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Social Choice and Welfare

Erschienen in:

01.02.2014 | Original Paper

Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections

verfasst von: Matías Núñez, Jean François Laslier

Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare | Ausgabe 2/2014

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Abstract

If voters vote strategically, is it useful to offer them the possibility of expressing nuanced opinions, or would they always overstate the intensity of their preferences? For additive voting rules, say that a ballot is extremal if it is neither abstention-like nor can be expressed as a mixture of the available ballots. We give a sufficient condition for strategic equivalence: if two rules share the same set of extremal ballots (up to an homothetic transformation), they are strategically equivalent in large elections. This condition is also necessary for the strategic equivalence of positional rules. These results do not hold for small electorates.

Vorheriger Artikel Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money

Nächster Artikel Transitive and acyclic rationality indicators of fuzzy choice functions on base domain

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EV is obviously related to Utilitarianism; see Karni (1998), Dhillon and Mertens (1999), Segal (2000), d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002) and Gaertner and Xu (2012) who called it Range Voting, for axiomatic analyses. \(AV\) is often advocated since it emerged in the literature in the mid 70s; see Laslier and Sanver (2010) for a detailed account. In an election held under \(PV\), a voter is allowed to give at most one point to at most one candidate and the candidate with the most votes wins the election. The most common rule for direct presidential elections is Plurality with a Runoff (Blais et al. 1997), but we here restrict attention to one-round voting systems.

Other models of large electorates have been proposed: Palfrey (1989), Laslier (2000), Myerson (2000), and McKelvey and Patty (2006).

See Sawyer and MacRae (1962), Brams (1975), Nitzan (1985), Cox (1990) and Gerber et al. (1998).

This is roughly equivalent to assume that the probability of candidates \(c_i\) and \(c_j\) being tied for first place is the same as the probability of candidate \(c_i\) being in first place one point ahead of candidate \(c_j\) (and both candidates above the rest of the candidates), which is in turn the same one as the probability of candidate \(c_j\) being in first place one vote ahead of candidate \(c_i\). Myerson and Weber (1993) justify this assumption by arguing that it seems reasonable when the electorate is large enough. This is not verified in Poisson games, a formal model of large elections in which the pivot probabilities are derived endogenously from the structure of the game.

See Theorem 1, page 105 in Myerson and Weber 1993.

See Milgrom 2009, 2010 and Perez-Richet (2011).

See Myerson (2002), Laslier (2009), Núñez (2010), Bouton et al. (2012), Goertz and Maniquet (2011), and Núñez (2010).

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Titel: Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections
verfasst von: Matías Núñez
Jean François Laslier
Publikationsdatum: 01.02.2014
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in: Social Choice and Welfare / Ausgabe 2/2014
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Elektronische ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0728-0

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