Tropes of the crusades in Indonesian Muslim discourse

Jakarta: Serambi, 2006 The Indonesian title translates “Wars of the Cross: Islamic Perspectives.” On September 12, 2006 a Google search for the Indonesian title returned 504 hits. Nearly four years later it is still a “best seller.”

I have done extensive ethnographic research among Indonesian Muslims of almost all theological and political orientations. I would like to thank the Center for Asian Research and the Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict at Arizona State University for financial support. Fieldwork conducted in the late 1970s serves as a baseline. It was supported by the Council for the International Exchange of Scholars, the Social Science Research Council and the Graduate College Research Board at the University of Illinois.

On Masyumi see Boland (1971); Lucius (2000); Samson (1978). On Natsir and his political thought see: Effendy (2003); Noer (1973). On DDII and the Masyumi legacy in contemporary Indonesia see: Diederich (2002); Hasan (2008); Liddle (1996a, b) and Woodward (2001).

For a detailed treatment of DDII see Husin (1998).

Natsir was affiliated with Persatuan Islam, a small, but influential, fundamentalist organization. See Federspiel (2001).

There is an unfortunate tendency in the literature on Indonesian Islam to accept the “reformist” view of these practices as sociological and historical fact and to describe these practices as either as “Hindu-Buddhist” or animistic in an uncritical way. The persistence of this view is due largely to the influence of Clifford Geertz’s Religion of Java, Glencoe; The Free Press, 1960 and the work of Indonesian Islamist scholars, including Deliar Noer (1973) who assert that their Islam is the only “true” Islam. This complex of beliefs and practices are not unique to Indonesia and are widely distributed across the Muslim world. Traditionalist Muslims in Indonesia and elsewhere argue that they are firmly rooted in either the Qur’an or Sunnah. A substantial body of more recent scholarship emphasizes the influence of Muslim textual traditions on Indonesian popular Islams. See Van Bruinessen (1999) and Woodward (1988).

For an overview of Saudi attempts the globalize Wahhabi Islam see: Shehabi (2009).

Azra (2000). Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Justice and Prosperity Party) is now Indonesia’s most significant Muslim political party. See: Diederich (2002); Rahmat (2008); Woodward (2008) and “Contesting Wahhabi Colonialism in Yogyakarta,” COMOPS Journal: Analysis, Commentary and News from the World of Strategic Communications, November, 2008 http://​comops.​org/​journal/​2008/​11/​06/​resisting-wahhabi-colonialism-in-yogyakarta/​

On Islamic publishing in contemporary Indonesia see: Watson (2005).

M. Woodward, “Turning up the Heat on Wahhabi Colonialism,” COMOPS Journal: Analysis, Commentary and News from the World of Strategic Communications, September, 2009 http://​comops.​org/​journal/​2009/​09/​02/​turning-up-the-heat-on-wahhabi-colonialism/​

There is now an extensive literature on Indonesian Islamist movements. See Van Bruinessen (2002) for a general overview and Abuza (2003); Barton (2005a); Hassan (2005) and Lim (2005).

There are many tarbiyah groups most of which are not directly affiliated with national or trans-national Islamist movements. Many in Yogyakarta live in isolation from the larger community, which they regard as unredeemably sinful and corrupt. For a more detailed discussion see Machmudi (2006).

The fatwa (Islamic legal opinion) issued February 23, 1998 by Usama bin Laden and the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders which declared jihad to be a religious obligation incumbent on all Muslims did much to popularize this terminology. Since then it has spread throughout the Muslim world. An English translation is available on line at http://​www.​fas.​org/​irp/​world/​para/​ladin.​htm. The Arabic original is at http://​www.​library.​cornell.​edu/​colldev/​mideast/​fatw2.​htm. It was first published in the London Arabic language newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi.

While it was not one of the major themes in his writing, Natsir made virulently Anti-Semitic comments in his discussions of the plight of the Palestinians (Natsir 1970). DDII consistently indulges in Anti-Semitic conspiracy theorizing. See: Burhanuddin (2007). On Indonesian Anti-Semitism more generally see: van Bruinessen (1994) and Siegel (2000).

On the Negara Islam Indonesia movement see: Dijk (1981); International Crisis Group, Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing, Asia Report No. 92, 22 February 2005; Soebardi (1983). Former NII leaders, who must remain anonymous, were interviewed in Yogyakarta in January 2010. Ali Amin and Inayah Rohmaniyah participated in these interviews and contributed the analysis of the resulting materials.

