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Über dieses Buch

This book covers microeconomic theory at the Master’s and Ph.D levels for students in business schools and economics departments. It concisely covers major mainstream microeconomic theories today, including neoclassical microeconomics, game theory, information economics, and contract theory. The revamped, 3rd edition of "Microeconomic Theory" offers faculty, graduate and upper undergraduate students with a comprehensive curriculum solution.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Chapter 1. Producer Theory

Abstract
Suppose that a firm has n goods to serve as inputs and/or outputs. If the firm uses $$y_{i}^{ - }$$ units of good i as an input and produces $$y_{i}^{ + }$$ units of the good, where $$y_{i}^{ - }$$, $$y_{i}^{ + } \in {\mathbb{R}}_{ + } ,$$ then $$y_{i} \equiv y_{i}^{ + } - y_{i}^{ - }$$ is the net output of good i.
Susheng Wang

Chapter 2. Consumer Theory

Abstract
There are two distinct approaches to modeling individual behaviors. The first approach starts with preferences and proceeds to rationalizing the preferences and then showing the existence of a utility representation. The second approach is based on observations of individual choices and proceeds to reveal individual preferences with the aid of some consistency assumptions on individual preferences.
Susheng Wang

Chapter 3. Risk Theory

Abstract
So far, we have assumed a world under certainty. In the real world, however, choices are often made under uncertainty.
Susheng Wang

Chapter 4. General Equilibrium Theory

Abstract
This chapter deals with three subjects: general equilibrium, Pareto optimality, and welfare properties. Previous chapters assume exogenous prices, that is, consumers and producers take prices as given and choose their best actions based on their own budget/resource constraints. In this chapter, all prices are endogenous and they adjust to clear all markets. An equilibrium is reached when all markets are clear and when no one wants to change anymore.
Susheng Wang

Chapter 5. Micro-foundation of Finance

Abstract
In this chapter, we look at financial markets. With complete and perfect markets, the models in this chapter are within the Arrow-Debreu world.
Susheng Wang

Chapter 6. Micro-foundation of Industry

Abstract
This chapter introduces the standard equilibrium theory of industry. We focus mainly on the output market and later cover briefly the input market.
Susheng Wang

Chapter 7. Imperfect Information Games

Abstract
In the last chapter, we saw that game theory is a powerful tool in dealing with the economic problems, especially when there are a small number of economic agents with conflicts of interest. Besides the issue of externalities, game theory is particularly useful for economic problems under imperfect and incomplete information.
Susheng Wang

Chapter 8. Incomplete Information Games

Abstract
The focus of this chapter is on games of incomplete information, including games of complete information as a special case. We will present several popular equilibrium concepts.
Susheng Wang

Chapter 9. Cooperative Games

Abstract
For a group of players, it is possible that they cooperate in some way to improve their individual welfare. They may find a need for cooperation on a common objective, but they may bargain over the sharing of benefits, just like the OPEC. They may form coalitions to cooperate within a coalition but compete between coalitions, just like political parties in practice. They may also seek third-party coordination, such as arbitration and government social programs.
Susheng Wang

Chapter 10. Market Information

Abstract
Observed market failures and inefficiencies such as those in medical insurance and unemployment insurance are well known. Possible causes include incomplete information, incomplete markets, and incentives. This and the next chapters will focus on incomplete information as a possible cause for market failures. We deal with competitive firms in this chapter and monopolies in the next chapter.
Susheng Wang

Chapter 11. Mechanism Design

Abstract
The previous chapter focuses on competitive markets under incomplete information. This chapter focuses on monopoly pricing under incomplete information. The basic modelling approach to monopoly pricing under incomplete information is the revelation principle, by which the uninformed strategically provide incentives for the informed to reveal their types.
Susheng Wang

Chapter 12. Incentive Contracts

Abstract
Besides asymmetric information, there is another type of information problem, called the incentive problem. For example, in an employer-employee relationship, the employee’s applied effort may be observable by his employer but not verifiable to a court. If so, the effort cannot be bounded by a contract. In this type of problem, information is symmetric: both the employer and the employee have the same set of information. But a third party, the court, cannot observe the information. So the issue here is: how does the employer provide sufficient incentives in a contract to motivate the employee?
Susheng Wang

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