinces. In November 2021, riots were triggered in the capital of Honiara by a shift in diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China among other issues, such as concerns about corruption, poor service delivery, and associated differences in opinion on centralised versus decentralised governance (Newton Cain, 2021; Ride, 2021). Pacific Islands Forum countries—notably Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and PNG—responded by deploying police officers and military troops. The Australian Government emphasised that the focus of the operation was policing support.
Peace Operations in Solomon Islands—RAMSI
RAMSI arose in response to conflict in Solomon Islands in 2000, the circumstances of which were complex (Fraenkel, 2004). Corruption among members of the government was an ongoing concern, particularly in relation to the timber industry (McDougall, 2004). People from Malaita had increasingly relocated to the island of Guadalcanal, which is home to Honiara. Resentment grew because of the perception that people from Malaita had benefited economically at the expense of those from Guadalcanal, with a belief that compensation was due. Militant forces emerged, forcing approximately 25,000 Malaitan people out of Guadalcanal (McDougall, 2004). Policing became increasingly compromised as violence escalated, and lines blurred between police and militia. While many police joined militia groups, others fled. The Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) collapsed. Widespread criminality followed, with events culminating in a coup in June 2000. A small contingent of armed ex-militants, including police and corrupt leaders, paralysed the state (Peake & Brown, 2005).
The Prime Minister of Solomon Islands made a request for assistance, supported by the parliament (McDougall, 2004). Australia and New Zealand had initially declined a request to become involved prior to the coup. However, following a ceasefire in August 2000, they facilitated the signing of the Townsville Peace Agreement in October, contributed to the International Peace Monitoring Team (along with personnel from Cook Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu) and kept a police presence in Solomon Islands until mid-2002 (McDougall, 2004). Influenced by concern over a failing state, high-profile murders in the country, and the realisation that due to Solomon Islands’ recognition of Taiwan, China would likely block UN involvement, it was agreed that a regional mission would be undertaken if the Pacific Islands Forum was supportive (McDougall, 2004). The Australian Strategic Policy Institute published a rationale and blueprint for an Australian-led intervention, which aimed to build on previous experience (Wainwright, 2003). RAMSI proceeded with the support of the Pacific Islands Forum under the auspices of the Biketawa Declaration on Mutual Assistance (Pacific Islands Forum, 2000). It was known in Solomon Islands pidgin as Helpem Fren (Helping a Friend).
The need to establish law and order was a driving element of the preliminary phase of the mission, which was police-led with military support (Peake & Brown, 2005). The Participating Police Force (PPF) consisted of around 250 police officers and was drawn from Australia (70%), New Zealand (11.8%) and 13 PICs (18.2%) (Putt et al., 2018). Specifically, the Pacific Islands contingent was drawn from the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, PNG, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu (Putt et al., 2018). Military personnel from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, PNG, and Tonga were also involved.
The first contingent of the PPF arrived in Solomon Islands in July 2003 to begin the restoration of law and order. Local people were reported that they were pleased to have the international police presence and felt safer (Peake & Brown, 2005). Security was restored in Honiara and a police presence was extended to other parts of the country. Weapons were confiscated, hundreds of members of militia groups were arrested, and criminal and corrupt police officers were removed from the RSIP (Dinnen, 2012). The mission encountered little resistance, and many members of the military contingent were able to return home (Fraenkel, 2015). With executive policing in place and efforts made to mentor and assist the RSIP, the first phase of RAMSI was generally regarded as successful (McDougall, 2004).
Peace operations can sometimes achieve the stabilisation of law and order relatively quickly, giving a perception of success. This occurred in Solomon Islands, and in Timor-Leste from 1999. However, peace operations do not address the underlying issues that led to the initial conflict (Peake & Brown, 2005). Without long-term work to develop the conditions for sustainable peace and development, conflict and riots can reoccur—as happened in both Solomon Islands in 2006 and Timor-Leste in 2007. As a liberal peace approach suggests, it was essential that the initial phase to establish suitable conditions was followed by the long-term and more challenging phase of state-building and the associated police capacity development.
Long-Term Police Capacity Development Projects
Numerous long-term police capacity development projects have been undertaken in PICs as part of broader state-building interventions. Two examples are particularly important to consider first: the capacity development phase of RAMSI and the Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP) in PNG. In both cases, the prevailing circumstances for local police included poor funding and lack of government support, poor working conditions, and a presence that was limited to specific (mostly urban) areas, leaving most of the population without access to state police (Dinnen & McLeod, 2009). Both countries had the institutional framework of the British Westminster system as a legacy of colonisation alongside the non-state local and customary approaches to governance and justice.
