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1982 | Buch

International Networks of Banks and Industry

verfasst von: M. Fennema

Verlag: Springer Netherlands

Buchreihe : Studies in Industrial Organization

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Research into interlocking directorates and other organizational ties between large corporations dates back to the beginning of the century. In Germany and the United States interlocking directorates became an important means of coordination and control of large corporations and banks at the end of the nineteenth century and were, as a result, particularly subject to scientific investigation and public debate. Trusts were regarded with mistrust, especially in the United States, where John Moody's study from 1904 was significantly entitled The Truth about Trusts. In Germany much attention was paid to the role-or-the large Berlin banks in the economic development. The first large study in Germany carried the prolix title The Relationship between the Large German Banks and Industry with Special Reference to the Iron Industry (Jeidels, 1905). ---- --------- The studies in the United States were predominantly induced and even carried out by committees of the Federal Congress. In Europe, on the other hand, the labor movement soon became interested in the patterns of interlocking directorates. In the Netherlands, for example, Wibaut, a socialist leader, carried out a study on interlocking directorates, copying the research design of Jeidels. Accordingly, two different schools can be distinguished from the start: the Marxian school which developed the concept of finance capital to explain the existing interlocking directorates, and the institutional economists who used the concept of economic power to explain the same phenomenon.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter
0. Introduction
Abstract
Research into interlocking directorates and other organizational ties between large corporations dates back to the beginning of the century. In Germany and the United States interlocking directorates became an important means of coordination and control of large corporations and banks at the end of the nineteenth century and were, as a result, particularly subject to scientific investigation and public debate. Trusts were regarded with mistrust, especially in the United States, where John Moody’s study from 1904 was significantly entitled The Truth about Trusts. In Germany much attention was paid to the role of the large Berlin banks in the economic development. The first large study in Germany carried the prolix title The Relationship between the Large German Banks and Industry with Special Reference to the Iron Industry (Jeidels, 1905).
M. Fennema
I. Themes and Problems
Abstract
In this first chapter I will sketch the theoretical framework of the two most important research traditions in the field of corporate interlocks. The first is that of finance capital. This theory is of German origin and has been developed predominantly within the marxist tradition. The second is that of (the abuse of) economic power. It is typically a product of the U.S. antitrust movement and has been developed within the school of institutional economics. The contribution of each theoretical tradition to the development of the empirical research will be assessed. [1] After that, two fundamental problems of research on interlocking directorates will be discussed: the theoretical and empirical problems related to the concept of interest- or financial group (Section 1.3) and the primarily theoretical problems related to the concepts of capitalist class and economic elite (Section 1.4).
M. Fennema
II. Between Market and Hierarchy
Abstract
In Section 1.1 the development of an intricate network of interlocking directorates was explained in terms of Hilferding’s theory of finance capital. In this theory, which firmly stands in the classical marxist tradition, interlocking directorates are explained by reference to the changing relations in the production process. According to historical materialism, the ownership relations follow suit. In the following section another explanation will be presented, based on the neo-classically inspired ‘new property-rights approach’. This approach differs fundamentally from that of Hilferding. While Hilferding explains the behavior of individuals from the economic structures, the neo-classical theorists explain the economic structures as resulting from the (economic) behavior of individuals.
M. Fennema
III. Imperialism in the Seventies: two models
Abstract
Preceding the emergence of industrial capitalism, the international economic order was based on mercantile capitalism. In this economic order there already existed an international financial network which found its summit in the internationally organized European merchant banks such as the Rothschild House, with its major branches in Paris, London and Vienna.
M. Fennema
IV. The International Corporate Elite
Abstract
Even though the study of interlocking directorates is basically a study of intercorporate power which cannot be based on theories and evidence of intracorporate power, the structure of the corporation is important for the position of the directors, especially for their position as interlocking directors. If, for example, the internal function of the board of directors is regarded as insignificant, the function of interlocking directorates will also be considered of minor importance. [1] In Section 4.1 the development of the decision-making structure of the large corporation and the main functions of different boards will be sketched. Furthermore, an international survey is necessary to compare national differences and to assign an identical meaning to corresponding positions. Since it is well known that formally similar positions may differ in content from one company to another within the same country, it is obvious that the idiosyncratic differences in companies from different nations will be even greater. For this reason the goal of Section 4.1 is very modest: only some major distinctions will be made to enable us to select the most important positions (Section 4.2) and to construct a simple typology of interlocking directorates according to the character of the position held in each of a pair of interlocked firms (Section 4.4.2).
M. Fennema
V. National and International
Abstract
In the nest four chapters, we will analyze the network of interlocking directorates according to the research design presented in Section 3.3. A few introductory remarks will be made here about the analytical tools to be used. Most of them are based on graph theory, a special branch of mathematics, the results which are used in the social sciences for quantitative structural analysis. Our presentation of some graph-theoretical concepts will be very summary and non-mathematical. For a more detailed and competent introduction, the reader is referred to Harary (1972).
M. Fennema
VI. Domination and Control
Abstract
In Chapter 5 we based our analysis on lines between firms rather than on interlocks proper. In this chapter the relation between two firms will be specified according to the number of interlocks, which was defined in Section 4.4.1 as the multiplicity of a line. Another typology defined in that section was based on the function of the interlocking director in each of two interlocked firms. Interlocks were labeled as weak, strong ortight ties, depending on whether the interlocking director had no inside position in either of the firms, had an inside position in only one of the firms, or had an inside position in both firms.
M. Fennema
VII. Competition and Cooperation: the role of banks
Abstract
In the preceding chapters we considered whether, at the international level, there exists an integrated network of interlocking directorates, and we found that for the largest Western firms this is, indeed, the case. This network, however, seems to suggest a system of communication rather than a system of domination, one in which New York banks and Dutch multinationals play a significant role in cementing the national subnetworks into an international whole. Although these findings do not corroborate the predicted structure of the network derived from the theory of Bucharin, there is still a possibility that they concur with the expected structure derived from the Bucharinist-inspired theory developed by Rowthorn. According to him the (few) international interlocks are predominantly carried by American, British and Dutch multinationals (see Section 3.2).
M. Fennema
VIII. The Impact of World Crisis: changes in the network
Abstract
Up to this point our analysis has been predominantly static. Only in Chapter 7 did the longitudinal comparison of interlocks between banks allow for some tentative conclusions about developments in the international banking system. In this chapter the dynamic aspects of the models inspired by economic theories of imperialism are central.
M. Fennema
IX. Summary and Conclusions
Abstract
In this final chapter, we will discuss some of the important findings of our investigation and take the liberty of formulating a few conclusions that are not, as yet, based on hard empirical evidence, but may nonetheless stimulate further research.
M. Fennema
Backmatter
Metadaten
Titel
International Networks of Banks and Industry
verfasst von
M. Fennema
Copyright-Jahr
1982
Verlag
Springer Netherlands
Electronic ISBN
978-94-009-7523-1
Print ISBN
978-94-009-7525-5
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7523-1