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1987 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

On Stakeholders’ Unanimity

verfasst von : Jochen E. M. Wilhelm

Erschienen in: Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives

Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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This paper provides an approach to quantify the concerns of the different parties having stakes in a business activity, in terms of the implied consumption opportunities; it outlines inherent potentials for conflict and presents possible strategies to resolve the complex problem. We show that the market value of the initial endowment with financial assets and labour contracts may be regarded as an indicator that allows for preference independent ordering of the desirability of implied consumption opportunity sets under particular assumptions on how financial markets work and which allocative features they have. Thus the market value of the inital endowment can be used as objective function serving as the basis for a quantitative analysis of the wellknown conflicts between owners and creditors, and managers and owners, respectively. This analysis particularly reveals the importance of an appropriate designed wage scheme for harmonizing the interests of managers and owners. A fully satisfactory solution for all the parties concerned seems however difficult to design because of a manager’s incentive to impair both owners and creditors.

Metadaten
Titel
On Stakeholders’ Unanimity
verfasst von
Jochen E. M. Wilhelm
Copyright-Jahr
1987
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75060-1_11

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