The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
The capacity development phase of RAMSI was backed by the Pacific Islands Forum and characterised by multinational deployments (see ‘Peace Operations in Solomon Islands—RAMSI’, above). Following the initial response aimed at stabilising law and order, the priorities in Solomon Islands shifted to the far more difficult and long-term task of reconstruction and development. This included a focus on the ministries of police, justice, and finance (Fraenkel, 2015). For the police, the crucial task was to rebuild the RSIP. Because many members of the RSIP had been dismissed and charged with crimes under RAMSI, there was a need to recruit and train new police officers, as well as prosecute those charged (Fraenkel, 2015).
Following a period of institutional strengthening, then one of capacity development amid political volatility, efforts turned to working in partnership with Solomon Islands Government towards transition (Putt et al., 2018). From 2013, when the remaining military contingent left, RAMSI became a police assistance and capacity development mission. The Solomon Islands police, now known as the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF), had responsibility for policing as RAMSI moved towards the drawdown in 2017 (Putt et al., 2018).
As RAMSI’s exit strategy was considered, a shift in narrative occurred, highlighting that the RSIPF had developed capacity throughout the mission (Dinnen & Allen, 2013). For example, the RSIPF and the PPF provided security for general elections in 2010 and 2014, which went ahead without incident (AFP, 2011, 2015). When flash flooding in Guadalcanal province in 2014 caused 22 deaths and the displacement of approximately 52,000 people, the RSIPF led the response—including establishing a temporary disaster victim identification centre—demonstrating its capacity to manage a major operation (AFP, 2014). Ultimately, by the time that the drawdown of RAMSI was complete, arrangements had been made to continue police capacity development through bilateral agreements (Putt et al., 2018). The RSIPF later oversaw the 2019 election, which built confidence both within the country and in the region about its effectiveness (AFP, 2019).
RAMSI was characterised by its capacity to adapt and change (Braithwaite et al., 2010; Dinnen, 2012; Dinnen & McLeod, 2009). While at the outset of the mission Solomon Islands was viewed through an external security lens, over time it came to be viewed from a more context-specific developmental perspective (Dinnen, 2012). Initially, the selection and pre-deployment training of those involved in capacity development did not ensure the right level of expertise and cultural awareness (Auditor-General, 2007). This evolved in response to feedback. For example, it came to include greater cultural training and input from Solomon Islanders, as well as training on how to mentor the local police rather than doing the job oneself (Putt et al., 2018)—a challenge exacerbated by the PPF’s periodic and non-linear switching from executive to advisory roles. Although at first the duration of deployments was too short to build the necessary relationships of trust, later in the mission the time spent in one role and location was increased (Goldsmith & Harris, 2012). Initially, each new advisor within the Learning and Development Group wanted to change the curriculum. Once this problem was recognised, a full review was undertaken to develop curriculum for future requirements (Den Heyer, 2010, p. 222). Further changes occurred in response to the needs of the Pacific Islands contingent. These included the development of designated leadership and wellbeing roles staffed by members of the contingent (Putt et al., 2018).
One of the great strengths of the mission was the inclusion of police officers from Pacific Islands jurisdictions. First, at the international level, this multilateral regional approach provided far greater legitimacy to such an intervention. Second, the inclusion of Pacific police officers was extremely beneficial for practical reasons (Peake & Brown, 2005; Putt et al., 2018). Members of the Pacific Islands contingent from various countries often understood the challenges of working in hybrid systems of justice. Those from PNG and Vanuatu were able to communicate effectively with Solomon Islands locals given the similarities in Melanesian cultural context and the use of variations of pidgin language (Putt et al., 2018). The value of the Pacific Islands contingent’s contribution is also evident in that Solomon Islands’ leaders often requested that officers assigned for their protection be Pacific members. In addition, Australian members reflected favourably on the contribution of the Pacific Islands contingent (Putt et al., 2018).
