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Erschienen in:
2012 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on Reduced Versions of the Camellia Block Cipher
verfasst von : Jiqiang Lu, Yongzhuang Wei, Enes Pasalic, Pierre-Alain Fouque
Erschienen in: Advances in Information and Computer Security
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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The Camellia block cipher has a 128-bit block length and a user key of 128, 192 or 256 bits long, which employs a total of 18 rounds for a 128-bit key and 24 rounds for a 192 or 256-bit key. It is a Japanese CRYPTREC-recommended e-government cipher, a European NESSIE selected cipher, and an ISO international standard. In this paper, we describe a few 5 and 6-round properties of Camellia and finally use them to give (higher-order) meet-in-the-middle attacks on 10-round Camellia with the FL/FL
− 1
functions under 128 key bits, 11-round Camellia with the FL/FL
− 1
and whitening functions under 192 key bits and 12-round Camellia with the FL/FL
− 1
and whitening functions under 256 key bits.