Pragmatic Argumentation in European Practices of Political Accountability

The politicians’ future actions are commonly discussed in the media, if only because in this way the proposed policies are put to public testing (Mulgan 2003). Such forms of accountability occur especially in situations of crisis in which politicians are questioned about their decisions while still being in the process of adopting them. Curtin (2007: 525) refers in this case to dumque accountability. Bovens (2006: 13–14) challenges that this form of account-giving constitutes accountability by emphasizing that “proactive inputs into the policy process should be classified and studied separately for what they are: forms of consultation and participation.” Most scholars investigating the issue of accountability no longer share this restricted view.

Van Eemeren and Garssen (2014) explain that pragmatic argumentation is a typical form of arguing in political discussions, because generally the policies at issue are justified by mentioning their positive or negative consequences.

This section is based on my characterization of political accountability practices published in Andone (2014). My earlier characterization concerns both retrospective and prospective accountability practices.

For a comprehensive presentation of the various settings in which practices of political accountability occur, see Mulgan (2003).

Although political accountability can be distinguished from other forms of accountability, such as legal accountability (to a court of law) or financial accountability (to a court of auditors), in practice it is as a rule combined with these other forms. Syrier (2013) shows, for example, that in accounting to the European Parliament, the European Union executive always uses political, legal, financial and ethical arguments at the same time.

The term ‘institutional point’ is used in the meaning explained by van Eemeren (2010: 130–131).

The account-holders judge their performance and impose sanctions in case of malperformance. In case of adequate performance, the political actor is rewarded (Bovens 2006: 9). If account-holders do not have the full authority to impose immediate sanctions—journalists are a good illustration—they prepare the ground for sanctions being imposed by others who do have the required authority. For instance, a journalist may not ask a politician to resign because it turns out in an interview that the politician has acted improperly, but the politician’s peers may do so after having taken note of the interview (Mulgan 2003).

The people to whom an account is rendered may vary from voters, political parties, courts, auditors, peers, interest groups, and other stakeholders (Bovens 2006: 15–17). It is therefore not uncommon that politicians explain and justify their future performance from a political perspective, as well as from a legal, administrative, and social viewpoint, so that the demands of most people possibly affected by their conduct are taken into account. In this way, multiple issues are up for discussion.

In what follows, these starting points will be reproduced from Andone (2014: 68). For further clarification of all starting points regulating practices of political accountability, see Andone (2014: 68). These starting points regulate both the politician’s argumentative behavior and the account-holder’s rights and obligations in criticizing the politician’s standpoints and arguments.

Starting point (3) is formulated in line with the feature of political accountability which imposes the provision and demand of explanations in ‘the information phase’ before ‘the debate phase’ can start (Bovens 2006).

Starting points (4) and (13) are based on the view that a politician who has carried out an action has done so because he believes that his action is adequate. He can be held committed to this belief because he has allegedly acted in line with the democratic and constitutional values. By arguing that his political performance is adequate, the politician should be able to show also that the consequences of a particular action are adequate.

The material starting point (1), according to which democratic and constitutional values need to be adhered to, indirectly imposes the use of this form of arguing, because in this way the politicians’ future actions can thus be evaluated and kept under democratic control.

Other scholars, such as Ball (1995: 5) refer to a normative proposition, which corresponds to the pragma-dialectical prescriptive proposition. In his view, such arguments are an attempt “to convince an audience that an action ought to be taken using relevant value principles and facts [of the policy issue].” According to Ball (1995: 6), in such form of arguing conductive inference is at issue, because the arguments are inconclusive, since there is no guarantee of the truth.

Pragma-dialecticians opt for a general formulation of the unexpressed premise (If actions of type X lead to a positive result Y, then those actions should be carried out) because only in this way the pragmatic optimum is captured. This general premise is more informative than a more specific formulation such as If an action X leads to a (positive) result Y, then that action should be carried out, based only on the logical minimum. For a clarification of the logical minimum and pragmatic optimum, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992: 60–66).

On the main level, the discussion concerns the issue of combating the ‘mad cow disease.’ Of course, no one can disagree that combatting this disease is indeed a positive result to be obtained and there is, therefore, no need actually to argue for this. But in arguing for certain measures to combat this disease, their desirability is not so obvious, as when it comes to informing the citizens. Hence, testing the positive character of the result needs to take place preliminary to testing the advocated causality relationship.

This question is a reformulation of the question ‘Is the announced effect of the proposed measure really so desirable?’ (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 102). It is a matter of debate whether this question is indeed a critical question. Ihnen Jory (2012: 28–29) explains that such a question tests in fact the acceptability of the evaluative proposition of pragmatic argumentation (because it tests the positive character) and should therefore not serve in testing the correctness of pragmatic argumentation. In this paper, I follow the view according to which critical questions are the dialectical method used to decide upon the correctness of the application of the pragmatic argument scheme (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992).

Based on this explanation, the fifth critical question could also be formulated as ‘Does result Y have minimal side-effects?’ or ‘Do the side-effects of the result Y of action X outweigh the side-effects of the result Z of action K?’

This question is a reformulation of the question ‘Will this effect indeed follow?’ (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 102).

Majone explains that in testing policy arguments three evaluative modes should be applied for a complete evaluation: (a) the outcome mode in which the evaluation focuses on the outputs or outcomes of a particular activity; (b) the input mode in which the emphasis is on the resources engaged in the activity; and (c) the process mode in which the attention shifts to the methods used to transform political, economic and other inputs into outputs/outcomes (1986: 172). These three evaluative modes correspond to the three aspects involved in testing the acceptability of pragmatic argumentation: results, means and methods.

This is identical to the idea that the costs involved bring insufficient benefits.

A similar view is suggested by Perelman (1959: 24) when he wonders whether “seeing that an effect most often results from a combination of causes, and seeing that each of these is in itself a member of a causal chain, is it possible to provide unquestionable criteria which would indisputably pick out the cause to which the pragmatic argument is applied?”

Ihnen Jory (2012: 31–32) explains feasibility in terms of how practical and allowable an action is.