However, the mission was not without critique. It was less ambitious in scope than initially intended. As an exercise in state-building, it was narrow, in that it only affected police, justice, and finance, while 21 other government ministries were not included (Fraenkel, 2015). It may be regarded as an exercise in strengthening the existing institutional frameworks rather than one in broader police reform (Dinnen & McLeod, 2009). Many of the changes achieved within the RSIPF were due to a new generation of police officers in the police organisation (Fraenkel, 2015). Further concerns included that RAMSI may have generated overreliance on external support (Dinnen, 2012). One of the paradoxes of having a highly professional and well-resourced PPF involved in policing was the stark contrast that it presented to the RSIPF. Solomon Islanders’ confidence in the RSPIF was inadvertently undermined (Dinnen & Allen, 2013).
Ultimately, while RAMSI is often regarded as largely successful, police capacity building on its own will not ensure that the justice system, including the customary and local aspects, is functional and sustainable in the longer term (Dinnen & McLeod, 2009; Peake & Brown, 2005). Police officers are unlikely to know the range of options that exist for development, and therefore work to build police organisations and officers in their own images. To be most effective, police capacity development must be part of broader state-building and therefore requires partnerships beyond policing (Peake & Brown, 2005). Since the conclusion of RAMSI in June 2017, the Solomon Islands Police Development Program has been in place to continue to support the RSIPF (AFP, 2017a, 2019). This suggests a narrative of continuity rather than rupture following the RAMSI intervention.
The Enhanced Cooperation Program
The ECP was conceptualised in 2003 following the early success of RAMSI and provides a relevant contrast. The Australian Government was concerned that PNG was facing a period of instability and corruption and could become a failing state. Although PNG was not a country in a post-conflict scenario, addressing the challenges was viewed as a more difficult prospect than in Solomon Islands (Hawksley, 2005; McLeod & Dinnen, 2007). Envisaged as a five-year whole-of-government program, the ECP would involve placing 64 technical and specialist advisors—from law and justice; economic, finance and planning; and border control—in central governmental agencies in PNG to strengthen institutions. It would include a police-led intervention involving 210 Australian police known as the Australian Assisting Police (AAP), comprised of generalist and specialist police members drawn from the AFP and Australian state and territory police jurisdictions. The ECP would contribute A$800 million to PNG, in addition to $300 million from AusAID. When PNG gained independence in 1975 after a history of German and British claims followed by 70 years of Australian colonial administration (Ferns, 2015), Australia had promised to continue to provide substantial aid.
Even though the discourse surrounding Pacific aid at the time already included important elements such as mutual obligations and key performance indicators, the ECP was a heavy-handed approach by the Australian Government (Hawksley, 2005). Part of the plan for the AAP was that they would engage in executive policing. The police officers would hold line positions in the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) but maintain a parallel command structure. They would have the power to arrest people, and—as is standard practice under peacekeeping deployments—they would have full immunity under PNG law (but not under Australian law). This arrangement was contentious in PNG—it was an affront to many members of the political elite. The legal foundations of the arrangement were challenged by PNG’s Governor of Morobe, Luther Wenge, who was a former judge of PNG’s National and Supreme Courts (Hameiri, 2009). AAP members had already been deployed to Port Moresby and Bougainville and were largely welcomed by the public, with reports of increased feelings of safety (McLeod, 2009). However, on 13 May 2005, the PNG Supreme Court ruled against the PNG legislation that had enabled the ECP, deeming it unconstitutional. Consequently, the AAP were withdrawn from PNG (May, 2012). Importantly, while most of the public servants remained, they did so as advisors rather than in-line officials in the agencies concerned. This reduced their potency.
Although the ECP was just beginning to be rolled out at the time of its demise in 2005—and thus was never fully implemented—it has provided fertile ground for analysis and critique. For example, while it was reportedly extremely popular among many ordinary Papua New Guinean people, including members of the RPNGC, the view among the political elite was that the program was too interventionist—it did not adequately respect the sovereignty of PNG (Hawksley, 2005). It was true that support was needed in PNG, but the approach to providing it had fallen short. In other words, because the program was not a humanitarian intervention and the Australian police contingent were not peacekeepers, Australia should have treated PNG as a sovereign state rather than a collapsed one (Hawksley, 2005, p. 37). Additional criticisms of the program were made based on its projected economic costs and benefits, which did not appear to offer the same value for money as those of health and education programs (Sugden, 2004). The previous aid project, a 15-year RPNGC Development Project (1989–2005), had been criticised because it lacked adequate mechanisms to measure achievements (Dinnen & McLeod, 2009), yet the ECP also lacked a framework for monitoring performance and accountability (Sugden, 2004).
