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Dynamic Games and Applications
Erschienen in: Dynamic Games and Applications 2/2015

01.06.2015

Conditions for Cooperation to be More Abundant than Defection in a Hierarchically Structured Population

verfasst von: Dhaker Kroumi, Sabin Lessard

Erschienen in: Dynamic Games and Applications | Ausgabe 2/2015

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Abstract

We study conditions for weak selection to favor tit-for-tat (TFT) over AllD in a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game played in a finite population subdivided into three subpopulations under the assumption of cyclic dominance in asymmetric interactions. Assuming parent-independent mutation and uniform migration, we show that TFT is more abundant that AllD in the stationary state if the defection cost incurred by individuals in interaction with dominant defecting individuals exceeds some threshold value. This threshold value decreases as the number of repetitions of the game, the population size, or the mutation rate increases, but increases as the migration rate increases. The same conclusions hold in the case of linear dominance.
Vorheriger Artikel Transfer Implementation in Congestion Games
Nächster Artikel Combinatorial Aspects of Parker’s Model

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Metadaten
Titel
Conditions for Cooperation to be More Abundant than Defection in a Hierarchically Structured Population
verfasst von
Dhaker Kroumi
Sabin Lessard
Publikationsdatum
01.06.2015
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Dynamic Games and Applications / Ausgabe 2/2015
Print ISSN: 2153-0785
Elektronische ISSN: 2153-0793
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-014-0114-2

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