Eliade (1954) On the role of dehumanization in collective violence see Woodward (2006). It is not possible to determine what percentage of Indonesian Muslims are strongly anti-western, but in 2000 the Pew Global Attitudes Survey indicated that 75% of Indonesian (including non-Muslims) had favorable impressions of the US. In 2006 only thirty per cent did. Over seventy percent have negative impressions of Jews. http://​pewglobal.​org/​reports/​display.​php?​ReportID=​252.

On the concept of Cosmic War see: Juergensmeyer (2003).

For an academic account see Anderson (1965). Since declaring independence in 1945, Indonesians have used this myth as an element of an attempt to imagine an ethnically and religiously diverse but tolerant community. This was perhaps an essential element in the construction of a nation state with the territorial boundaries of the former Netherlands East Indies.

See Woodward (1996).

Raffles (1817). This interpretation of Javanese Islam is developed throughout chapter nine of this classic work. vol. 2, pp.1–64.

See Patung, “Hasyim Muzadi Interview,” Indonesia Matters, May 14, 2006. http://​www.​indonesiamatters​.​com/​357/​hasyim-muzadi-interview/​

Sufis also served as military commanders in South Asia. See Eaton (1978).

There is an extensive and controversial literature on the coupe of 1965. Some scholars, particularly Anderson and Mc Vey maintain that it was an internal military fued and that the communists were not directly involved. B. Anderson and R. McVey A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1 1965 Coupe in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1971. For present purposes what is significant is not who was ultimately responsible for the attempted coup and the death of a group of generals, but simply the scale and ferocity of the killings. An English translation of the Indonesian government’s account of the coup is The September 30th Movement, the Attempted Coup by the Indonesian Communist Party: Its background, Actions and Eradication, Jakarta: State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia, 1995. H. Sulistyo presents a detailed account of the east Java killings, The Forgotten Years: The Missing History of Indonesia’s Mass Slaughter (Jombang-Kediri 1965–1966). Unpublished PhD Thesis, Arizona State University. 1997.

On the rise of radical Islamism in Indonesia see: van Bruinessen (2002) and Hasan (2006).

On Islamic politics in contemporary Indonesia see Woodward (2008), “Indonesia’s Religious Political Parties”.

Sayid Qutb 1903–1966 was an Egyptian Islamist and considered by many to be the founder of contemporary Islamism. He was educated in Egypt and the United States receiving an MA from the University of Northern Colorado. He was deeply affected by what he saw as the moral laxity of 1950s American culture and came to have a bitter hatred of everything western. He was also the first to advocate the use of force to establish a global Islamic state. Hasan al-Bana 1906–1949 was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Hizb al Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party) was founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqi al Din al Nabhani (1909–1977). Al Nabhani studied at al Azhar in Cairo and was subsequently a religious teacher and judge in Palestine. The ILP was found when he and a group of associates split from the Muslim Brotherhood. Their primary goal was restoring an authentic Islamic way of life to the Muslim community and purging it of the vestiges of colonialism, westernization and secularism. This is to be achieved, and all of the problems of the Muslim world solved, by the re-establishment of the universal Caliphate. ILP is now a global organization headquartered in London. It maintains websites in numerous European and Islamic languages. It is increasingly visible and active in Indonesia, one of the few Muslim countries in which it operates legally. It appeals primarily to university students, primarily those with little Islamic education.

http://​www.​irib.​ir/​worldservice/​melayuRADIO/​default.​htm is the Malay/Indonesian website of the Iranian World Broadcasting Service http://​www.​geocities.​com/​bush_​elek/​ is an Indonesian language al-Qaeda website.

Karbala in Iraq was the site of a battle in which Hussein, the third Shia Imam and grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, and much of his family was killed/martyred.

Iranians also participated in and were well received at the Second Annual Conference for Islamic Scholars held in Jakarta in July of 2006. Conference delegates were nearly unanimous in their support of Iran’s nuclear program and accepted Iranian assurances of its peaceful purpose. They unanimously and opposed the sanctions proposed by the US government. I was at the conference.

See Qur’an (3:110)

Qur’an (2:191) Tumult and oppression are worse than killing.

Qur’an (40:43) But if one is patient in adversity and forgives, this is indeed the best resolution of affairs.

On Front Pembela Isalm, see: Desker (2002) and Rosadi (2008).

The “Bali Bombings” were the work of Jemaah Islamiyah which remains the most significant violent Islamist group in Indonesia. See: Barton (2005b).

Majalah Islam Sabili June 29th 2006 pp 60–61. Sabili is very popular. It can be purchased on news stands and in mainstream as well as Islamic book stores.