Further, the aims, ethos, and values of the program were not sufficiently shared by its partners. Analysis of data from focus groups and interviews with ECP participants, including 100 members of the RPNGC and 33 members of the AAP, highlighted mismatches (McLeod, 2009). The premise of the ECP as a one-way transfer of skills or capacity development program was problematic. From the PNG perspective, recognition of two-way learning and knowledge exchange would have been more appropriate because, without sufficient understanding of the local context, Australian advice and mentoring was unlikely to be meaningful (McLeod, 2009). In PNG, wisdom, knowledge, and experience are associated with age, the presence of grey hair, and the achievement of certain milestones in life, as well as significant relevant career experience. The fact that some AAP members had been deployed above their ordinary rank was not welcomed by PNG officers (McLeod, 2009). Stark contrasts in conditions, such as pay and accommodation, between the RPNGC and the AAP contributed to resentment. Further, differences in policing practices added complexity. For example, PNG officers reportedly regarded the use of force as an essential component of policing, due to a lack of resources and a perceived community desire for strong policing. For the AAP, however, the deterrence of police brutality was an important component of their role in building trust in local policing. Furthermore, the use of non-state dispute resolution processes, which focus on talk to resolve differences, often had widespread community and police support. The preference of PNG officers to resolve matters using community approaches posed a challenge for the AAP whose role was to help strengthen the state system (McLeod, 2009).
In short, the ECP did not reflect a true partnership, but a rather more domineering approach imposed by Australia. It lacked the legitimacy of a multilateral agreement (Patience, 2005). It did not have adequate accountability measures in place and it did not reflect adequate understanding of the PNG context.
In the aftermath of the program, efforts turned to a more suitable bilateral agreement to continue assisting the RPNGC and justice institutions. This meant abandoning the executive policing role and reverting to an advisory one. Since being re-established, a PNG–Australia Policing Partnership has been in place in various forms (AFP, 2019).
Follow-up research after international deployments for RAMSI and the ECP revealed that despite the many practical challenges and frustrations (Harris, 2010), both during deployment and when reintegrating at home (Auditor-General, 2007; Putt et al., 2018), participating police officers experienced several secondary benefits. For example, while it was challenging for Australian police to mentor local police rather than do the work themselves, they gained insights into other countries and cultures. Some were humbled by the way local colleagues demonstrated resilience in the face of extreme poverty and lack of resources (Harris, 2010). For a number of police officers, their international deployments had been life-changing experiences (Brennan, 2015).
Similarly, research with the Pacific Islands contingent after RAMSI revealed significant benefits. The month spent in pre-deployment training at Majura in Canberra was valuable not only for the mission itself but also for the members’ roles in their home countries (Putt et al., 2018). The opportunities for confidence building and further development during the mission itself were wide-ranging. Informal networking and more formal efforts to institutionalise these connections were evident, for example, among female police officers in the Women’s Advisory Network (Putt et al., 2018; see Chapter 6). Many participants reportedly used new skills in their roles, some achieved promotions, and others contributed to change in their organisations (Putt et al., 2018). In short, although the circumstances of deployment were challenging, the goodwill and personal connections developed may have benefits in the longer term if connections can be maintained.
Recent Capacity Development Programs
Many challenges associated with large-scale police capacity development programs also apply in projects of a smaller scale (e.g., in Nauru, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu, and Bougainville). Indeed, evidence from annual reports, evaluations, and program design suggests an ongoing challenge to ensure that programs respond to local needs and contexts and are well integrated into larger programs.
For example, the Tonga Police Development Programme is a trilateral agreement between Tonga, Australia, and New Zealand that grew out of a stabilisation mission after riots in 2006. Although an increase in skills in target areas has been achieved from the program, it does not appear to be part of a larger program to build capacity in the justice sector or state more broadly (Law and Development Partnership, 2013a). It was recommended that program partners engage in a planning session to identify needs, what will be done to meet them, and how outcomes will be monitored (Tennant & Bernklau, 2016). The importance of spending more time planning at each new phase of a project to identify and prioritise the needs, strategies, measurement, and reporting has been highlighted in regard to multiple capacity development programs (Law and Development Partnership, 2013a; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade [DFAT], 2016).
