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The Review of International Organizations
Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations 4/2016

07.10.2015

Can I stay a BIT longer? The effect of bilateral investment treaties on political survival

verfasst von: Soumyajit Mazumder

Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations | Ausgabe 4/2016

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Abstract

Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) have proliferated throughout the international system. While ostensibly commercial in purpose, do BITs have domestic political ramifications? I argue that BITs affect a leader’s tenure through their effect on the property rights environment in developing countries. BITs, by segmenting a country’s property rights environment for foreign and domestic firms, reduce the incentive for foreign firms to lobby for property rights protections in the host country thus leading to a stagnating domestic property rights environment. In autocracies, a stagnating domestic property rights regime benefits domestic business elites who can continue to stymie small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The political benefits of BITs, however, decrease as a country becomes more democratic. Using a dataset of developing country leaders over the period 1965-2011, I find support for my hypothesis that BITs are associated with a decreased hazard of losing office and that the effect diminishes with higher levels of democracy. My results highlight the consequences of the legalization of global investment on the domestic political economy.
Vorheriger Artikel Human rights treaties and mobilized dissent against the state
Nächster Artikel Ayse Kaya. 2015. Power and Global Economic Institutions

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Fußnoten
1
This does not necessarily mean that the property rights of other domestic firms must be secure–a point that I return to later.
 
2
Other arbitration options include the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, the Cairo Regional Centre for Commercial Arbitration, the Arab Investment Court, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (Hague).
 
3
For the evidence demonstrating that politically increased firms enjoy increased firm value, see Faccio (2006), Ferguson and Voth (2008), Goldmann et al. (2009), Cooper et al. (2010), Desai and Olofsgȧrd (2011), Dube et al. (2011). For studies showing that politically connected firms have preferential access to finance, see Khwaja and Mian (2005), Bai et al. (2006), Claessens et al. (2008), Faccio (2010). Studies that show that politically connected firms enjoy favorable regulations include Stigler (1971), Johnson and Mitton (2003). Finally for the literature on how politically connected firms receive favorable litigation outcomes and corporate bailouts, see Faccio et al. (2006), Blau et al. (2013), Lu et al. (2013).
 
4
While MNCs from capital-exporting states tend to win cases under BITs, investors do have difficulty in securing compensation from a host state that violated its obligations under a BIT (Johnston 2013; Graham et al. 2013). Allee and Peinhardt (2011) as well as Jensen et al. (2013b) find, however, that MNCs punish states that expropriate by withholding future investment. Such actions can potentially improve compliance with panel decisions. Furthermore, the litigation process itself can also be costly and time-consuming for developing countries making it more attractive for such states to either settle or comply.
 
5
In my main analyses, I include leaders who died in office of natural death as well. Assuming that the probability of dying in office is independently and identically distributed across all leaders, my estimates should not be affected by the inclusion of these leaders. While including these leaders provides us with relevant information, removing leaders who died in office from my analysis does not qualitatively change my results.
 
6
Leaders that entered into office before 1965 do not enter into the likelihood function until January 1st, 1965 and therefore are treated as being at risk starting from January 1st, 1965.
 
7
The log of zero is undefined. Because most leaders do not have a North-South BIT go into force in a given year, I would lose a substantial amount of data leading to biased and/or inconsistent estimates.
 
8
The use of the semi-parametric Cox Hazards estimator also accounts for diminishing marginal returns by adjusting for time dependency.
 
9
Arias et al. (2014) find a similar effect of BITs on leader survival. They argue that the BITs affect political survival through their effect on FDI. Yet, theory suggests that the effect of FDI on political survival is ambiguous and the evidence presented in this paper demonstrates that the effect of FDI is not robust.
 
10
Cheibub et al. (2010) point out a number of problems with the Polity II index. I use the Polity II in my main models because Hollyer and Rosendorff (2012) serves as my baseline model. My main results hold when using the Cheibub et al. (2010) index as well.
 
11
It is important to note, however, that given the causal direction of BITs, PTAs and leader survival, the inclusion of PTA signing might induce post-treatment bias into my models. Estimating my models without PTA signing does not substantively change the results.
 
12
See Ross (2001), Jensen and Wantchekon (2004), Smith (2004, 2008), Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) for literature on the effect of oil on political survival. For the literature on foreign aid and political survival, see Knack (2004), Smith (2008), Kono and Montinola (2009), Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), Ahmed (2012).
 
13
If FDI is indeed survival enhancing, then this would also risk post-treatment bias that would put downward pressure on the effect of BITs on political survival.
 
14
I thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
 
15
Another potential instrument could be the number of BITs signed by that leader’s economic competitors (Elkins et al. 2006). However, the theoretical justification is tenuous. The number of BITs signed by competitors can lead to FDI outflows from the country of interest, which can have a plausible effect on a leader’s probability of surviving in office especially if the competitive pressures to sign a BIT are particularly acute for the leader. Other potential instruments such as international organization membership and treaty signing have been shown to have effects on leader survival (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011, 2012; Poast and Urpelainen Forthcoming).
 
16
Statistical significance on the constituent components of the interaction term are not enough either (Braumoeller 2004).
 
17
Note: Estimates derived from Model 5 in Table 3
 
18
Recent research by Hollyer et al. (Forthcoming) suggests that autocrats strategically leverage transparency, which generates instability in order to solidify the support of elites around the leader.
 
19
I leave out covariates that are likely to exhibit post-treatment bias such as PTA signing, FDI, fuel exports, and transparency. The inclusion of other pre-treatment covariates such as IMF program membership, the number of World Bank programs, and political constraints does not affect the results of the matched estimates. They do, however, yield lower R 2 values hence why I leave them out of the main matched results.
 
20
My results remain robust to using the Entropy Balancing procedure described by Hainmueller (2012) and balancing on the 1st and 2nd moments.
 
21
Note: Estimates derived from Model 5 in Table 3 re-weighted by each leader’s propensity score.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Can I stay a BIT longer? The effect of bilateral investment treaties on political survival
verfasst von
Soumyajit Mazumder
Publikationsdatum
07.10.2015
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
The Review of International Organizations / Ausgabe 4/2016
Print ISSN: 1559-7431
Elektronische ISSN: 1559-744X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-015-9235-7

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