Co-operative Environmental Governance

Environmental issues have given new impetus to the debate on the opportunities and limitations of managing social change. The concept of governance presupposes a manageable society, or one that can at least be influenced. That concept is thus allied to a belief in progress; the malleability of society could be turned to its advantage. These elements have been pivotal to modern environmental policy from its very inception. Environmental change implies social change. The intent of environmental policy is to help shape a different society. No matter along which lines it is moulded, that society should be different and better to live in than the present one. Environmental policy is an attempt to induce people to change their behaviour and to imbue society with new and more ecologically sound social arrangements. These changes will have to be organized in one way or another. This raises questions as, who will manage that process and how? What are the options to get a process of environmental change going? Which criteria would the agents of change have to meet? To what extent can they live up to these requirements? The answers to these questions can be classified in terms of models of governance. Models of governance are developed to make complex issues more amenable to dedicated social action. They differ according to the role ascribed to government. However, that role is often a composite of standpoints on what makes environmental problems hard to manage. On the basis of different definitions of the governance issue, various ways can be advocated to introduce change.

This chapter will explore the potential which a particular pattern of interactive decision making offers for the successful management of environmental problems in industrialised democratic states. The approach involves drawing together partners from different sectors of social life to collectively define and implement solutions to specific environmental challenges. Such negotiated environmental settlements can be described as ‘co-operative management regimes’ (Lafferty and Meadowcroft, 1996), but their character might also be captured by phrases such as ‘Collaborative environmental administration’, ‘environmental co-management’, or even ‘environmental corporatism’. Here it will be argued that such initiatives offer a promising alternative to traditional regulatory strategies in dealing with some of the more intractable environmental dilemmas.

This book is an inquiry into the nature and preconditions of public-private co- operation for managing environmental problems. That topic calls for an investigation of the place of such co-operation in public administration as well as within the private sector. In both realms, one can observe a continuous search for innovative managerial strategies. Several modes of environmental governance were already introduced by Pieter Glasbergen in the introductory chapter to this volume. Also on the side of private industry, various organizational paradigms have evolved over time, some becoming more dominant than others. Until a few years ago, organizational paradigms for the public and the private sphere were developed independently. The new trend towards ‘New Public Management’, on the other hand, draws heavily on experience in private industry. The ties are especially clear with what is called the ‘Lean Production’ paradigm, creating substantial parallels to the main strategic thrust of these modes of organization. In this chapter, I will investigate the extent to which this common ground is a resource for public-private co-operation in the field of environmental management.

My purpose in this essay is to investigate the mutual relationships of some important conclusions on the nature-humanity issues that have been brewing, mostly independently of each other, in recent years. These conclusions stem from political and sociological studies as well as from an increasingly nuanced view of environmental science. I connect these developments to the perspective of developing social deliberation in environmental policy and politics.

Environmental agreements have become a very popular and often discussed instrument of environmental policy. Surveys and studies that were performed recently showed that voluntary agreements are a vital element of environmental policy in most member states of the European Union.¹ But it is not only in Europe that agreements have become a popular form of policy-making - examples from Poland and the U.S. show some interesting approaches as well.²

Environmental issues have to be tackled within a network of public and private actors. However, traditional instruments of environmental policy were not always designed to deal with the multifaceted, self-referential, interdependent, and dynamic nature of this network. Therefore, most governments have come to acknowledge that an environmental policy based solely on unilateral regulation is no longer adequate. Thus, there is a need for a new way of making environmental policy making. The new approach must be based on a mix of traditional and ‘novel’ instruments of environmental policy. The new measures must be more flexible and more appropriate to the characteristics of a network.

Dutch environmental policy of the past decade may be seen as a quest for new relationships between government and the private sector. What makes this quest so special is the clarity of its mission: to make the problem-solving capacity of government more effective when dealing with environmental issues. Yet the aim is not to expand the reach of government agencies. Nor does the policy seek to saddle the private sector with responsibilities that were previously public-sector tasks. Rather, it is an effort to give established relationships between public and private domains a new impetus. On the basis of existing responsibilities, which are recognized as being different, the relationships are to play a productive role in tackling environmental issues.

National and international environmental policies are moving towards’ softer’ regulation, especially in the form of (negotiated) environmental agreements. Supporters of this trend emphasize the positive effects on the economy and the environment, calling these agreements ‘efficient’, ‘innovative’ and ‘environmentally friendly’. The German Federal Government puts its faith in these positive effects, espousing environmental agreements in principle. However, by giving preference to these ‘soft’ instruments, the government may be tacitly relinquishing its responsibility for the environment. Negotiated agreements made by the business community -like the pledges to develop so-called three-litre cars, to take back old cars, or to reduce carbon dioxide emissions- are therefore controversial from an ecological and economic point of view.

There is a clear need for further measures to protect and repair the environment as well as to safeguard the welfare, health and life of society. Yet this does not necessarily mean that the focus must be solely on stronger environmental legislation along traditional avenues. A recent shift in the focus of environmental policy, calling for new approaches to problems, moves the emphasis from control over relatively few sources of the most serious industrial pollution to the exertion of influence over a very large number of smaller, highly decentralised and diverse, sources. Each of these may be of relatively little significance, but cumulatively they are of very great importance. Connected to this is a change in governance strategy.

Co-operative management denotes a new approach to environmental governance in which public and private parties co-operate on relatively equal terms with a view to reaching consensual and practicable solutions to environmental problems (cf. the introductory chapter to this book). A major policy instrument within this new approach is the environmental agreement. Environmental agreements imply a different procedural method for reaching decisions than direct regulations: the private parties who are supposed to carry out pollution abatement activities participate directly in all phases of the decision process, that is, in preparation, negotiation, formulation, implementation and evaluation of agreements. Thus, agreements are based on interactive processes of environmental policy-making. In principle none of the parties can be forced into an agreement; decisions are only made when discussions lead to a common solution to which all parties can agree. Hence, certain political actors have advanced a democratic image of co-operative management and environmental agreements connoting implicitly to modern ideas about consensual decision-making, discursive democracy and communicative rationality.

In order to assess the limits of co-operative strategies for environmental management it is necessary to adopt a critical perspective on the strengths and weaknesses of the approach and to offer a more general overview of the process as a whole. Earlier chapters have shown that considerable progress is being made in specific circumstances though often outcomes are uncertain. In this chapter I intend to address in more general terms the question of how far co-operative strategies offer a solution to environmental problems.

The preceding chapters of this book revolve around a specific form of environmental governance, namely co-operative management. That model assigns a key role to collaborative relations between governments, mediating non- governmental organizations, and private interests. The mechanism for change lies in communication and dialogue, the results of which are laid down in voluntary agreements among the participants. Uncertainty and complexity, which are part and parcel of modern environmental issues, are not seen as obstacles. Rather, co- operative management takes these characteristics as a point of departure for governance. Uncertainty and complexity are made ‘manageable’ through collaboration between public and private parties. Co-operative management is essentially different from other forms of governance that are used in environmental policy - governance based on the models of regulatory control, market regulation, civil society, and self-regulation. In Chapter 1, Glasbergen points out that these models are associated with particular scientific disciplines; thus, each is fed by a different wellspring of rationality.