In recent years, the Vanuatu–Australia Policing and Justice Program (Stretem Rod blong Jastis mo Sefti) has evolved. Prior to 2014, two separate programs for police and justice were operating simultaneously. In response to earlier critique about the lack of communication, collaboration, and coordination of the programs, they were brought together to improve outcomes across the sector and its organisations and to undertake community-based pilot programs (DFAT, 2016). The design of the program explicitly recognises the role of traditional and community justice mechanisms. This shift acknowledges that sustainable reform in the justice sector requires a strong element of working with—rather than against—the grain (Cox et al., 2012). The program aims to build on policing, justice, and community services to enhance access to justice, especially for women and children who have experienced violence, in all parts of Vanuatu (DFAT, 2016).
Similarly, the Bougainville Community Policing Project aims to support the Bougainville Police Service and to integrate and support a strong and sustainable community auxiliary police program (Tennant & Cowley, 2019). It was established in 1998 after New Zealand’s involvement in facilitating the peace declaration in 1997 between Bougainville leaders and PNG, and extends the reach of state police into previously isolated areas, enhancing access to justice. However, two evaluations highlighted that it could be better aligned with broader justice initiatives, including an Australian project that aims to strengthen criminal justice (Dinnen & Peake, 2013a; Law and Development Partnership, 2013a). This finding supported research in which stakeholders in PICs perceived that Australia and New Zealand could work together more effectively (Boswell, 2010; Dinnen & Peake, 2013b). Further, it was observed that planning should involve a long-term vision that fosters sustainability to avoid overreliance on hands-on support and funding. Working closely with other agencies is important so that police officers are not tasked with work that may be more appropriately undertaken by development professionals (Tennant & Cowley, 2019).
Discrete Police Capacity Development Initiatives
Discrete police capacity development initiatives aim to address local policing needs in generalist or specialist areas of policing, often through technical assistance or training. Many such initiatives exist in the Pacific region. One goal has been to support programs for the Pacific, by the Pacific (e.g., training on gender-based violence through the Women’s Crisis Centre in Fiji) (AFP, 2015). Some examples of training ‘by the Pacific’ occurred following the Pacific Islands contingent’s participation in RAMSI and the increased confidence its members developed. For example, Cook Islands Police delivered training on command and control to police from other PICs, and the RSIPF provided training on use of force and public order management to police in Nauru and Samoa (Putt et al., 2018). The Pacific Faculty of Policing, an initiative led by the AFP and the Australian Institute of Police Management (AIPM) aims to enhance leadership capabilities for the management of emerging regional security threats (AFP, 2019; AIPM, 2020). It is unclear the extent to which the training offered is also ‘by the Pacific’.
Table 5.2 presents some examples of discrete initiatives, many of which have been offered in various forms over long periods of time with the support of the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP).
Table 5.2
Examples of discrete police capacity development initiatives
Project | Activities | Partners |
|---|---|---|
Preventing Family Violence in the Pacific Program (PDVPP) | • Aims to build capacity in host police organisations (including in the Cook Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Kiribati, and Vanuatu) to prevent and respond to domestic violence | PICP New Zealand Police Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) |
Partnership for Pacific Policing (3P) | • Offers targeted interventions, including training in specific areas of identified need, management support, and leadership mentoring (New Zealand Police, 2020) • Involves discussions about needs and priorities before country-specific programs are designed (Allen & Clarke, 2017) • Includes the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Niue, Tokelau, Tuvalu, Samoa, and Vanuatu (New Zealand Police, 2020) | New Zealand Police MFAT |
Women’s Advisory Network | • Offers conferences, secondments to the PICP head office in New Zealand, exchanges to other PICs, mentoring programs, leadership workshops, and driver training programs (PICP, 2019a) | PICP MFAT AFP |
Pacific Police Development Program—Regional (PPDP-R) | • Includes multi-country programs and programs for countries without specific agreements (AFP, 2011) • Includes provision of police uniforms and equipment, investigation training, learning in generalist and specialist areas, and leadership development programs (AFP, 2015) • Provides support to regional organisations such as the PICP, the Pacific Police Training Advisory Group and the Pacific Police Policy Network (AFP, 2015) | AFP + others (depending on initiative) |
Cyber Safety Pasifika (PPDP-R initiative) | • Aims to increase the police capability to enforce laws, and to investigate and prosecute relevant crimes (AFP, 2018) • Prepares police officers to act as trainers in cyber safety awareness, strengthens cybercrime legislation and policy in line with international standards, and increases police officers’ skills in cybercrime investigations in conjunction with international experts from the FBI and Interpol (AFP, 2018; Cyber Safety Pasifika, 2019) | PICP AFP |
