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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

The New Anti-Dumping Methodology of the European Union: A Breach of WTO Law?

verfasst von : Christian Tietje, Vinzenz Sacher

Erschienen in: The Future of Trade Defence Instruments

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Following the expiry of Article 15(a)(ii) of China’s Accession Protocol to the WTO, the European Union faced the substantive challenge to rework its Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation. This paper seeks to provide an overview over the legislative process of the new Anti-Dumping methodology of the European Union and to analyse the new provisions on their consistency with WTO law. We hereby argue that the remaining parts of Article 15 of China’s Accession Protocol do not allow for the continuous application of the pre-existing EU approach and that also the new approach of the European Union is in violation of Articles 2.2.1.1 and 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as well as Article VI:1(b)(ii) of the GATT, especially in the light of the recent Appellate Body decision in EU – Biodiesel.

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Vorheriges Kapitel The New Rules Adopted by the European Union to Address “Significant Distortions” in the Anti-Dumping Context

Nächstes Kapitel EU – Price Comparison Methodologies (DS516): Interpretation of Section 15 of China’s WTO Accession Protocol

Euractiv, China frets over new EU anti-dumping duties on steel. Euractiv.com with Reuters, 28 February 2017, https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/china-frets-over-new-eu-anti-dumping-duties-on-steel (last accessed 30 April 2018).

In detail on China’s Accession Protocol: Qin (2003), pp. 487 et seq.; concerning the legal status of WTO Accession Protocols: Kennedy (2013), pp. 58 et seq.; Liu (2014), p. 751.

The European Parliament explicitly opposed to a recognition of China as a market economy in May 2016 and requested the Commission to handle possible anti-dumping duties strictly, see: European Parliament, Resolution on China’s market economy status, 2016/2667(RSP), 12 May 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2016-0223+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (last accessed 30 April 2018); the Council on the other hand published a more careful statement: “In this context the European Council believes that unfair trade practices need to be tackled efficiently and robustly. (…) This requires a (…) modernisation of all trade defence instruments by the end of 2016.”, European Council, Conclusions on meeting 20–21 October 2016, EUCO 31/16, 21 October 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24257/20-21-euco-conclusions-final.pdf (last accessed 30 April 2018), p. 5; EU-Commissioner for Trade, Cecilia Malmström even said: “Yet China is far from being a market economy”, Cecilia Malmström, The future of EU trade policy, Brussels, 24 January 2017, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/january/tradoc_155261.pdf (last accessed 30 April 2018).

World Steel Production has doubled in the last 20 years, whereas China’s market share grew from 15 to nearly 50%: World Steel Association, World Steel in Figures 2017, https://www.worldsteel.org/en/dam/jcr:0474d208-9108-4927-ace8-4ac5445c5df8/World+Steel+in+Figures+2017.pdf (last accessed 30 April 2018), p. 6.

OJ 2017 L 338/1.

In detail on the Australian Approach: Zhou (2015), p. 980; Australia did recognise China formally as a Market Economy in the wake of the negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement, though: Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China on the Recognition of China’s Full Market Economy Status and the Commencement of Negotiation of A Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the People’s Republic of China, 18 April 2005, http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/chafta/Pages/australia-china-fta.aspx (last accessed 30 April 2018).

In detail on this provision: Snyder (2001), pp. 380 et seq.; Polouektov (2002), pp. 6 et seq.

BKP Development Research & Consulting, Evaluation of the European Union’s Trade Defence Instruments, Final Evaluation Study Volume 1, 27 February 2012, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/march/tradoc_149236.pdf (last accessed 30 April 2018), p. 292; Cliff Stevenson, Mayer, Brown, Row & Maw LLP, Evaluation of EC Trade Defence Instruments, December 2005, Final Report, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/february/tradoc_127382.pdf (last accessed 30 April 2018); De Kok (2016), p. 519.

Adamantopoulos (2010) para. 24; Tietje C and Nowroth K, Myth or Reality? China’s Market Economy Status under WTO Anti-Dumping Law after 2016. Policy Papers on Transnational Economic Law No. 34, December 2011, http://telc.jura.uni-halle.de/sites/default/files/telc/PolicyPaper34.pdf (last accessed 30 April 2018), p. 10; Yan (2010), p. 162; also see the obiter dictum of the Appellate Body in the EC – Fasteners decision: “We observe that the second Ad Note to Article VI:1 refers to a “country which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its trade” and “where all domestic prices are fixed by the State”” (emphasis added), Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R, adopted 15 July 2011, DSR 2011:II, para. 285 and fn. 460.

