The Pragma-Dialectical Theory Under Discussion

The fact that the rules for critical discussion are capable of dealing with the defective argumentative moves distinguished in the Standard Treatment of the fallacies (Hamblin 1970) is viewed as a test of their ‘problem(-solving) validity’ (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1994). For experimental empirical research of the intersubjective acceptability that lends the rules for critical discussion ‘conventional validity,’ see van Eemeren et al. (2009).

In van Eemeren et al. (2007), for instance, with the help of the notion of ‘dialectical profiles’ indicators of argumentative moves are identified that are used in argumentative reality.

Adopting the notion of strategic manoeuvring means adding a rhetorical dimension to the theoretical framework of p ragma-dialectics (van Eemeren 2010).

Using a critical discussion in all cases as the point of reference in the characterization not only ensures a consistent and coherent appreciation of the argumentative dimension of communicative activity types, but also creates unity in comparing between communicative activity types.

Dissociating ‘a pragma-dialectical approach’ to argumentation from ‘Pragma-Dialectics’ as the theoretical enterprise of those who have coined the term is in our view just as awkward as it would be to dissociate ‘a new rhetoric approach’ to argumentation from the ‘New Rhetoric’ of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. The term normative pragmatics, which van Eemeren (1986, 1990) introduced as a general label, is a more suitable starting point for further differentiations.

In a review of Johnson (2000), van Rees (2001) signals and corrects a whole series of misunderstandings of pragma-dialectics; that it is concerned only with spoken and not with written arguments being just one of them, and that it is concerned only with dialogic and not with monologic discourse another one. Woods (2006) seems a case in point, but in other publications (e.g., Woods 2004) this critic’s conclusions are in the end more positive.

According to Wohlrapp (2009, p. 41), linguistic pragmatics is insufficient and Popper hardly understood anything of dialectic (2009, p. 41)). Wohlrapp also regrets that pragma-dialectics does not account for differences of ‘frames’ (but see van Eemeren 2010, pp. 126–127).

Bermejo-Luque (2011, pp. 58–72) also tackles the pragmatic dimension of pragma-dialectics, but Andone (2012) points out the weaknesses of Bermejo-Luque’s claims.

As her discussion of the Gulf Debate in American Congress makes clear, Goodwin (1999) uses the term argumentation in the general sense of ‘argument’. Her tentative definition of argumentation as “showing” that a standpoint is acceptable and her reference to the terms demonstrare and apodeixis confirm this reading.

Goodwin emphasizes that some politicians who advanced ‘argumentation’ in Congress said explicitly that they did not want to convince, and mentions ‘explaining’ as one of the functions of ‘argumentation’, which is a different function of ‘argument’ than ‘argumentation’ has in the pragma-dialectical use of this term.

Gilbert suggests “moving away from the abstract to the actual, from the ideal to the real” (2001, p. 7). Although he presents this as a “continuation” of van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s inclusion of the rhetorical dimension of argumentation, what he seems to have in mind is something different: to continue by considering certain terminological and conceptual categories from pragma-dialectics merely as heuristic distinctions.

The principle of externalization promotes concentrating on traceable commitments in the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse (see 10.). Application of this principle also creates an appropriate starting point for the examination of the cognitive processes involved in the production, perception and appreciation of these commitments. For methodological reasons pragma-dialecticians are reluctant to amalgamate argumentation theory completely with psychology, sociology, epistemology, communication theory or any other discipline belonging to its intellectual resources.

In spite of the fact that generally rhetoricians themselves associate rhetoric primarily with aiming for effectiveness (see van Eemeren 2010, pp. 66–80), Kock (2007) criticizes the tendency among argumentation theorists to define “rhetorical” argumentation in this way. Arguers “speaking for opposite choices,” he also observes, are not “obliged” to resolve their difference of opinion. However, if they aim to convince others of their position their argumentation must be aimed at resolving a difference of opinion with the audience they want to convince (which need not necessarily coincide with the opponents they address). Kock ignores that choosing from different options involves expressing a preference for a certain decision and that political argumentation is as a rule aimed at convincing others of the preferred option.

In a moralistic and confused essay, in which he claims that Perelman “recognized the defining characteristic of totalitarian thought: the absolute commitment to the ‘cold logic’ of deductive reasoning” (p. 270), Frank (2004) reacts in the first place to criticisms made in the handbook Fundamentals of argumentation theory (van Eemeren et al. 1996) and its predecessors against some aspects of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s new rhetoric.

Leaving aside the wrong and extremely rhetorical description of their soundness standard, and the fact that pragma-dialecticians in fact actively promote the democratic cause (e.g., van Eemeren 2002, 2010, pp. 2–4), the use of ‘good’ is misleading, because pragma-dialecticians, being argumentation theorists, concentrate explicitly and exclusively on the argumentative quality (‘soundness’) of advocacy, not on other qualities ‘good’ may refer to.