There is a theological discourse about Jews and Christians in the Javanese pesantren (Islamic Boarding Schools) tradition. It is rooted in the following passage from the Qur’an: “neither the Jews nor the Christians will be pleased with you until you follow their religion. Say: Allah’s Guidance is the [only] Guidance.” Many Javanese kyai (Muslim scholars) express surprise that Jews and Christians do not accept the (to them) obvious truth of Islam. This critical discourse has not, however, sparked social/political movements seeking to convert or confront Jews and Christians, who are regarded by most Indonesian Muslims as “people of the book” whose religions and communities are deserving of the protection of the Muslims.

This observation is based on conversations with faculty and students at government and private Islamic schools and at secular universities. See also Burhanuddin (2007).

Sabili and Media Dakwah are the most widely circulating outlets for Indonesian anti-Semitism. Media Dakwah once devoted an entire issue to the condemnation of the Ohio State University Political Scientist William Liddle including referring to him as a “stinking Jew” for criticizing the magazine’s previous anti-Semitic remarks. The paper that so outraged the editors was published in Indonesian as “Skripturalisme Media Dakwah: Satu Bentuk Pemikiran dan Aksi Politik Islam Masa Orde Baru,” Ulumul Qur’an, Vol. IV, No. 3, 1993, pp. 53–66 and subsequently in English as:“Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Political Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia,” in Mark Woodward, ed., Toward A New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought, Tempe: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Arizona State University, 1996, pp. 323–357.

Conspiracy theories linking these organizations with Zionist and Crusader forces are common throughout the Muslim World. See Schwarz (2006).

See http://​www.​scribd.​com/​doc/​4005800/​ISLAM-YANG-SEMAKIN-LIBERAL-DI-UNIVERSITAS-ISLAM

On the development of anti-Semitism in the Arab Muslim World see Greenberg (2001).

This is true in a more general sense. Local Islamist discourse systems share a concern with Crusaders and Jews but in most instances also include local partners in the alleged conspiracies they depict. In India, for example, Hindus are often linked with Crusaders and Jews.

East Timor is a former Portuguese colony occupied by Indonesia in 1975. After decades of struggle and the loss of at least 100, 000 lives at the hands of Indonesian security forces, it became an independent nation in 1999. See Taylor (1999).

Prior to the time of satellite television American Westerns were enormously popular in Indonesia. The term “cowboy” suggests the image of a heavily armed, violent and often drunk American.

There were ethnically Chinese Jews in Indonesia during the colonial period but contemporary Islamists are generally not aware of this.

The growth of Pentecostalism is another factor that has contributed to the deterioration of Muslim/Christian relations in recent years. The reason for this is that Pentecostal churches sometimes direct aggressive missionary activities at Muslims. Surreptitious missionary activities by foreigners, most of whom are American, are also deeply resented.

July, 2007

Even some very well educated Muslims are inclined to accept the rumor that 4,000 Jews did not go to work on the morning of September 11, 2001 because they had been warned of the attacks. Several of my Indonesian students are absolutely convinced of the truth of this rumor. The Islamic daily Republika reported this rumor as fact immediately after the 9–11 attacks, Burhanuddin (2007).

Shiddiq (2007). In the sixteenth century Malacca, which is located on the western shore of the Malay Peninsula, was an important seaport and center of the Southeast Asian spice trade. The fall of Malacca to the Portuguese, and subsequently the Dutch and British, contributed significantly to the expansion of European power in the region and to what Indonesians refer to as three centuries of colonial rule. The wali songo are the nine legendary saints said to have established Islam as the Religion of Java.

This statement is inaccurate. Portugal was not conquered by the Turks. It is probably a reference to the Turkish capture of Constantinople in that year.

This was actually the Third Crusade.

http://​majelis.​mujahidin.​or.​id/​new/​kolom/​hadist_​shahih/​perang_​salib_​baru/​

Pope Benedict XVI is mentioned because of a lecture he delivered on September 12, 2006 in which he quoted a Byzantine emperor’s derogatory characterization of Islam.

It is so derogatory that many of my Indonesian friends are surprised that I am familiar with the expression.

http://​www.​persis.​or.​id/​site/​index.​php?​option=​com_​content&​task=​view&​id=​30&​Itemid=​26

Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah Tempo Interactive November 15, 2006.

The Reverend Jerry Falwell is an example. In an interview with CBS news that sparked riots throughout the Muslim world he stated: “I think Mohammed was a terrorist. He—I read enough of the history of his life written by both Muslims and—and—non-Muslims, that he was a violent man, a man of war.”