Tietje C and Nowroth K, Myth or Reality? China’s Market Economy Status under WTO Anti-Dumping Law after 2016. Policy Papers on Transnational Economic Law No. 34, December 2011, http://telc.jura.uni-halle.de/sites/default/files/telc/PolicyPaper34.pdf (last accessed 30 April 2018), p. 4; Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R, adopted 30 January 2012, DSR 2011:V, para. 278; Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, WT/DS397/AB/R, adopted 15 July 2011, DSR 2011:II, para. 289.

Recently among others: Zhou and Peng (2018), p. 7; Sacher (2017), pp. 20 et seq.; Yu and Guan (2017), pp. 16 et seq.; Depayre (2016), pp. 42 et seq.; Miranda (2016a), pp. 244 et seq.; Miranda (2014), pp. 94 et seq.; Miranda (2016c), pp. 447 et seq.; Miranda (2016b), pp. 306 et seq.; Gatta (2014a), pp. 144 et seq.; Gatta (2014b), p. 165; Graafsma and Kumashova (2014), pp. 154 et seq.; Stewart et al. (2014), pp. 272 et seq.; Vermulst et al. (2016), pp. 212 et seq.; Zhenghao (2016), pp. 229 et seq.; Noel (2016), pp. 296 et seq.; Searles (2016), pp. 430 et seq.; O’Connor (2015), p. 176; O’Connor B, The EU Does Not Have to Make China a Market Economy in 2016, March 2015, https://www.lexology.com/library/document.ashx?g=e68313f5-db9d-445b-879a-bfd6a03e9fd6 (last accessed 30 April 2018); O’Connor B, The Myth of China and Market Economy Status in 2016, http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/files/oconnorresponse.pdf (last accessed 30 April 2018); O’Connor B, Market-economy status for China is not automatic, CEPR’s policy portal, 27 November 2011, http://voxeu.org/article/china-market-economy (last accessed 30 April 2018).

Miranda (2014), pp. 100 et seq.; O’Connor B, The EU Does Not Have to Make China a Market Economy in 2016, March 2015, http://www.lexology.com/library/document.ashx?g=e68313f5-db9d-445b-879a-bfd6a03e9fd6 (last accessed 30 April 2018); O’Connor B, The Myth of China and Market Economy Status in 2016, http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/files/oconnorresponse.pdf (last accessed 30 April 2018); Posner (2014), p. 149.

Graafsma and Kumashova (2014), pp. 154 et seq.; Tietje C and Nowroth K, Myth or Reality? China’s Market Economy Status under WTO Anti-Dumping Law after 2016, Policy Papers on Transnational Economic Law No. 34, December 2011, http://telc.jura.uni-halle.de/sites/default/files/telc/PolicyPaper34.pdf (last accessed 30 April 2018), p. 7; De Kok (2016), p. 527; Gatta (2014b), p. 165; Vermulst et al. (2016), pp. 212 et seq.; Zhou and Peng (2018).

For a detailed analysis of the bilateral drafting history of Article 15 CAP between China and the United States, Zhou and Peng (2018), p. 13. With respect to an analysis of the wording of Article 15 see, Zhou and Peng (2018), p. 6; Sacher (2017), pp. 20 et seq.

Panel Report, European Union – Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies, WT/DS516/9, adopted 10 March 2017.

Among others: Nicely (2014), p. 160; De Kok (2016), p. 515; Gatta (2014a), p. 144; Searles (2016), p. 430; Noel and Zhou (2016), p. 559; Rao (2013), p. 152; Noel (2016), p. 296.

European Commission, Commission opens a public consultation on future measures to prevent dumped imports from China, 10 February 2016, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1455 (last accessed 30 April 2018); European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, Possible change in the calculation methodology of dumping regarding the People’s Republic of China (and other non-market economies) accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union and Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union, SWD(2016) 370 final, 9 November 2016, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/november/tradoc_155080.pdf (last accessed 30 April 2018).

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union and Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union, COM(2016) 721 final, 9 November 2016, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0721&from=EN (last accessed 30 April 2018).

Global Times, China says EU’s proposed anti-dumping rules disappointing. Global Times, 10 November 2016, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1017190.shtml (last accessed 30 April 2018); China also refers to the proposal of the Commission in its Request for the Establishment of a Panel: Panel Report, European Union – Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies, WT/DS516/9, adopted 10 March 2017, para. 12.

