Skip to main content
Erschienen in: Water Resources Management 12/2016

01.09.2016

Water Allocation in Transboundary River Basins under Water Scarcity: a Cooperative Bargaining Approach

verfasst von: Dagmawi Mulugeta Degefu, Weijun He, Liang Yuan, Jian Hua Zhao

Erschienen in: Water Resources Management | Ausgabe 12/2016

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

Transboundary river basins are one of the main sources of fresh water which are facing water scarcity. When transboundary water is contested not only the allocation outcomes matter but also the allocation process should possess a certain desirable properties such as flexibility and sustainability. Therefore designing a mechanism that possesses these desirable characteristics and allocates the contested water resource is important as well. This article proposed a water allocation framework by combining the bankruptcy theory with asymmetric Nash bargaining solution concept for solving the water sharing problem in transboundary river basins under scarcity. Furthermore, the allocation framework was applied to the Nile river basin and to a hypothetical water scarce transboundary river basin. The results obtained were then compared with the allocation outcomes from classical bankruptcy allocation rules. The results showed that the proposed method can provide insights which could be useful for obtaining water allocation outcomes which are easier to implement and enforce under water scarce conditions.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe




 

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Ansink E (2009) Game-theoretic models of water allocation in transboundary river basins. Wageningen University, Dissertation Ansink E (2009) Game-theoretic models of water allocation in transboundary river basins. Wageningen University, Dissertation
Zurück zum Zitat Ansink E, Harold H (2015) The economics of transboundary river management. In: Dinar A, Schwabe K (eds) Handbook of water economics. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 434–469CrossRef Ansink E, Harold H (2015) The economics of transboundary river management. In: Dinar A, Schwabe K (eds) Handbook of water economics. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 434–469CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Ansink E, Marchiori C (2010) Reallocating water: an application of sequential sharing rules to Cyprus. FEEM Work Pap No 126(20):1–19 Ansink E, Marchiori C (2010) Reallocating water: an application of sequential sharing rules to Cyprus. FEEM Work Pap No 126(20):1–19
Zurück zum Zitat Ansink E, Weikard H-P (2012) Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems. Soc Choice Welf 38(2):187–210CrossRef Ansink E, Weikard H-P (2012) Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems. Soc Choice Welf 38(2):187–210CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Aumann RJ, Maschler M (1985) Game theoretical analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud. Journal Economic Theory 36(2):195–213CrossRef Aumann RJ, Maschler M (1985) Game theoretical analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud. Journal Economic Theory 36(2):195–213CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Awulachew SB, Demissie SS, Hagos F, Erkossa T, Peden D (2012) Water management intervention analysis in the Nile Basin. In:Awulachew SB, Smakhtin V, Molden D, Paden D (eds) The Nile River Basin Water,Agriculture, Governance and Livelihoods. Routledge-Earthscan, Abingdon, pp 292–311 Awulachew SB, Demissie SS, Hagos F, Erkossa T, Peden D (2012) Water management intervention analysis in the Nile Basin. In:Awulachew SB, Smakhtin V, Molden D, Paden D (eds) The Nile River Basin Water,Agriculture, Governance and Livelihoods. Routledge-Earthscan, Abingdon, pp 292–311
Zurück zum Zitat Barrett S (1994) Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxf Econ Pap 46(S):878–894 Barrett S (1994) Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxf Econ Pap 46(S):878–894
Zurück zum Zitat Brunnee J, Stephen JT (2002) The changing Nile basin regime: does law matter? Harvard International Law Journal 43(1):107–159 Brunnee J, Stephen JT (2002) The changing Nile basin regime: does law matter? Harvard International Law Journal 43(1):107–159