In a more critical vein, Walton (2007) plays down the empirical scope of the pragma-dialectical theory by portraying a ‘critical discussion’ as just one of the many dialogue types (or communicative activity types) used in argumentative reality, thus ignoring its status of a theoretical construct applying to all of them. See for the scope of pragma-dialectics, e.g., van Eemeren (2009), and for a critical response to Walton Garssen (2009, pp. 187–188).

In van Eemeren (2010) I have summarized the pragma-dialectical position regarding the two dimensions of validity: “Granting that ‘conventional validity’ based in intersubjective agreement is indeed a prerequisite for reaching a conclusive judgment concerning the acceptability of argumentative moves, I would like to emphasize that, because of its overriding importance, determining their ‘problem-solving validity’ should come first” (p. 137). In agreement with this hierarchy, Tindale reaches in his discussion of the criticisms against pragma-dialectics eventually also the conclusion that “it is these rules (or the observance of them) which guarantee the reasonableness of the proceedings. So perhaps all along we have only needed to recognize these rules as the necessary objective conditions” (1999, p. 61). “The rules”, he acknowledges, “should have priority over the agreement of the discussants” (p. 62).

This answers Tindale’s observation that, “in the shift to the new concept”, the pragma-dialecticians “appear to bring the old criteria of the traditional fallacies with them” (1999, p. 55).

Tindale (1999), who reaches on several points conclusions which do justice to the pragma-dialectical position, also recognizes the importance of problem-validity. It is indeed hard to imagine how one could embark on examining the fallacies from a normative perspective without having some kind of ‘etic’ approach, involving external critical norms, because in an ‘emic’ approach argumentative moves which are acceptable to the participants in the discussion do not require any further reflection as to their possible “fallaciousness”. See (van Eemeren et al. 1993, pp. 50–51).

As a case in point, Woods (2004) claims erroneously that “the pragma-dialectical construal makes of ad baculum, ad hominem and ad misericordiam […] the same fallacy” (p. 156). He also observes that this construal of the traditional fallacies provides “brief caricatures straight out of the Standard Treatment” (p. 159, pp. 178–179), without mentioning that van Eemeren and Grootendorst precisely aim to show that pragma-dialectics can, in principle, accommodate the fallacies distinguished in the Standard Treatment.

Without adding much original reflection of her own, Cummings (2005, p. 178) reaches a negative judgment about pragma-dialectics based on the observations made by Woods. Striking in Wreen’s (1994) equally negative judgment are the basic assumptions that fallacies are intrinsically connected with inferences (whereas pragma-dialecticians put them in a broader communicative perspective) and have an objective ontological status (whereas pragma-dialecticians view them as impediments to resolving a difference of opinion on the merits whose identification depends on whether one shares this theoretical outlook on the discourse).

As Botting (2010) observes, from an epistemic perspective a critical discussion models “the critical rationalist procedure of conjecture and refutation” (p. 415).

Zenker concludes from his inventory of the (very few) changes the pragma-dialectical rules have undergone in the course of time that the most important material change is “the acknowledgement of non-deductive forms of validity” (2007a, p. 1588). Lumer (2010) asserts that van Eemeren and Grootendorst “originally” proposed “only one type of argumentation, namely deductive argumentation” and “more recently” included “some further argument schemes” (p. 65), “as a way to explain and justify non-deductive arguments” (p. 66). In reality, van Eemeren and Grootendorst distinguish already since 1978 argument(ation) schemes (van Eemeren et al. 1978, p. 20), next to (deductive and non-deductive) logical argument forms (e.g., van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, pp. 66–67).

Another critic who accuses pragma-dialectics of “some form of” deductivism is Kock (2003, p. 162).

Another critic who endorses this wrong characterization of pragma-dialectics is Lumer (2010). Botting (2010) indicates which basic characteristic of argumentative exchanges, captured in the model of a critical discussion, is probably the source of the consensualist misconception: a completed critical discussion “ends with consensus” (p. 416). However, in pragma-dialectics an unequivocal result of the process of resolving a difference of opinion is in a critical rationalist vein viewed as being only a temporary state of affairs in an ongoing flux of opinions. Unlike in consensualism, it does not represent a final point with a desired status, but a provisional outcome. See for a continuation of this discussion about the epistemic dimension of pragma-dialectics Lumer (2012) and Botting (2012).