European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on the Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union and Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union, REX/483-EESC-2017, 29 March 2017, http://www.eesc.europa.eu/our-work/opinions-information-reports/opinions/rex483-trade-defence-instruments-methodology (last accessed 30 April 2018).

Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union and Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union (COM(2016)0721—C8-0456/2016—2016/0351(COD)), 27 June 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2017-0236+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN (last accessed 30 April 2018), pp. 13 et seq.

European Parliament, EU anti-dumping measures that protect jobs: MEPs and ministers strike deal, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20171003IPR85229/eu-anti-dumping-measures-that-protect-jobs-meps-and-ministers-strike-deal (last accessed 30 April 2018); Provisional Agreement resulting from interinstitutional negotiations, European Commission, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union and Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union, COM(2016) 721 final, 9 November 2016.

In detail on the issues relating to “input-dumping”, see: Tietje et al. (2011), pp. 1071 et seq.; Pogoretskyy (2009), pp. 313 et seq.; Shadikhodjaev (2016), pp. 705 et seq.

See the new Article 2(6a)(a) Regulation (EU) 2016/1036.

Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R, adopted 29 November 2004, DSR 2004:IV, para. 172; Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136/AB/R, adopted 28 August 2000, DSR 2000:V and VI, paras. 60 et seq. and 92 et seq.; Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/AB/R, adopted 4 February 2009, DSR 2008:XI, paras. 179 et seq.; Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan, WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 15 December 2003, DSR 2003:V, para. 81; Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods, WT/DS438/AB/R, adopted 15 January 2015, DSR 2014:IX, para. 5.103.

Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136/AB/R, adopted 24 August 2000, DSR 2000:V and VI, fn. 59; Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan, WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 15 December 2003, DSR2003:V, para. 89; Appellate Body Report, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WT/473/AB/R, adopted 6 October 2016, DSR 2016:IV, paras. 6.229, 7.271; in detail on this issue also: Kang (2012), p. 879; Lockhart and Sheargold (2010), p. 379; Naiki (2004), p. 52; Howse and Staiger (2006), p. 254; Lester (2011), p. 372; Bhuiyan (2002), p. 571.

Appellate Body Report, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WT/473/AB/R, adopted 6 October 2016, DSR 2016:IV, paras. 6.281 et seq.

According to Article 3.2 DSU WTO-law shall be interpreted “(...) in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.” The Appellate Body clarified that this provision allows for the Articles 31 et seq. of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to be used for interpreting WTO-law: Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, para. 17.

See http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/132361 (last accessed 30 April 2018).

According to Article 33(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the text of a treaty is equally authoritative in each language. The Appellate Body consistently refers to the Spanish or the French version in interpreting the WTO-Agreements, see i.e.: Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 12 March 2001, DSR 2000:XI, para. 91; Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R, adopted 30 April 2008, DSR 2008:I, fn. 200.

Noel (2016), p. 303.

Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted 24 July 2001, DSR 2001:II, para. 139.

Article 2.2.1 ADA.

For a detailed analysis on this requirement, see: Sacher (2017), pp. 25 et seq.

Zhou and Percival (2016), p. 863; Gatta and Nicely (2016), p. 239; Gatta (2014b), p. 170; Noel (2016), p. 303.

See http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/180520 (last accessed 30 April 2018).

See http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/138260 (last accessed 30 April 2018).

Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Large Residential Washers from Korea, WT/DS464/AB/R, adopted 7 September 2016, DSR 2016:II, para. 5.52; Appellate Body Report, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WT/473/AB/R, adopted 6 October 2016, DSR 2016:IV, para. 6.25.

Article 2(6a)(b) Regulation (EU) 2016/1036.

Appellate Body Report, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WT/473/AB/R, adopted 6 October 2016, DSR 2016:IV, para. 6.71.

Appellate Body Report, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WT/473/AB/R, adopted 6 October 2016, DSR 2016:IV, para. 6.73.

Report of the Panel, European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Indonesia, WT/480/P/R, adopted 25 January 2018, para. 7.3.

Article 2(6a)(a) Regulation (EU) 2016/1036.

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Titel: The New Anti-Dumping Methodology of the European Union: A Breach of WTO Law?
verfasst von: Christian Tietje
Vinzenz Sacher
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: The Future of Trade Defence Instruments
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-95305-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-95306-9

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95306-9_5

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