Zurück zum Zitat Carraro C, Marchiori C and Sgobbi A (2006 )Applications of negotiation theory to water issues, University Ca′ Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 09/06 World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3641 Carraro C, Marchiori C and Sgobbi A (2006 )Applications of negotiation theory to water issues, University Ca′ Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 09/06 World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3641
Zurück zum Zitat Casas-Méndez B, Fragnelli V, García-Jurado I (2011) Weighted bankruptcy rules and the museum pass problem. Eur J Oper Res 215(1):161–168CrossRef Casas-Méndez B, Fragnelli V, García-Jurado I (2011) Weighted bankruptcy rules and the museum pass problem. Eur J Oper Res 215(1):161–168CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Curiel IJ, Maschler M, Tijs SH (1987) Bankruptcy games. Zeitschrift far Operations Research 31: A 143–A 159 Curiel IJ, Maschler M, Tijs SH (1987) Bankruptcy games. Zeitschrift far Operations Research 31: A 143–A 159
Zurück zum Zitat Dagan N, Volij O (1993) The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative the bankruptcy bargaining approach. Math Soc Sci 26:287–297CrossRef Dagan N, Volij O (1993) The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative the bankruptcy bargaining approach. Math Soc Sci 26:287–297CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat De Bruyne C, Fischhendler I (2013) Negotiating conflict resolution mechanisms for transboundary water treaties: a transaction cost approach. Glob Environ Chang 23(6):1841–1851CrossRef De Bruyne C, Fischhendler I (2013) Negotiating conflict resolution mechanisms for transboundary water treaties: a transaction cost approach. Glob Environ Chang 23(6):1841–1851CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat De Stefano L, Duncan J, Dinar S, Stahl K, Strzepek KM, Wolf AT (2012) Climate change and the institutional resilience of international river basin. J Peace Res 49(1):193–209CrossRef De Stefano L, Duncan J, Dinar S, Stahl K, Strzepek KM, Wolf AT (2012) Climate change and the institutional resilience of international river basin. J Peace Res 49(1):193–209CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Degefu DM, He W (2016b) Water bankruptcy in the mighty Nile river basin. Sustainable Water Resource Management 2(1):29–37CrossRef Degefu DM, He W (2016b) Water bankruptcy in the mighty Nile river basin. Sustainable Water Resource Management 2(1):29–37CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Eckstein G (2009) Water scarcity, conflict and security in a climate change world: challenges and opportunities for international law and policy. Wisconsin International Law Journal 27(3):409–461 Eckstein G (2009) Water scarcity, conflict and security in a climate change world: challenges and opportunities for international law and policy. Wisconsin International Law Journal 27(3):409–461
Zurück zum Zitat Gallastegui MC, Iñarra E, Prellezo R (2002) Bankruptcy of fishing resources: the Northern European anglerfish fishery. Mar Resour Econ 17(4):291–307CrossRef Gallastegui MC, Iñarra E, Prellezo R (2002) Bankruptcy of fishing resources: the Northern European anglerfish fishery. Mar Resour Econ 17(4):291–307CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Gleick PH (2000) The changing water paradigm: a look at twenty-first century water resources development. Water Int 25(1):127–138CrossRef Gleick PH (2000) The changing water paradigm: a look at twenty-first century water resources development. Water Int 25(1):127–138CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Gray B (1989) Collaborating: finding common ground for multiparty problems, first edn. Jossey-Bass publishers, San Francisco Gray B (1989) Collaborating: finding common ground for multiparty problems, first edn. Jossey-Bass publishers, San Francisco
Zurück zum Zitat Gunasekara NK, Kazama S, Yamazaki D, Oki T (2014) Water conflict risk due to water resource availability and unequal distribution. Water Resour Manag 28(1):169–184CrossRef Gunasekara NK, Kazama S, Yamazaki D, Oki T (2014) Water conflict risk due to water resource availability and unequal distribution. Water Resour Manag 28(1):169–184CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Harsanyi JC (1982) A simplified bargaining model for the n-person cooperative game. In: Harsanyi JC (ed) Papers in game theory. Springer, Netherlands, pp. 45–70CrossRef Harsanyi JC (1982) A simplified bargaining model for the n-person cooperative game. In: Harsanyi JC (ed) Papers in game theory. Springer, Netherlands, pp. 