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Erschienen in:
On the Push&Pull Protocol for Rumour Spreading Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Logit Dynamics with Concurrent Updates for Local Interaction Games

verfasst von : Vincenzo Auletta, Diodato Ferraioli, Francesco Pasquale, Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano

Erschienen in: Extended Abstracts Summer 2015

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Game Theory is the main tool used to model the behavior of agents that are guided by their own objective in contexts where their gains depend also on the choices made by neighboring agents. Game theoretic approaches have been often proposed for modeling phenomena in a complex social network, such as the formation of the social network itself. We are interested in the dynamics that govern such phenomena. In this paper, we study a specific class of randomized update rules called the logit choice function which can be coupled with different selection rules so to give different dynamics. We study how the logit choice function behave in an extreme case of concurrency.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Random Walks That Find Perfect Objects and the Lovász Local Lemma
Nächstes Kapitel The Set Chromatic Number of Random Graphs
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Metadaten
Titel
Logit Dynamics with Concurrent Updates for Local Interaction Games
verfasst von
Vincenzo Auletta
Diodato Ferraioli
Francesco Pasquale
Paolo Penna
Giuseppe Persiano
Copyright-Jahr
2017
Buch
Extended Abstracts Summer 2015

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-51752-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-51753-7

Copyright-Jahr: 2017

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51753-7_3