Pacific Forensic Working Group (PPDP-R initiative) | • Aims to enhance capacity to undertake forensic services work within policing • Includes refurbishing forensic laboratories (e.g., in Samoa, Tonga, and Cook Islands) and introducing the Pacific Automated Fingerprint Identification System (PAFIS) • Developed model provisions for forensic legislation that were approved by the PICP in 2015 | PICP AFP |
The fact that many programs have received positive endorsements from the partner organisations and renewed funding in successive rounds may be encouraging to those involved, but is not an objective measure of success. Indeed, measuring the achievement of objectives has been notoriously difficult. While training and technical assistance may lead to increases in the skills of individual participants, these technical skills initiatives may fall short of meeting the needs of the police organisation in the host country (Law and Development Partnership, 2013b). Often, they may have limited impact on the organisation and the broader justice sector. To improve effectiveness and relevance, and to minimise duplication, overlap, and critical gaps, these initiatives must be undertaken within the context of a larger project design that recognises the local circumstances and needs (Law and Development Partnership, 2013b). On the one hand, evidence from evaluations suggests that stakeholders have made substantial efforts to improve offerings over time, listen to local stakeholders, and foster local ownership and leadership (see e.g., Allen & Clarke, 2017). However, such evidence also highlights that many of the same challenges are recurring and that initiatives must be connected in the broader context (Peake & Dinnen, 2014a). A further criticism has been that discrete initiatives often serve the needs of provider countries’ interests in various ways, such as geostrategic positioning (e.g., in response to increased interest in the region from China) and improving the detection of transnational crime (McLeod, 2009).
Cross-Border Cooperation
Transnational crime is one of the key contemporary crime concerns associated with globalisation and technological connectivity (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2016). Concerns arise in the Pacific region not only because weak or fragile states could become havens of criminal activity, but also because the borders of the Pacific are vast and porous. Existing data suggests that various PICs are affected by environmental crimes (especially illegal fishing and resource extraction), sex trafficking (associated with logging and resource extraction industries), and the trafficking of illicit drugs and their precursors (UNODC, 2016; see Chapter 3). News reports suggest that drug shipments from South America destined for the ‘lucrative markets’ of Australia and New Zealand have found their way into PICs (see e.g., Lyons, 2019). This ‘spillover’ presents a challenging social issue for PICs, even though they are the unintended recipients of supplies (UNODC, 2016).
The Governments of Australia and New Zealand (among others, such as the United States) have long been concerned about criminal enterprises transiting through the Pacific region. For many PICs, the primary focus of crime concerns has been internal security threats (see e.g., May, 2012). In the mid-2000s, it was considered unlikely that PICs would be able to address transnational crime—both for budget-related reasons (Mid-Term Review Team [MTRT], 2006) and because of the challenges of corruption of officials (McCusker, 2006). Most of the small PICs do not have separate military, prison, or maritime officers; the police fulfil many roles. Membership of various networks aimed at addressing transnational crime could burden staff and stretch resources due to the need to manage different information-sharing agreements and reporting requirements (MTRT, 2006). Nevertheless, donor partners expected Pacific police organisations to participate in training and capacity development initiatives designed to combat transnational crime. However, doing so has not always met local organisational priorities (McLeod, 2009; Peake & Dinnen, 2014b; Watson et al., 2021). Increasingly, a recognised need exists among PICs to document and address transnational crime in the Pacific (UNODC, 2016). This is supported by the Boe Declaration on Regional Security (Pacific Islands Forum, 2018), which explicitly endorsed an increased focus in the Pacific region on transnational crime.
A host of agencies within and beyond the Pacific region collaborate to address and prevent transnational crime. For example, some PICs are part of broader networks through their membership of Interpol. These are Fiji, Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Nauru, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu. Additionally, the PICP is partnered with the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the UNODC (PICP, 2019c). Additionally, many PICs are members or observers of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG). This autonomous regional body aims to prevent criminal entities from profiting from crime by addressing money laundering and associated crimes, and terrorist financing (APG, 2019).5
As shown in Table 5.3, partnerships include the Pacific Transnational Crime Network, which has grown since its establishment by the AFP in 2002, and the associated Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre. The agreement by Fiji, Tonga, Australia, and New Zealand to form a transnational organised crime network—Transnational Serious and Organised Crime Pacific Taskforce—reflects the increased prominence of these types of crimes within PICs. Successful operations with Pacific partners targeting drug trafficking are routinely reported by the AFP (see e.g., AFP, 2017a). Australia and New Zealand also have police officers posted in the region as part of their international liaison officer networks. Specifically, the AFP has liaison officers in Fiji, PNG, and New Zealand (AFP, 2017b), while New Zealand Police has liaison officers in Samoa and Australia (New Zealand Police, 2020).
