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Erschienen in:
2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Cryptanalysis of Ascon
verfasst von : Christoph Dobraunig, Maria Eichlseder, Florian Mendel, Martin Schläffer
Erschienen in: Topics in Cryptology –- CT-RSA 2015
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We present a detailed security analysis of the CAESAR candidate
Ascon
. Amongst others, cube-like, differential and linear cryptanalysis are used to evaluate the security of
Ascon
. Our results are practical key-recovery attacks on round-reduced versions of
Ascon
-128, where the initialization is reduced to 5 out of 12 rounds. Theoretical key-recovery attacks are possible for up to 6 rounds of initialization. Moreover, we present a practical forgery attack for 3 rounds of the finalization, a theoretical forgery attack for 4 rounds finalization and zero-sum distinguishers for the full 12-round
Ascon
permutation. Besides, we present the first results regarding linear cryptanalysis of
Ascon
, improve upon the results of the designers regarding differential cryptanalysis, and prove bounds on the minimum number of (linearly and differentially) active S-boxes for the
Ascon
permutation.