2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Collision Attack on 5 Rounds of Grøstl
verfasst von : Florian Mendel, Vincent Rijmen, Martin Schläffer
Erschienen in: Fast Software Encryption
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Abstract
Grøstl
hash function. This significantly improves upon the best previously published results on 3 rounds. By using a new type of differential trail spanning over more than one message block we are able to construct collisions for Grøstl
-256 on 4 and 5 rounds with complexity of \(2^{67}\) and \(2^{120}\), respectively. Both attacks need \(2^{64}\) memory. Due to the generic nature of our attack we can even construct meaningful collisions in the chosen-prefix setting with the same attack complexity.