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Erschienen in:
An Introduction to Institutional Inertia-Theory and Evidence Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2024 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

An Introduction to Institutional Inertia: Concepts, Types and Causes

verfasst von : Ali Hussein Samadi, Masoomeh Alipourian, Sajjad Afroozeh, Alireza Raanaei, Mojtaba Panahi

Erschienen in: Institutional Inertia

Verlag: Springer Nature Switzerland

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Abstract

The resistance of institutions to change (or institutional inertia), is one of the important issues in institutional economics. In this chapter, the concept of inertia, the types of inertia in human sciences, and the causes of institutional inertia have been explained. Also, types of inertia at the level of individuals, inertia at the level of social and political structures, and inertia at the level of knowledge development, concepts and ideas are explained. Due to the importance of institutional inertia and the fact that this type of inertia includes a large number of other types of inertia (such as organizational inertia, psychological inertia, and socio-political inertia), sixteen major and fundamental factors causing institutional inertia have also been introduced and explained. These factors are divided into four categories: economic, socio-political, historical, and psychological factors and are briefly explained. Another contribution of this chapter is providing evidence of the compatibility of institutional changes and institutional continuity.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Inertia: Resistance and Endurance
Nächstes Kapitel The Origin of Development, Critical Juncture, and Institutional Inertia
Fußnoten
1
To read more about the concept of inertia, refer to Chapter “Inertia:​ Resistance and Endurance” of this book.
 
2
Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or the human-designed constraints that shape human interactions. Institutions reduce uncertainty by providing structure to everyday life.” Institutions include both formal rules such as laws and constitutions and informal constraints such as contracts and norms (North, 1990: 3). Fundamentally, institutions are seen as enduring rules that govern human interactions, and are designed by human hands. For further reading, refer to Samadi and Alipourian (2021).
 
3
To read more about the concept, and causes of cognitive inertia, and its effect on institutional change and institutional inertia, refer to Chapters “Cognitive Inertia as a Fundamental Cause of Institutional Inertia” and “Overview of Institutional–Organization Inertia Nexus” of this book.
 
4
To read more about the organizational inertia, refer to Chapters “Internal Empowerment Dynamics of Organizational Inertia Management” and “Trade and Institutional Inertia” of this book.
 
5
De facto and de jure institutions are not antonyms; they may overlap (Marciano & Ramello, 2018, p. 525).
 
6
De jure means a state of affairs that is in accordance with the law, i.e., de jure institutions constitute a subclass of formal institutions and must necessarily be external in nature (Marciano & Ramello, 2018, p. 525).
 
7
De facto means a state of affairs that is true in fact but does not have to be officially sanctioned, i.e., de facto institutions may be formal or informal, as well as external or internal, provided that they are operative (Marciano & Ramello, 2018, p. 525).
 
8
To read more about the inertia in informal institutions, refer to Chapter “The Roots of Cognitive Inertia:​ An Introduction to Institutional Changes” of this book.
 
10
Olson uses the concept of coalition in the two meanings of “distributive coalition” and “inclusive coalition” (Olson, 2008). Both types of coalitions are trying to gain access to the political environment. A distributive coalition is a special interest group that only represents the interests of a small group of political elites. This group is trying to maintain its position in achieving benefits and privileges arising from the existing institutional relations. In contrast, the inclusive coalition seeks to redistribute benefits and privileges among the society.
 
11
To read more, refer to Chapter “Overview of Institutional–Organization Inertia Nexus” of this book.
 
12
For a more conceptual study of these aspects, refer to the Chapter “Inertia:​ Resistance and Endurance” of this book – Faghih et al.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
An Introduction to Institutional Inertia: Concepts, Types and Causes
verfasst von
Ali Hussein Samadi
Masoomeh Alipourian
Sajjad Afroozeh
Alireza Raanaei
Mojtaba Panahi
Copyright-Jahr
2024
Buch
Institutional Inertia

Print ISBN: 978-3-031-51174-5

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-031-51175-2

Copyright-Jahr: 2024

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51175-2_3

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