Table 5.3
Pacific partnerships for addressing transnational crime
Partnership | Activities |
|---|---|
Pacific Transnational Crime Network (PTCN) | The PTCN aims to work collaboratively to provide intelligence and investigative capability to combat transnational crime in the Pacific (PICP, n.d.). The network consists of 28 locally staffed transnational crime units (TCUs) in 20 Pacific Island countries and territories (AFP, 2019; PICP, n.d.). The first TCUs were established in 2002 in Fiji, Samoa, and Tonga, followed by Vanuatu and PNG, with funding from the AFP’s Law Enforcement Cooperation Program (now PPDP-R) |
Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre (PTCCC) | The PTCCC is based in Apia, Samoa (having been established in Suva, Fiji in 2004 and relocated in 2008 following the coup of 2006). It coordinates, produces, manages, and disseminates intelligence products to PTCN member countries and territories and other international law enforcement partners (PICP, n.d.) |
Transnational Serious and Organised Crime Pacific Taskforce (TSOC) | Established in 2019 by Fiji, Tonga, Australia and New Zealand, the aims of the TSOC are to enhance operations and information sharing through the PTCN and PTCCC. One of the focal concerns is crime facilitated by small craft in the region. It demonstrates commitment to effectiveness in multinational cooperation (AFP, 2019) |
An explicitly Pacific regional focus is evident in other partnerships. In a complex arrangement of networks, the PICP partners with numerous regional stakeholder organisations (PICP, 2019c). For example, the Oceania Customs Organisation (OCO) is an intergovernmental organisation that aims to assist member countries in achieving international standards and best practices in border security (OCO, 2018). The Pacific Immigration Development Community is also aimed at protecting borders (PICP, 2019c). The Pacific Islands Law Officers Network (PILON) brings together judges and senior officials. Focus areas in recent years have included cybercrime, environmental crime, and corruption, with a focus on combating illegal fishing and illegal logging, and criminal activities and corruption associated with the resource extraction industries (PILON, 2016, 2019). The Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency also collaborates to prevent fisheries crimes (PICP, 2019c).
The geography of the region makes it necessary to collaborate both within and between agencies and countries—a situation that is also evident in post-disaster assistance.
Post-Disaster Assistance
Although the Pacific region is well known for its geographical and geological vulnerability to natural disasters such as tropical cyclones, floods, tsunami, droughts, earthquakes, and volcanic activity, many PICs have limited access to local emergency assistance and resources for rebuilding (Noy, 2015). Examples in recent years of natural disasters in the region include volcanic activity in Vanuatu in 2017 and 2018, and Cyclone Harold, which impacted Fiji, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu in 2020. Due to climate change, the frequency and intensity of these disasters is expected to increase in the coming years (Gero et al., 2015). For many years, the Pacific Islands Forum was at an impasse on the issue of climate change due to inaction by Australia and New Zealand (Lawson, 2017). Thus, the Boe Declaration on Regional Security (Pacific Islands Forum, 2018)—which redefined security to recognise ‘that climate change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific’ (article 1[i])—reflects an important step forward.
In terms of international policing, post-disaster assistance can include a deployment of generalist and specialist police officers; for example, to assist in community policing and support search and rescue (AFP, 2011). Family investigation liaison officers, forensic experts, and disaster victim identification experts can assist in cases of mass fatality. In instances of terrorist attacks, intelligence officers and investigative support can also be provided (AFP, 2019). For example, forensic specialists were deployed to Tonga to assist with investigation and the identification of five deceased persons following the 2006 Shoreline fire (AFP, 2008). Humanitarian forensic science is more complex than routine forensic science, and international deployments are therefore essential to provide the necessary skills and equipment (Cordner, 2018).
