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The Review of International Organizations

Erschienen in:

01.03.2013

Mark Copelovitch. 2010. The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy: Banks, bonds, and bailouts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

verfasst von: Daniel L. Nielson

Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations | Ausgabe 1/2013

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In a refreshing way the Review of International Organizations unites scholars across academic disciplines–particularly economics and political science. This often leads to synergistic exchanges among researchers who share substantive interests in international organizations but approach the related questions from distinct theoretical perspectives. Occasionally, however, the differences can result in disconnects and dissonance. …

Vorheriger Artikel Daniel Finke, Thomas König, Sven-Oliver Proksch and George Tsebelis. 2012. Reforming the European Union: Realizing the Impossible (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)

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Titel: Mark Copelovitch. 2010. The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy: Banks, bonds, and bailouts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
verfasst von: Daniel L. Nielson
Publikationsdatum: 01.03.2013
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: The Review of International Organizations / Ausgabe 1/2013
Print ISSN: 1559-7431
Elektronische ISSN: 1559-744X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-012-9156-7

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