Skip to main content
Erschienen in: Public Choice 3-4/2020

30.03.2020

How Buchanan’s concern for the South shaped his first academic works

Erschienen in: Public Choice | Ausgabe 3-4/2020

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to show that, at the very beginning of his career, Buchanan was interested in concrete issues related to the economic situation in the South rather than with abstract and philosophical works in public finance. We examine the published and unpublished articles, reviews and replies that Buchanan wrote between 1949 and 1952 on federalism. By putting what Buchanan wrote in the intellectual, academic and political context of the period, we put forward four factors which we believe are important to understand Buchanan’s ideas. First, Buchanan defended the intervention of the federal government to redistribute, in the form of equalizing grants, income from rich to poor regions. Second, as a consequence, for Buchanan, such redistribution was an ethical necessity that should precede any consideration of efficiency. Even more important, fiscal justice was a precondition without which a competitive or free market system could not function properly. Third, at least during that period, Buchanan appears to have been interested primarily in practical, concrete problems, rather than in pure and abstract questions. Finally, a fourth and crucial point is that Buchanan insisted on the need for federal government intervention to industrialize the South, a stance that stands in stark contrast to policies the Nashville Agrarians defended.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Fußnoten
1
The Agrarians—also known as the Vanderbilt, Nashville or Southern Agrarians—were a group of scholars mainly from Nashville University who did not only oppose to the industry and to industrialization in general but who criticized the growing industrialization of the South, and praised agriculture, agrarian and rural life. To them, “there was an irrepressible conflict between industrialism (representing all that was anti-traditional, immoral, and deadening) and agrarianism (representing all that was stable, moral, and uplifting to the human spirit).” (Newby 1963, pp. 144–145) One of their fears was “that liberalism and industrialization were only a Trojan horse for collectivism. The larger industry became, the more central control would be required.” (Connelly 1963, p. 27; see also Shapiro 1970, p. 793).
 
2
Buchanan to Uhr, January 22, 1952, Buchanan Papers (hereafter, BP). [C0246, Special Collections Research Center, George Mason University Libraries].
 
3
The essay is entitled Gasoline tax sharing among local units of government in Tennessee (1941). Buchanan suggested using an ethical criterion for sharing the benefits of a pay-as-you-go gasoline tax, centrally collected across counties in order to finance roads and highways, (see Marciano 2019). The issue remained topical among public finance theorists and constitutionalists (Binns 1948; Birch 1949). For instance, James Maxwell’s (1948) The Fiscal Impact of Federalism in the United States published by (Cambridge University Press,)was reviewed in the Economic Journal (Johnson 1949), the Journal of Political Economy (Blough 1948), and the American Political Science Review (Anderson 1946).
 
4
Our claim is not that Roosevelt and Truman did—or did not—allocate New Deal and Fair Deal resources to actually help the South but that helping the South was part of their political rhetoric. It nonetheless remains that, indeed, it has been shown that political motivations were crucial in the way New Deal funds were allocated to the different states, and that “other things being the same, more was allocated to states which had supported FDR most solidly in 1932 a were crucial to the president's 1936 Electoral College strategy” (Couch and Shughart 1998, p. 190).
 
5
“If the wage differential between northern and southern labor were eliminated (between laborers of some grade), the employment of labor in the south would be curtailed due to the fact that the higher wage would mean that the employer would only hire workers to the point where marginal productivity equaled the higher wage” (Buchanan 1947a, p. 3).
 
6
“if the wage differential were enforced and allowed to reach its ‘normal’ level, capital would be encouraged into the south, the workers would be hired and paid at their productivity. The labor supply in the South would be increased and in the long run the productivity of the southern worker would have a chance to equate that of the northern workers and the wage ‘“normally’ be equal (Buchanan 1947a, p. 3).
 
7
While not uncontested, the argument was not uncommon among contemporary economists (see Stigler 1946, for instance). It was and continues to be the textbook interpretation of the effects of the minimum wage, although the empirical evidenced is mixed, in magnitude, if not in sign.
 
8
The so-called “freight rate battle” (Tally, 947; Fortune October 4, 1944, p. 149).
 
9
To be more precise, the ICC set minimum tariffs but the railroad companies via rate bureaus and associations to which they belonged contribute to determine the effective tariffs.
 
