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2014 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Lightweight Authentication Protocols on Ultra-Constrained RFIDs - Myths and Facts

verfasst von : Frederik Armknecht, Matthias Hamann, Vasily Mikhalev

Erschienen in: Radio Frequency Identification: Security and Privacy Issues

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

While most lightweight authentication protocols have been well analyzed with respect to their security, often only little (or even nothing) is known with respect to their suitability for low-cost RFIDs in the range of $0.05 to $0.10. Probably this is mainly due to the fact that open literature rarely provides information on what conditions need to be met by a scheme in practice, hindering a sound development and analysis of schemes.
We provide a comprehensive collection of several conditions that should be met by lightweight authentication schemes if deployed in low-cost RFID systems. Afterwards, we show that none of the existing authentication protocols that are based on the hardness of the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem complies to these conditions, leaving the design of an LPN-based protocol for low-cost RFIDs as an open question.

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Nächstes Kapitel High-Speed Dating Privacy-Preserving Attribute Matching for RFID
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Fußnoten
1
In [6], it is stated that “in accordance with C1G2, a maximum tag to reader data transmission rate of 640 kbps and a reader to tag data transmission rate of 126 kbps based on equi-probable binary ones and zeros in the transmission can be calculated” and that “performance criteria of an RFID system demand a minimum label reading speed in excess of 200 labels per second”.
 
2
In [2], a 0.13 \({\upmu }\)m CMOS process is used. For comparison, the AES implementation in [8] is based on a 0.35 \({\upmu }\)m CMOS process and occupies 0.25 mm\(^2\), which “compares roughly to 3400 gate equivalents” in this context.
 
3
For the sake of simplicity, in this subsection, the term key will always be used to refer to the shared secret’s unique representation as a binary vector in the corresponding scheme, irrespective of potential blow-up measures like, e.g., the use of Toeplitz matrices. In particular, the key size lower bounds the size of the individual key storage required on each tag.
 
4
At the current state, Lapin was omitted from the table in Appendix B as, according to its authors, it is actually “targeting lightweight tags that are equipped with (small) CPUs” as compared to “ultra constrained tokens (such as RFIDs in the price range of few cents targeting the EPC market)” [17]. (See also [11] for a very recent suggestion of an FPGA implementation for Lapin, which, however, is still not feasible when transferred to low-cost ASICs. Again, the details of this will be discussed in the full version of the paper.)
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Lightweight Authentication Protocols on Ultra-Constrained RFIDs - Myths and Facts
verfasst von
Frederik Armknecht
Matthias Hamann
Vasily Mikhalev
Copyright-Jahr
2014
Buch
Radio Frequency Identification: Security and Privacy Issues

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-13065-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-13066-8

Copyright-Jahr: 2014

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13066-8_1

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