45–70CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Herings P, Predtetchinski A (2010) One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities. J Econ Theory 145(1):189–215CrossRef Herings P, Predtetchinski A (2010) One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities. J Econ Theory 145(1):189–215CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Herrero M (1989) The Nash program: non-convex bargaining problems. J Econ Theory 49(2):266–277CrossRef Herrero M (1989) The Nash program: non-convex bargaining problems. J Econ Theory 49(2):266–277CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Herrero C, Villar A (2001) The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problem. Math Soc Sci 42(3):307–328CrossRef Herrero C, Villar A (2001) The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problem. Math Soc Sci 42(3):307–328CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Homer D, Thomas F (1994) Environmental scarcities and violent conflict: evidence from cases. Int Secur 19(1):5–40CrossRef Homer D, Thomas F (1994) Environmental scarcities and violent conflict: evidence from cases. Int Secur 19(1):5–40CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Houba H, Van der Laan G, Zeng Y (2014) Asymmetric Nash solutions in the river sharing problem. Strategic Behavior and the Environment 4(4):321–360CrossRef Houba H, Van der Laan G, Zeng Y (2014) Asymmetric Nash solutions in the river sharing problem. Strategic Behavior and the Environment 4(4):321–360CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Kalai E, TelAviv (1975) Non-symmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2-Person bargaining. International Journal of Game Theory 6(3):129–133 Kalai E, TelAviv (1975) Non-symmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2-Person bargaining. International Journal of Game Theory 6(3):129–133
Zurück zum Zitat Keith B, Enos J, Cadets Garlick B, Simmons G, Daniel C, Mario C (2013) Limits to population growth and water resource adequacy in the Nile river basin, 1994–2100. In: Proceedings of the 31st international conference of the system dynamics society. Massachusetts, USA, Cambridge, pp. 1701–1745 Keith B, Enos J, Cadets Garlick B, Simmons G, Daniel C, Mario C (2013) Limits to population growth and water resource adequacy in the Nile river basin, 1994–2100. In: Proceedings of the 31st international conference of the system dynamics society. Massachusetts, USA, Cambridge, pp. 1701–1745
Zurück zum Zitat Madani K, Hipel KW (2011) Non-cooperative stability definitions for strategic analysis of generic water resources conflicts. Water Resour Manag 25(8):1949–1977CrossRef Madani K, Hipel KW (2011) Non-cooperative stability definitions for strategic analysis of generic water resources conflicts. Water Resour Manag 25(8):1949–1977CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Madani K, Zarezadeh M, Morid S (2014) A new framework for resolving conflicts over transboundary rivers using bankruptcy methods. Hydrol Earth Syst Sci 18(8):3055–3068CrossRef Madani K, Zarezadeh M, Morid S (2014) A new framework for resolving conflicts over transboundary rivers using bankruptcy methods. Hydrol Earth Syst Sci 18(8):3055–3068CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Mark R, Jury (2011) Climate variability and hydrologic response climatic factors modulating Nile river flow. In: Assefa MM (ed) Nile river basin hydrology, climate and water use. Springer, Netherlands, pp 267–280 Mark R, Jury (2011) Climate variability and hydrologic response climatic factors modulating Nile river flow. In: Assefa MM (ed) Nile river basin hydrology, climate and water use. Springer, Netherlands, pp 267–280
Zurück zum Zitat Mianabadi H, Sheikhmohammady M, Mostert E, Giesen N (2014) Application of the ordered weighted averaging (OWA) method to the Caspian Sea conflict. Stoch Env Res Risk A 28(6):1359–1372 Mianabadi H, Sheikhmohammady M, Mostert E, Giesen N (2014) Application of the ordered weighted averaging (OWA) method to the Caspian Sea conflict. Stoch Env Res Risk A 28(6):1359–1372
Zurück zum Zitat Mianabadi H, Mostert E, van de Giesen N (2015a) Trans-boundary river basin management: factors influencing the success or failure of international agreements. In: Hipel KW, Fang L, Cullmann J, Bristow M (eds) Conflict resolution in water resources and environmental management, 1st edn. Springer, Switzerland, pp. 133–141 Mianabadi H, Mostert E, van de Giesen N (2015a) Trans-boundary river basin management: factors influencing the success or failure of international agreements. In: Hipel KW, Fang L, Cullmann J, Bristow M (eds) Conflict resolution in water resources and environmental management, 1st edn. Springer, Switzerland, pp. 133–141
