2010 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Approval Voting in Large Electorates
verfasst von : Matías Núñez
Erschienen in: Handbook on Approval Voting
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.
Wählen Sie Textabschnitte aus um mit Künstlicher Intelligenz passenden Patente zu finden. powered by
Markieren Sie Textabschnitte, um KI-gestützt weitere passende Inhalte zu finden. powered by
The strategic analysis of voting rules has given some insight into the understanding of their properties. However, one can assert that these analyses are “too rich” in the sense that they show that a plethora of equilibria can arise under most voting rules. In particular, there is a controversy over Approval voting or
AV
, a voting rule which has been called “the electoral reform of the twentieth century.” This voting rule allows the voter to vote for as many candidates as he wishes and the candidate who gets the most votes wins the election. Its detractors claim that this kind of method enhances strategic voting when compared for instance to Plurality voting (henceforth
PV
), whereas its proponents consider that it has several advantages as far as strategic voting is concerned. For an extensive discussion on this controversy over
AV
, the reader can refer to Brams (2008) and Weber (1995).