10
Composed of Governors of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. It became known as the “Southern Governors Case.” Its official name is “The State of Alabama, et al. vs. The New York Central Railroad Company et al.”, I.C.C. Docket 27746.
 
11
In the preface of the special issue of Law and Contemporary Problems (1947) he guest-edited, Currie (1947, p. 391) reported that “it is also said that railroad rates are fashioned atmosphere of monopoly which renders administrative regulation ineffective.” The situation already was difficult by the end of the 1920s. It worsened in the 1930s because of “the virtual suspension of the antitrust laws during the first years of the New Deal” after the adoption of the National Industrial Recovery Act in I933 (Potter 1947, p. 445).
 
12
The most famous case was the complaint issued by the State of Georgia in 1945, ultimately heard by the Supreme Court of the United States, against railroad companies for having fixed “unfair and non-competitive rates, all tending to penalize … and damage her economy” (Tally 1947, p. 173; also see Berge 1947b, p. 468). The State of Georgia “charges that the defendants have conspired to fix freight rates which discriminate against the State” (https://​supreme.​justia.​com/​cases/​federal/​us/​324/​439/​) Wiprud (1947, p. 573) reported that “The Court, adhering to its earlier decisions, held that regulated industries are not per se exempt from the Sherman Act; that railroads are subject to the antitrust laws; that conspiracies among carriers to fix rates are included within the broad sweep of the Sherman Act” (see also Berge 1947a, b, p. 449).
 
13
See Wiprud (1945, 1947) for one exception.
 
14
Vickrey (1948, p. 226) named that solution “Lerner’S rule”.
 
15
The policy began to be implemented in 1947.
 
16
In his “Positive Program for Laissez-Faire”, Simons (1934 [1948], p. 58),wrote that:“governments should plan definitely on socialization of the railroads and utilities and of every other industry where competitive conditions cannot be preserved.” He (1936, p. 74) repeated later that: “In my pamphlet, I suggested early transition to government ownership for the railroads, and gradual movement in that direction with the other utilities. Candidly, I feel that our situation with respect to these industries will always be unhappy, at best; and I have no genuine enthusiasm for public ownership.”
 
17
Here, Buchanan departed from Lerner (1937, pp. 269–270) for whom socialist system would avoid the complex system of taxes that was inevitable in a capitalist economy.
 
18
One could argue that Buchanan chose to write the paper because, as a young scholar, he wanted to get high level publications and the paper had obvious potential. However, one must not forget that Buchanan had waited since 1947 before he decided to turn his term paper into an academic journal article, that he already had written two other articles before and that large parts of his dissertation remained unexploited. We claim that writing the 1950 paper represented Buchanan’s personal choice.
 
19
Buchanan introduced the concept of “fiscal residuum” in his 1947 term paper, defining (1947a, b, p. 21) it “as the differential between the economic value of the burden imposed by “government” on the one hand, and the economic value of the service rendered to the individual on the other.” In his dissertation (1948, p. 44) he gave a similar definition, the difference “between the value of contributions made and the value of services returned to the individual”. It was this concept that led Buchanan to Wicksell (see Marciano 2019).
 
20
Buchanan (1950b, p. 598) cites Simons (1942, p. 178) against Alvin Hansen on the fact “that legislatures can be trusted to spend if required to tax accordingly”.
 
21
What Buchanan said is unavailable, but we have a detailed report from a series of articles aimed at presenting the different contributors to the workshop published in Nashville’s Tennessean, on May 7, 1950.
 
22
For instance, in his dissertation, Buchanan (1948, pp. 6-7) wrote that the student in public finance "must either accept the tenets of those economists who consider that the economic problem could best be solved by a competitive free enterprise system operating within the limits of defined “rules of the game” laid down and enforced by the political unit, or he must accept the doctrines of the opposing school asserting that a freely competitive system is not the ultimate means and that Instead greater political direction of economic life is required for the optimum solution of the economic problem.”
 
23
The most recent reference being from 1947.
 
24
Market process ideas would become central to Buchanan’s scholarly work’ A later reflection on the market as a process can be found in Buchanan (1964).
 
Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Alderman, S. S. (1947). How shall the railroad rate structure be regulated in the public interest? Law and Contemporary Problems,12(3), 579–599.CrossRef Alderman, S. S. (1947). How shall the railroad rate structure be regulated in the public interest? Law and Contemporary Problems,12(3), 579–599.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Anderson, W. (1946). Review of “The fiscal impact of federalism in the United States, by James A. Maxwell”. American Political Science Review,40(6), 1186–1188.CrossRef Anderson, W. (1946). Review of “The fiscal impact of federalism in the United States, by James A. Maxwell”. American Political Science Review,40(6), 1186–1188.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Barton, F. L. (1940a). Recent developments concerning the South’s freight-rate problem. Southern Economic Journal,6(4), 461–478.CrossRef Barton, F. L. (1940a). Recent developments concerning the South’s freight-rate problem. Southern Economic Journal,6(4), 461–478.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Barton, F. L. (1940b). Background of the class-rate investigation. Southwestern Social Science Quarterly,21(3), 197–209. Barton, F. L. (1940b). Background of the class-rate investigation. Southwestern Social Science Quarterly,21(3), 197–209.
Zurück zum Zitat Barton, F. L. (1947). Economic effects of discriminatory freight rates. Law and Contemporary Problems,12(3), 507–531.CrossRef Barton, F. L. (1947). Economic effects of discriminatory freight rates. Law and Contemporary Problems,12(3), 507–531.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Berge, W. (1947a). Monopoly and the South. Southern Economic Journal,13(4), 360–369.CrossRef Berge, W. (1947a). Monopoly and the South. Southern Economic Journal,13(4), 360–369.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Berge, W. (1947b). The rate-making process. Law and Contemporary Problems,12(3), 449–469.CrossRef Berge, W. (1947b). The rate-making process. Law and Contemporary Problems,12(3), 449–469.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Bigham, T. C. (1947). Regulation of minimum rates in transportation. Quarterly Journal of Economics,61(2), 206–231.CrossRef Bigham, T. C. (1947). Regulation of minimum rates in transportation. Quarterly Journal of Economics,61(2), 206–231.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Binns, K. J. (1948). Federal financial relations in Canada and Australia. Report prepared for the Government of Tasmania (p. 75). Hobart: Government Printer. Binns, K. J. (1948). Federal financial relations in Canada and Australia. Report prepared for the Government of Tasmania (p. 75). Hobart: Government Printer.
Zurück zum Zitat Birch, A. H. (1949). Federalism and finance. The Manchester Review,17(2), 163–185.CrossRef Birch, A. H. (1949). Federalism and finance. The Manchester Review,17(2), 163–185.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Blough, R. (1948). Review of “The Fiscal Impact of Federalism in the United States. James A. Maxwell.”. Journal of Political Economy,56(5), 453–454.CrossRef Blough, R. (1948). Review of “The Fiscal Impact of Federalism in the United States. James A. Maxwell.”. Journal of Political Economy,56(5), 453–454.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Boyd, W. M. (1952). Southern politics, 1948–1952. Phylon (1940–1956),13(3), 226–235.CrossRef Boyd, W. M. (1952). Southern politics, 1948–1952. Phylon (1940–1956),13(3), 226–235.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (1946). Federalism: one barrier to labor mobility. Mimeo, Buchanan archives. Special Collections: George Mason University library. Buchanan, J. M. (1946). Federalism: one barrier to labor mobility. Mimeo, Buchanan archives. Special Collections: George Mason University library.
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (1947a). Economics 300B, answers to exam, 14 February, Buchanan archives. Special Collections: George Mason University library. Buchanan, J. M. (1947a). Economics 300B, answers to exam, 14 February, Buchanan archives. Special Collections: George Mason University library.
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (1947b). A theory of financial balance in a federal state. Mimeo, Buchanan archives. Special Collections: George Mason University library. Buchanan, J. M. (1947b). A theory of financial balance in a federal state. Mimeo, Buchanan archives. Special Collections: George Mason University library.
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (1948). Fiscal equity in a federal state. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Chicago. Buchanan, J. M. (1948). Fiscal equity in a federal state. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Chicago.
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (1949a). Unemployment, industrial slowdown could result from minimum wage law. The University of Tennessee News Letter 5–6. Buchanan, J. M. (1949a). Unemployment, industrial slowdown could result from minimum wage law. The University of Tennessee News Letter 5–6.