Oddly, Zenker (2007b) ends up calling satisfaction of the preliminary higher order conditions “a further necessary condition” for resolving differences of opinion. Ignoring that the pragma-dialecticians were the ones drawing attention to these preconditions for a legitimate application of the rules for critical discussion in evaluating the reasonableness of argumentative discourse, he correctly remarks that the nonfulfillment of certain higher order conditions can explain seemingly unreasonable behaviour (see van Eemeren et al. 1993, pp. 30–35). Without considering how far argumentation theorists should go in extending the boundaries of their efforts, he reproaches the pragma-dialecticians for their “apparent laxness” in not specifying the higher order conditions “precisely and exhaustively”. It is doubtful whether examining the fulfillment of psychological and socio-political higher order conditions is really a proper task for argumentation theorists.

Notions such as ‘pro argumentation’ and ‘justificatory force’ are in pragma-dialectics understood in a dialectical fashion and acquire a non-justificationist meaning. See also Garssen and van Laar (2010, p. 134).

In a paper marked by incomprehension, Lumer calls pragma-dialectics “a heterogeneous theory composed of unqualified and therefore unsatisfactory consensualism and an ill-conceived form of epistemic rationalism” (2010, p. 67) According to Lumer, pragma-dialectics relies on very problematic epistemologies, “namely Critical Rationalism and Dialogic Logic” (p. 67). However, “much could probably be improved by changing the epistemological basis of Pragma-Dialectics” (p. 58).

A similar point is made by Wreen (1994, p. 300).

Pragma-dialecticians too aim for the most rational outcome, but leave room for the possibility that a definitive verdict about truth cannot be given in all cases because the necessary tools for doing so are lacking. In some cases we have to appeal to experts from the various disciplines, and if they cannot come to a unified verdict we shall have to live with it. Some truths (e.g., non-flatness of the earth, global warming) have been in limbo for some time. As Garssen and van Laar rightly ask (2010, p. 129): who is to decide in such cases?

In this perspective, the addressees and their procedural and material starting points are of vital importance to argumentation theory. Siegel and Biro (2010, p. 467) may regret it, and perhaps Tindale (1999, p. 57) too, but as a consequence of argumentation involving not just reasoning but also trying to convince others, besides reaching a “problem-valid” conclusion, intersubjective agreement needs to be aimed for—and this makes it necessary to reach agreement between the parties. A consequence may be that—exceptionally, we hope—in practice—unlike, in epistemics, we hope—“good” arguments and standpoints are eventually rejected and “bad” arguments and standpoints accepted. This happens only on reasonable grounds however if the arguers have complied with all the required testing procedures. A “better” result can only be achieved if the problem-validity of the testing methods for establishing truth etc. are first improved and the tests are made acceptable to would-be discussants.

Although such standpoints can be described in terms of truth values, the disputants are not in the first place out to establish their truth but to determine their acceptability on reasonable grounds.

Siegel and Biro may claim that nothing in the epistemic view suggests that there cannot be arguments about moral, political and legal matters (2010, p. 472), but the “justified beliefs” involved in dealing with evaluative and prescriptive issues can as a rule better be treated in terms of intersubjective acceptability than in terms of objective truth. Problem-validity and intersubjective validity have in pragma-dialectics a broader scope than these epistemologists seem to have in mind.

See also Biro and Siegel (1992, p. 91).

As Tindale (disapprovingly) observes, the whole pragma-dialectical program “has been set up to be resolution-oriented and not audience-oriented (dialectical and not rhetorical)” (1999, p. 63).

Is it reasonable for participants to start from the best material and procedural starting points they have access to or only from starting points which epistemologists consider objectively true or valid? This is what the difference amounts to. As epistemologists Biro and Siegel seem to be only interested in the assessment of argumentation by an external evaluator who judges the argumentation on ‘objective’ grounds, independently of the particularities of the actual discussion in which it takes place and its intersubjective acceptability (see Siegel and Biro 2010, pp. 467–468). Apart from the question whether this is indeed a better view of what argumentation theory should be, the question arises to what extent in practice such an approach can lead to decisive results and is more suitable for dealing with argumentative discourse in the various communicative practices than the pragma-dialectical approach.

Establishing the acceptability of starting points is, according to pragma-dialecticians, not a proper task of argumentation theorists if it involves more than checking whether they are on the list of jointly accepted starting points. However, because of the critical rationalist rationale of their theory, it is understood that their acceptability is to be established in a problem-valid way.

Interestingly, extremely different positions such as—bien etonnés de se trouver ensemble—Gerber’s and Frank’s pragmatic ethics and rhetorical moralism, on the one hand, and Biro and Siegel’s objectivist epistemics, on the other hand, have in common that they are out to include certain extrinsic requirements which, in the pragma-dialectical view, transcend argumentation and argumentation theory proper.