International humanitarian assistance in the wake of disasters is often a multidisciplinary and multi-agency endeavour (Gero et al., 2015). What is offered depends on the needs identified and requests made by the governments of affected countries, as well as the capacity and resources available in sending countries. The multifaceted nature of disaster assistance highlights the need for partnership approaches so that the activities of government agencies can be coordinated effectively with those of the private sector, non-governmental organisations, the UN, and other organisations and countries (Gero et al., 2015).
Disaster assistance has typically flowed from well-resourced countries of the global North, which have long-established partnerships in this regard. These include the FRANZ Arrangement of France, Australia, and New Zealand, and the Quadrilateral Defence Coordinating Group comprised of Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and France.6 Other countries called upon to assist have included Canada and Singapore. However, the dominance of countries of the global North has begun to change, with greater prominence of relief efforts from PICs. In 2015, after Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu (among other PICs), Fiji contributed to international support through the provision of military engineers, health professionals, and supplies. The Royal New Zealand Air Force assisted with their transport needs (Greener & Powles, 2015).
Similarly, during Australia’s unprecedented bushfires in the summer of 2019–2020, several PICs offered to assist (Wyeth, 2020). In response to the official Australian request, PNG sent 100 and Fiji sent 58 troops, most of whom were engineers. For PNG it was the largest overseas deployment to date. Additionally, Vanuatu donated funds to support fire services. Local people and small businesses in Fiji, PNG and Vanuatu collected donations (Ewart & Handley, 2020). The unexpected contribution from the Pacific region reflected warmth and reciprocity in Pacific partnerships (Wyeth, 2020). While there are striking differences in access to financial resources and specialist equipment between countries like Australia and PICs, these examples raised opportunities for renewed thinking and discussion about ways of working together. One suggestion is to extend the membership of existing groups such as the FRANZ Arrangement to PICs; another is for a regional body to coordinate disaster responses in such a way that leadership of the response need not be by those equipped with the greatest resources (Greener & Powles, 2015).
Conclusion
International policing is a multifaceted and political endeavour. This chapter has outlined the nature of international policing, providing an overview of its history in the Pacific and its association with objectives related both to security and development. It highlighted examples of international policing in the Pacific region. Collectively, these examples reflect motivations both of self-interest and of good global citizenship among the participating countries. However, while international policing in the Pacific has the potential to be mutually beneficial for those involved, vast resourcing disparities are abundantly evident. Other critical disparities also exist. For example, Australia and New Zealand may benefit from gains in international reputation and their policing organisations may receive increased national government funding based on their international policing efforts. By contrast, policing in PICs often relies on a steady flow of aid funding for initiatives to continue effectively. Achieving tangible benefits in PICs requires appropriate planning and partnerships. While evidence suggests that there have been efforts to improve partnerships and program design over time, there is no room for complacency. These are not simple matters and remain ongoing challenges (Peake & Dinnen, 2014a).
Since its early beginnings, the story of international policing is one of learning to work with others. This has included the need for police to work with the military and police contingents from other countries. A substantial challenge exists for international police to understand the unique and specific cultural contexts of their Pacific deployments (Harris, 2010; McLeod, 2009). This need for understanding suggests the importance of adequate pre-deployment preparation, and the development and maintenance of relationships in the local context. More broadly, however, there is a clear need for communication and consultation across multiple agencies in provider and host countries at all phases of the process of international policing. One of the main characteristics of justice sectors in PICs is that they can be extremely broad, reflecting state, customary, and local community ways of providing justice (Dinnen & McLeod, 2009). The need to work within a broader programmatic framework for sustainable development that minimises gaps and overlaps has been a recurring theme of the chapter.
Importantly, despite the challenges associated with international policing, the mutual benefits of cooperation are apparent. The enduring relationships and partnerships are positive features of international policing in the Pacific. As PICs have contributed to international policing both within and beyond the region, police officers have experienced valuable professional development and cross-border relationships in the region, which have in turn benefited their organisations (Putt et al., 2018). Collaborative efforts to address security threats provide reason for optimism about the future of the region (Wallis, 2012, 2017), as does an increased focus on regionalism in the Pacific. The Boe Declaration on Regional Security (Pacific Islands Forum, 2018) is an important example—reflecting consensus on the need for regional security cooperation, and increased emphasis on both transnational crime and climate change as prominent security concerns. With continued efforts to work effectively in Pacific partnerships, this consensus has the potential to contribute to shaping international policing in new and as yet unknown ways in coming years.
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