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (1949b). The pure theory of government finance: a suggested framework. Mimeo, Buchanan Archives, Buchanan House, George Mason University, 42 pages. Buchanan, J. M. (1949b). The pure theory of government finance: a suggested framework. Mimeo, Buchanan Archives, Buchanan House, George Mason University, 42 pages.
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (1949c). Regional implications of marginal cost rate making. Southern Economic Journal,16(1), 53–61.CrossRef Buchanan, J. M. (1949c). Regional implications of marginal cost rate making. Southern Economic Journal,16(1), 53–61.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (1949d). The pure theory of government finance: A suggested approach. Journal of Political Economy,57(6), 496–505.CrossRef Buchanan, J. M. (1949d). The pure theory of government finance: A suggested approach. Journal of Political Economy,57(6), 496–505.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (1950a). Note on the differential controversy. Southern Economic Journal,17(1), 59–60.CrossRef Buchanan, J. M. (1950a). Note on the differential controversy. Southern Economic Journal,17(1), 59–60.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (1950b). Federalism and fiscal equity. American Economic Review,40(4), 583–599. Buchanan, J. M. (1950b). Federalism and fiscal equity. American Economic Review,40(4), 583–599.
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (1951a). Review of “A financial history of Tennessee since 1870 by James E. Thorogood”. Southern Economic Journal,17(3), 368–369.CrossRef Buchanan, J. M. (1951a). Review of “A financial history of Tennessee since 1870 by James E. Thorogood”. Southern Economic Journal,17(3), 368–369.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (1951b). Knut Wicksell on marginal cost pricing. Southern Economic Journal,18, 173–178.CrossRef Buchanan, J. M. (1951b). Knut Wicksell on marginal cost pricing. Southern Economic Journal,18, 173–178.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (1952a). Wicksell on fiscal reform: Comment. American Economic Review,42, 599–602. Buchanan, J. M. (1952a). Wicksell on fiscal reform: Comment. American Economic Review,42, 599–602.
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (1952b). Federal grants and resource allocation. Journal of Political Economy,60(3), 208–217.CrossRef Buchanan, J. M. (1952b). Federal grants and resource allocation. Journal of Political Economy,60(3), 208–217.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (1952c). Review of “Federal grants and the business cycle by James A. Maxwell”. Journal of Political Economy,60(5), 457–458.CrossRef Buchanan, J. M. (1952c). Review of “Federal grants and the business cycle by James A. Maxwell”. Journal of Political Economy,60(5), 457–458.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (1952d). Federal grants and resource allocation: A reply. Journal of Political Economy,60(6), 536–538.CrossRef Buchanan, J. M. (1952d). Federal grants and resource allocation: A reply. Journal of Political Economy,60(6), 536–538.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (undated, circa 1950). The optimal fiscal policy for a southern state. Mimeo, Buchanan archives. Special Collections: George Mason University library. Buchanan, J. M. (undated, circa 1950). The optimal fiscal policy for a southern state. Mimeo, Buchanan archives. Special Collections: George Mason University library.
Zurück zum Zitat Buchanan, J. M. (1964). What should economists do? Southern Economic Journal, 30(3), 213–222.CrossRef Buchanan, J. M. (1964). What should economists do? Southern Economic Journal, 30(3), 213–222.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Coase, R. H. (1946). The marginal cost controversy. Economica, 13(51), 169–182.CrossRef Coase, R. H. (1946). The marginal cost controversy. Economica, 13(51), 169–182.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Coase, R. H. (1947). The marginal cost controversy: Some further comments. Economica, 14(54), 150–153.CrossRef Coase, R. H. (1947). The marginal cost controversy: Some further comments. Economica, 14(54), 150–153.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Connelly, T. L. (1963). The Vanderbilt Agrarians: Time and place in southern tradition. Tennessee Historical Quarterly,22(1), 22–37. Connelly, T. L. (1963). The Vanderbilt Agrarians: Time and place in southern tradition. Tennessee Historical Quarterly,22(1), 22–37.