Zurück zum Zitat Mianabadi H, Mostert E, Pande S, Giesen N (2015b) Weighted bankruptcy rules and transboundary water resources allocation. Water Resour Manag 29(7):2303–2321CrossRef Mianabadi H, Mostert E, Pande S, Giesen N (2015b) Weighted bankruptcy rules and transboundary water resources allocation. Water Resour Manag 29(7):2303–2321CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Molden D, Awulachew SB, Conniff K, Rebelo LM, Mohamed Y, Peden D, Kinyangi J, van Breugel P, Mukherji A, Cascão A, Notenbaert A, Demissie SS, Neguid MA, El Naggar G (2010) Nile basin focal project: synthesis report, CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food. Colombo, Sri Lanka Molden D, Awulachew SB, Conniff K, Rebelo LM, Mohamed Y, Peden D, Kinyangi J, van Breugel P, Mukherji A, Cascão A, Notenbaert A, Demissie SS, Neguid MA, El Naggar G (2010) Nile basin focal project: synthesis report, CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food. Colombo, Sri Lanka
Zurück zum Zitat Nash Z (1953) Two-person cooperative games. Econometrica 21(1):128–140CrossRef Nash Z (1953) Two-person cooperative games. Econometrica 21(1):128–140CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat O’Neill B (1982) A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud. Math Soc Sci 2(4):345–371CrossRef O’Neill B (1982) A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud. Math Soc Sci 2(4):345–371CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Oftadeh E, Shourian M, Saghafian B (2016) Evaluation of the bankruptcy approach for water resources allocation conflict resolution at basin scale. Iran’s Lake Urmia Experience Water Resources Management. doi:10.1007/s11269-016-1368-9 Oftadeh E, Shourian M, Saghafian B (2016) Evaluation of the bankruptcy approach for water resources allocation conflict resolution at basin scale. Iran’s Lake Urmia Experience Water Resources Management. doi:10.​1007/​s11269-016-1368-9
Zurück zum Zitat Rachmilevitch S (2015) A characterization of the asymmetric Nash solution. Rev Econ Des 19(2):167–171 Rachmilevitch S (2015) A characterization of the asymmetric Nash solution. Rev Econ Des 19(2):167–171
Zurück zum Zitat Raskin P, Gallopín G, Gutman P, Hammond A, and Swar R (1998) Bending the curve: toward global sustainability. PoleStar Series Report, 8, Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm Raskin P, Gallopín G, Gutman P, Hammond A, and Swar R (1998) Bending the curve: toward global sustainability. PoleStar Series Report, 8, Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm
Zurück zum Zitat Rogers P, Leal S, Markey J (2010) Running out of water: the looming crisis and solutions to conserve our most precious resource. St. Martin's Press, New York Rogers P, Leal S, Markey J (2010) Running out of water: the looming crisis and solutions to conserve our most precious resource. St. Martin's Press, New York
Zurück zum Zitat Salman SM (2007) The Helsinki rules, the UN watercourses convention and the Berlin rules: perspectives on international water law. International Journal of Water Resource Development 23(4):625–640CrossRef Salman SM (2007) The Helsinki rules, the UN watercourses convention and the Berlin rules: perspectives on international water law. International Journal of Water Resource Development 23(4):625–640CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Saz-Salazar S, García-Rubio MA, González-Gómez F, Picazo-Tadeo AJ (2016) Managing water resources under conditions of scarcity: on consumers’ willingness to pay for improving water supply infrastructure. Water Resour Manag 30(5):1723–1738CrossRef Saz-Salazar S, García-Rubio MA, González-Gómez F, Picazo-Tadeo AJ (2016) Managing water resources under conditions of scarcity: on consumers’ willingness to pay for improving water supply infrastructure. Water Resour Manag 30(5):1723–1738CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Sechi GM, Zucca R (2015) Water resource allocation in critical scarcity conditions: a bankruptcy game approach. Water Resour Manag 29(2):541–555CrossRef Sechi GM, Zucca R (2015) Water resource allocation in critical scarcity conditions: a bankruptcy game approach. Water Resour Manag 29(2):541–555CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Sgobbi A, Carraro C (2011) A stochastic multiple players multi-issues bargaining model for the Piave river basin. Strategic Behavior and the Environment 1(2):119–150CrossRef Sgobbi A, Carraro C (2011) A stochastic multiple players multi-issues bargaining model for the Piave river basin. Strategic Behavior and the Environment 1(2):119–150CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Sheikhmohammady M, Madani K (2008) Sharing a multi-national resource through bankruptcy procedures. In: Babcock RW, Walton R (eds) Proceeding of the 2008 world environmental and water resources congress. Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, pp. 556–556 Sheikhmohammady M, Madani K (2008) Sharing a multi-national resource through bankruptcy procedures. In: Babcock RW, Walton R (eds) Proceeding of the 2008 world environmental and water resources congress. Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, pp. 556–556
Zurück zum Zitat Swain A (2001) Water wars: fact or fiction? Futures 33(8–9):769–781CrossRef Swain A (2001) Water wars: fact or fiction? Futures 33(8–9):769–781CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Swain A (2015) Water wars. In: Wright JD (ed) International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences, vol 25, 2nd edn. Elsevier, Oxford, pp. 443–447CrossRef Swain A (2015) Water wars. In: Wright JD (ed) International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences, vol 25, 2nd edn. Elsevier, Oxford, pp. 443–447CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat UN Watercourses Convention (1997) Convention on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses. United Nations Adopted on May 21:1997 UN Watercourses Convention (1997) Convention on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses. United Nations Adopted on May 21:1997
Zurück zum Zitat Wang X, Zhang Y, Zeng Y, Liu C (2013) Resolving trans-jurisdictional water conflicts by the Nash bargaining method: a case study in Zhangweinan canal basin in north China. Water Resour Manag 27(5):1235–1247 Wang X, Zhang Y, Zeng Y, Liu C (2013) Resolving trans-jurisdictional water conflicts by the Nash bargaining method: a case study in Zhangweinan canal basin in north China. Water Resour Manag 27(5):1235–1247
Zurück zum Zitat Wolf AT (1999) Criteria for equitable allocations: the heart of international water conflict. Nat Res Forum 23(1):3–30CrossRef Wolf AT (1999) Criteria for equitable allocations: the heart of international water conflict. Nat Res Forum 23(1):3–30CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Wu X, Whittington D (2006) Incentive compatibility and conflict resolution in international river basins: a case study of the Nile Basin. Water Resour Res 42(2):W02417CrossRef Wu X, Whittington D (2006) Incentive compatibility and conflict resolution in international river basins: a case study of the Nile Basin. Water Resour Res 42(2):W02417CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Wu QL, Xu NR (1996) Improved interactive methods of multi-objective decision-making based on target-satisfaction degree. J Manag Eng 4:217–222 Wu QL, Xu NR (1996) Improved interactive methods of multi-objective decision-making based on target-satisfaction degree. J Manag Eng 4:217–222
Zurück zum Zitat Zarezadeh M, Madani K, Morid S (2012) Resolving transboundary water conflicts: lessons learned from the Qezelozan-Sefidrood river bankruptcy problem. World environmental and water resources congress, Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA, pp. 2406–2412 Zarezadeh M, Madani K, Morid S (2012) Resolving transboundary water conflicts: lessons learned from the Qezelozan-Sefidrood river bankruptcy problem. World environmental and water resources congress, Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA, pp. 2406–2412
Metadaten
Titel
Water Allocation in Transboundary River Basins under Water Scarcity: a Cooperative Bargaining Approach
verfasst von
Dagmawi Mulugeta Degefu
Weijun He
Liang Yuan
Jian Hua Zhao
Publikationsdatum
01.09.2016
Verlag
Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in
Water Resources Management / Ausgabe 12/2016
Print ISSN: 0920-4741
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-1650
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-016-1431-6

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 12/2016

Water Resources Management 12/2016 Zur Ausgabe