1987 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
On Stakeholders’ Unanimity
verfasst von : Jochen E. M. Wilhelm
Erschienen in: Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Enthalten in: Professional Book Archive
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This paper provides an approach to quantify the concerns of the different parties having stakes in a business activity, in terms of the implied consumption opportunities; it outlines inherent potentials for conflict and presents possible strategies to resolve the complex problem. We show that the market value of the initial endowment with financial assets and labour contracts may be regarded as an indicator that allows for preference independent ordering of the desirability of implied consumption opportunity sets under particular assumptions on how financial markets work and which allocative features they have. Thus the market value of the inital endowment can be used as objective function serving as the basis for a quantitative analysis of the wellknown conflicts between owners and creditors, and managers and owners, respectively. This analysis particularly reveals the importance of an appropriate designed wage scheme for harmonizing the interests of managers and owners. A fully satisfactory solution for all the parties concerned seems however difficult to design because of a manager’s incentive to impair both owners and creditors.