Zurück zum Zitat Corry, J. A. (1941). The federal dilemma. Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne d’Economique et de Science politique, 7(2), 215–228.CrossRef Corry, J. A. (1941). The federal dilemma. Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne d’Economique et de Science politique, 7(2), 215–228.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Couch, J. F., & Shughart, W. F. (1998). The political economy of the New Deal. Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar. Couch, J. F., & Shughart, W. F. (1998). The political economy of the New Deal. Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar.
Zurück zum Zitat Currie, B. (1947). Foreword. Law and Contemporary Problems,12(3), 391–403. Currie, B. (1947). Foreword. Law and Contemporary Problems,12(3), 391–403.
Zurück zum Zitat Goff, J. H. (1940). The interterritorial freight-rate problem and the south. Southern Economic Journal,6(4), 449–460.CrossRef Goff, J. H. (1940). The interterritorial freight-rate problem and the south. Southern Economic Journal,6(4), 449–460.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Gossett, E. (1945). Freight-rate parity? Not Yet! Southwest Review,30(4), 366–368. Gossett, E. (1945). Freight-rate parity? Not Yet! Southwest Review,30(4), 366–368.
Zurück zum Zitat Hamby, A. L. (1972). The vital center, the Fair Deal, and the quest for a liberal political economy. American Historical Review,77(3), 653–678.CrossRef Hamby, A. L. (1972). The vital center, the Fair Deal, and the quest for a liberal political economy. American Historical Review,77(3), 653–678.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Heath, M. S. (1946). The uniform class rate decision and its implications for southern economic development. Southern Economic Journal,12(3), 213–237.CrossRef Heath, M. S. (1946). The uniform class rate decision and its implications for southern economic development. Southern Economic Journal,12(3), 213–237.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Hotelling, H. (1938). The general welfare in relation to problems of taxation and of railway and utility rates. Econometrica, 6(3), 242–269.CrossRef Hotelling, H. (1938). The general welfare in relation to problems of taxation and of railway and utility rates. Econometrica, 6(3), 242–269.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Johnson, H. G. (1949). Review of “The fiscal impact of federalism in the United States, by James A. Maxwell”. Economic Journal,59(235), 432–434.CrossRef Johnson, H. G. (1949). Review of “The fiscal impact of federalism in the United States, by James A. Maxwell”. Economic Journal,59(235), 432–434.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Knight, F. H. (1924). Some fallacies in the interpretation of social cost. The Quaterly Journal of Economics, 38(4), 582–606.CrossRef Knight, F. H. (1924). Some fallacies in the interpretation of social cost. The Quaterly Journal of Economics, 38(4), 582–606.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Lerner, A. P. (1937). Statics and dynamics in socialist economics. Economic Journal,47, 253–270.CrossRef Lerner, A. P. (1937). Statics and dynamics in socialist economics. Economic Journal,47, 253–270.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Lerner, A. P. (1944). The economics of control. New-York: Macmillan. Lerner, A. P. (1944). The economics of control. New-York: Macmillan.
Zurück zum Zitat Leuchtenburg, W. E. (2005). The white house looks south: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University. Leuchtenburg, W. E. (2005). The white house looks south: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University.
Zurück zum Zitat Lively, R. A. (1948). The south and freight rates: Political settlement of an economic argument. Journal of Southern History,14(3), 357–384.CrossRef Lively, R. A. (1948). The south and freight rates: Political settlement of an economic argument. Journal of Southern History,14(3), 357–384.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Locklin, D. P. (1946). Reorganization of the railroad rate structure. American Economic Review,36(2), 466–478. Locklin, D. P. (1946). Reorganization of the railroad rate structure. American Economic Review,36(2), 466–478.
Zurück zum Zitat Locklin, D. P. (1947). Can existing regional differences in class-rate levels be justified? Law and Contemporary Problems,12(3), 495–506.CrossRef Locklin, D. P. (1947). Can existing regional differences in class-rate levels be justified? Law and Contemporary Problems,12(3), 495–506.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat MacLean, N. (2017). Democracy in chains: The deep history of the radical Right’s stealth plan for America. New York, NY: Penguin Books. MacLean, N. (2017). Democracy in chains: The deep history of the radical Right’s stealth plan for America. New York, NY: Penguin Books.
Zurück zum Zitat Markham, J. W. (1950). Some comments upon the North-South differential. Southern Economic Journal, 16(3), 279–283.CrossRef Markham, J. W. (1950). Some comments upon the North-South differential. Southern Economic Journal, 16(3), 279–283.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Marshall, A. (1890). Principles of economics. London: Macmillan. Marshall, A. (1890). Principles of economics. London: Macmillan.
