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Constitutional Political Economy
Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy 4/2017

08.07.2017 | Original Paper

A proposal for a more objective measure of de facto constitutional constraints

verfasst von: Moshe Yanovskiy, Tim Ginker

Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy | Ausgabe 4/2017

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Abstract

In this paper we propose two new indicators of de facto constitutional constraints. The indicators are based on the presence or the absence of easily observable political events. This makes the proposed measures relatively objective and easy to verify relative to the most widely used indicators of de jure and de facto constitutions. This paper describes the indicators and demonstrates their usefulness for research on economic development.
Nächster Artikel De jure and de facto determinants of power: evidence from Mississippi

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Fußnoten
1
See Alvarez et al. (1996) and Przeworski (2000)
 
2
This case is widely publicized and politically significant, so we (or any expert) could easily detect the case.
 
3
Ríos-Figueroa and Staton classification (2014) would definethe criterion as a “de facto measure”.
 
4
To assess the observable regime as RoLD we use stronger form of the criterion (3) “…AND call for its replacement, without routine intimidation, revenge or punishment?”.
 
5
The total number of observations actually engaged in the analysis restricted by GDP per capita Growth rate data availability so we have got 12,160 observations without imputation and 25,375 observations with imputed data (see Descriptive Statistics in the Supplemental Materials https://​papers.​ssrn.​com/​abstract=​2993465; imputation procedure see pp. 21–22 of Supplemental materials).
 
10
Lipset hypothesized that Democracy is caused and supported by sustainable economic development, political and cultural maturity.
 
Literatur
Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J. A., Limongi, F., & Przeworski, A. (1996). Classifying political regimes. Studies in Comparative International Development, 31, 1–37.CrossRef
Barro, R. J. (1999). Determinants of economic growth. London: MIT Press.
Bils, M., & Klenow, P. J. (2000). Does schooling cause growth? The American Economic Review, 90(5), 1160–1183.CrossRef
Bolt, J., & van Zanden, J. L. (2014). The Maddison Project: collaborative research on historical national accounts. The Economic History Review, 67(3), 627–651.
Dupuy E. R., & Dupuy T. N. (1986). The encyclopedia of military history (2nd ed.). Harper & Row Publishers.
La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F., Pop-Eleches, C., & Shleifer, A. (2004). Judicial Checks and Balances. Journal of Political Economy, 112(2), 445–470.CrossRef
Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53(01), 69–105.CrossRef
Przeworski, A. (2000). Democracy and development: Political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950–1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Ríos-Figueroa, J., & Staton, J. K. (2014). An evaluation of cross-national measures of judicial independence. Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 30(1), 104–137.CrossRef
Suharev, A. Ya. (Ed.). (2003). Legal system of the countries around the world (3rd ed.). Moscow: Norma.
Tavares, J., & Wacziarg, R. (2001). How democracy affects growth. European economic review, 45(8), 1341–1378.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
A proposal for a more objective measure of de facto constitutional constraints
verfasst von
Moshe Yanovskiy
Tim Ginker
Publikationsdatum
08.07.2017
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Constitutional Political Economy / Ausgabe 4/2017
Print ISSN: 1043-4062
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-9966
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-017-9242-1

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