Zurück zum Zitat Maxwell, J. A. (1946). The fiscal impact of federalism in United States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.CrossRef Maxwell, J. A. (1946). The fiscal impact of federalism in United States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat McMahon, K. J. (2007). You can’t go home again: Democratic presidents and dixie. Review of “The white house looks South: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson by William E. Leuchtenburg”. Reviews in American History,35(1), 111–117.CrossRef McMahon, K. J. (2007). You can’t go home again: Democratic presidents and dixie. Review of “The white house looks South: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson by William E. Leuchtenburg”. Reviews in American History,35(1), 111–117.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Miller, E. H. (1947). Corrective action by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Law and Contemporary Problems,12(3), 549–570.CrossRef Miller, E. H. (1947). Corrective action by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Law and Contemporary Problems,12(3), 549–570.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat National Emergency Council. (1938). Report on economic conditions of the south, Government Printing Office. National Emergency Council. (1938). Report on economic conditions of the south, Government Printing Office.
Zurück zum Zitat Nelson, J. C. (1947). A research basis for corrective action with respect to interterritorial freight rates. Law and Contemporary Problems,12(3), 532–548.CrossRef Nelson, J. C. (1947). A research basis for corrective action with respect to interterritorial freight rates. Law and Contemporary Problems,12(3), 532–548.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Newby, I. A. (1963). The southern Agarians: A view after thirty years. Agricultural History,37(3), 143–155. Newby, I. A. (1963). The southern Agarians: A view after thirty years. Agricultural History,37(3), 143–155.
Zurück zum Zitat Peck, J. (1950). Free system endangered, club warned. The Knoxville Journal, March 3. Peck, J. (1950). Free system endangered, club warned. The Knoxville Journal, March 3.
Zurück zum Zitat Pigou, A. C. (1912). Wealth and welfare. London: Macmillan. Pigou, A. C. (1912). Wealth and welfare. London: Macmillan.
Zurück zum Zitat Pigou, A.C. (1913) Railway rates and joint cost. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 27(3), 535–538 and 27(4), 687–692. Pigou, A.C. (1913) Railway rates and joint cost. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 27(3), 535–538 and 27(4), 687–692.
Zurück zum Zitat Pigou, A. C. (1920). The economics of wealth and welfare. London: Macmillan. Pigou, A. C. (1920). The economics of wealth and welfare. London: Macmillan.
Zurück zum Zitat Pigou, A. C. (1929). A study in public finance. London: Mac-millan. Pigou, A. C. (1929). A study in public finance. London: Mac-millan.
Zurück zum Zitat Potter, D. M. (1947). The historical development of eastern-southern freight rate. Law and Contemporary Problems,12(3), 416–448.CrossRef Potter, D. M. (1947). The historical development of eastern-southern freight rate. Law and Contemporary Problems,12(3), 416–448.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Rayback, J. G. (1954). Our “Dixiecrat” revolts—A case study. Social Science,29(3), 138–146. Rayback, J. G. (1954). Our “Dixiecrat” revolts—A case study. Social Science,29(3), 138–146.
Zurück zum Zitat Scott, A. D. (1950). A note on grants in federal countries. Economica,17(68), 416–422.CrossRef Scott, A. D. (1950). A note on grants in federal countries. Economica,17(68), 416–422.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Scott, A. D. (1952). Federal grants and resource allocation. Journal of Political Economy,60(6), 534–536.CrossRef Scott, A. D. (1952). Federal grants and resource allocation. Journal of Political Economy,60(6), 534–536.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Shapiro, E. (1970). The southern Agrarians and the Tennessee Valley Authority. American Quarterly,22(4), 791–806.CrossRef Shapiro, E. (1970). The southern Agrarians and the Tennessee Valley Authority. American Quarterly,22(4), 791–806.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Simons, H. C. (1934 [1948]). A positive program for laissez-faire: Some proposals for a liberal economic policy, reprinted in Economic policy for a free society (pp. 40–78). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Simons, H. C. (1934 [1948]). A positive program for laissez-faire: Some proposals for a liberal economic policy, reprinted in Economic policy for a free society (pp. 40–78). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Simons, H. C. (1936). The requisites of free competition. American Economic Review,26(1), 68–76. Simons, H. C. (1936). The requisites of free competition. American Economic Review,26(1), 68–76.
Zurück zum Zitat Simons, H. C. (1942). Hansen on fiscal policy. Journal of Political Economy, 50(2), 161–196.CrossRef Simons, H. C. (1942). Hansen on fiscal policy. Journal of Political Economy, 50(2), 161–196.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Smith, E. A. (1946). The Interstate Commerce Commission, the Department of Justice, and the Supreme Court. American Economic Review,36(2), 479–493. Smith, E. A. (1946). The Interstate Commerce Commission, the Department of Justice, and the Supreme Court. American Economic Review,36(2), 479–493.
Zurück zum Zitat Somers, H. M. (1951). Government expenditures and economic welfare. Revue de Science et de Législation Financières,XLIII. Somers, H. M. (1951). Government expenditures and economic welfare. Revue de Science et de Législation Financières,XLIII.
Zurück zum Zitat Stigler, G. J. (1946). The economics of minimum wage legislation. American Economic Review,36(3), 358–365. Stigler, G. J. (1946). The economics of minimum wage legislation. American Economic Review,36(3), 358–365.
Zurück zum Zitat Sufrin, S. C., Swinyard, A. W., & Stephenson, F. M. (1948). The North-South differential: A different view. Southern Economic Journal, 15(2), 184–190.CrossRef Sufrin, S. C., Swinyard, A. W., & Stephenson, F. M. (1948). The North-South differential: A different view. Southern Economic Journal, 15(2), 184–190.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Tally, J. O., Jr. (1947). The Supreme Court, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the freight rate battle. North Carolina Law Review,25(2), 17. Tally, J. O., Jr. (1947). The Supreme Court, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the freight rate battle. North Carolina Law Review,25(2), 17.
Zurück zum Zitat Taussig, F. (1891). A contribution to the theory of railway rates. Quarterly Journal of Economics,5(4), 438–465.CrossRef Taussig, F. (1891). A contribution to the theory of railway rates. Quarterly Journal of Economics,5(4), 438–465.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Taussig, F. (1913a). Railway rates and joint cost once more. Quarterly Journal of Economics,27(2), 378–384.CrossRef Taussig, F. (1913a). Railway rates and joint cost once more. Quarterly Journal of Economics,27(2), 378–384.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Taussig, F. (1913b). Railway rates and joint cost: Rejoinder and Comment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 27(3), 536–38 and 27(4), 692–94. Taussig, F. (1913b). Railway rates and joint cost: Rejoinder and Comment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 27(3), 536–38 and 27(4), 692–94.
Zurück zum Zitat Taussig, F. (1933). The theory of railway rates once more. Quarterly Journal of Economics,47(2), 337–342.CrossRef Taussig, F. (1933). The theory of railway rates once more. Quarterly Journal of Economics,47(2), 337–342.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat van Sickle, J. V. (1943). Planning for the south. An inquiry into the economics of regionalism. Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press. van Sickle, J. V. (1943). Planning for the south. An inquiry into the economics of regionalism. Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Vickrey, W. (1948). Some objections to marginal-cost pricing. Journal of Political Economy, 56(3), 218–238.CrossRef Vickrey, W. (1948). Some objections to marginal-cost pricing. Journal of Political Economy, 56(3), 218–238.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Wagner, R. E. (2017). James M. Buchanan and liberal political economy: A Rational Reconstruction. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Wagner, R. E. (2017). James M. Buchanan and liberal political economy: A Rational Reconstruction. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Zurück zum Zitat Wiprud, A. C. (1945). Justice in transportation: An Exposé of Monopoly Control. New York: Ziff-Davis publishing Company. Wiprud, A. C. (1945). Justice in transportation: An Exposé of Monopoly Control. New York: Ziff-Davis publishing Company.
Zurück zum Zitat Wiprud, A. C. (1947). Corrective action under the antitrust laws. Law and Contemporary Problems,12(3), 571–578.CrossRef Wiprud, A. C. (1947). Corrective action under the antitrust laws. Law and Contemporary Problems,12(3), 571–578.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Young, R. R. (1947). A national transportation policy. Law and Contemporary Problems,12(3), 621–639.CrossRef Young, R. R. (1947). A national transportation policy. Law and Contemporary Problems,12(3), 621–639.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
How Buchanan’s concern for the South shaped his first academic works
Publikationsdatum
30.03.2020
Erschienen in
Public Choice / Ausgabe 3-4/2020
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00800-x

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 3-4/2020

Public Choice 3-4/2020 Zur Ausgabe

Premium Partner