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2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

National Report on Germany

verfasst von : Sebastian Mock

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Abstract

One of the unique features of German company law is the existence of an explicit regulation for groups of companies which was finally created in 1965. However, due to its limited scope of application and some of its questionable foundations the actual law of group of companies reflects only partially the original concept of the German legislator. In fact, especially in the law of the closed corporation and partnership law the judiciary and legal scholars developed an almost independent legal system for groups of companies. This paper analyzes the legal framework of groups of companies in Germany law and discusses some recent developments in specific areas of law dealing with groups of companies.

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See Sect. 9 for further details.

It has to be noted that single aspects of the law of groups of companies are addressed in other laws. However, a coherent and comprehensive regulation addressing all aspects of the law of groups of companies does not exist in this context. See also Sect. 1 for further details. See e.g. Beck (2017), p. 726 ff. for a detailed overview.

See e.g. Grundmann (2012), § 4.

European Commission, Preliminary Draft of a Directive Based on article 54, 3 (g) on Harmonization of the Law of Groups of Companies (Part I—EEC Doc. XI/328/74-E, Part II—EEC Doc. XV/593/75-E). A German version of the draft can be found in Lutter (1984), pp. 187–225.

European Commission, Preliminary Draft of a Directive Based on article 54, 3 (g) on Harmonization of the Law of Groups of Companies (Doc. III/1639/84). A German version of the draft can be found in ZGR (1985), 446 ff. For a discussion of this draft, see Böhlhoff and Budde (1984).

See Grundmann (2012), § 4 II.1.c).; Lutter et al. (2012), p. 143 f.

European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union—a Plan to Move Forward, COM(2003) 284 final.

See Sect. 19 for further details.

Directive (EU) 2017/828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement, OJ L 132 of 20.5.2017, p. 1 ff.

See e.g. European Company Law Experts (ECLE), A proposal for the Reform of Group Law in Europe, 18 EBOR 1 (2017); Forum Europaeum on Groups of Companies, Corporate Group Law for Europe, 1 EBOR 165 (2000).

Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE), OJ L 294 of 10.11.2001, p. 1 ff.; see Grundmann (2012), § 33 for further details.

See for a historical overview Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 1 II.

See Sect. 3. for further details.

See Sect. 3.1.1.1 for further details.

See Sect. 1.2.2.5.

However, other forms of enterprise agreements exist but are generally of less importance. These include a profit pool agreement (Gewinngemeinschaft—sec. 292 subs. 1 no. 1 GSCL), an agreement to transfer a share of profits (Teilgewinnabführungsvertrag—sec. 292 subs. 1 no. 2 GSCL), an agreement to lease operations (Betriebspachtvertrag—sec. 292 subs. 1 no. 3 alt. 1 GSCL) and an agreement to surrender operations (Betriebsüberlassungsvertrag—sec. 292 subs. 1 no. 3 alt. 2 GSCL).

This principle deviates from § 76 subs. 1 GSCL, which states that the management board has direct responsibility for the management (see e.g. Fleischer, in: Spindler and Stilz (2015), § 76 note 57 f.; Kort, in: Großkommentar zum AktG (Hirte 2015), § 76 note 5; Spindler, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette and Habersack 2008), § 76 note 22 ff.).

See Sect. 30 for further details.

See Sect. 7.1.3 for further details.

See Sects. 9 and 10 for further details.

See Sect. 11 for further details.

See Sect. 14 for further details.

See Sect. 1.2.2.1.1.

Grunewald, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2015), Vorbemerkungen zu §§ 319 ff. note 9; Schmolke, in: Großkommentar zum AktG (Hirte 2013), Vorbemerkungen zu §§ 319 ff. note 8.

See Sect. 3.1.4.1 for further details.

See Sect. 3.1.4.2 for further details.

See Sect. 1.2.2.1.

These consequences include: specific reporting requirements (§§ 312 ff. GSCL—see Sect. 11.3.1.1), the option for minority shareholder to apply for a special audit (§ 315 GSCL—see Sect. 18.3.1.2.2), liability for the controlling enterprise (§ 317 subs. 1 GSCL—see Sect. 11.3.1.2) and personal liability for the member of the management board of the controlled enterprise (§ 318 subs. 1 GSCL—Sect. 16.3.2.2).

Official Statement of the German parliament on the Aktiengesetz 1965, BT-Drucks. IV/171, p. 228.

See Sect. 1.2.2.1.

See Sects. 7.1.3 and 7.1.4 regarding the non-application to closed corporations and partnerships.

This term refers to the metaphor that all German companies are basically linked to one another and form—in a metaphorical sense—a single stock corporation (AG) called “Germany Stock Corporation” (Deutschland AG).

Bayer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2016), § 19 note 7.

Official Statement of the German parliament on the Aktiengesetz 1965, BT-Drucks. IV/171, p. 213 f.

See in the context of closed corporations Sect. 7.1.3 and in the context of partnerships Sect. 7.1.4.

It has to be noted that this law is not limited to mergers, but it also addresses divisions (Spaltung), the transfer of all assets of a company (Vermögensübertragung) and the change of the form of a company (Formwechsel).

For Germany see Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 9a; Hirte, in: Kölner Kommentar zum WpÜG (Hirte and Bülow 2010), Einleitung note 79 ff. with further references.

See Sect. 25 for further details.

For the influence of European law on German capital markets law see e.g. Moloney (2014), I.3.; Veil, in: Veil, European Capital Markets Law (2017), § 1.

See e.g. Sect. 26 for the disclosure on group information.

See Sect. 25 for further details.

Gesetz zur Erleichterung der Bewältigung von Konzerninsolvenzen as of 13.4.2017, BGBl. I, S. 866.

Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings, OJ L 141 as of 5.6.2015, p. 19 ff.

See Kindler, in: Großkommentar zum HGB (Staub 2011), Vor § 290 note 8 ff.

Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, OJ L 182 as of 29.6.2013, p. 19 ff.

See Sect. 29 for further details.

See Sect. 31 for further details.

See Sect. 32 for further details.

See Sect. 33 for further details.

See Sect. 34 for further details.

See Sects. 1.2 and 34 for further details.

Also translated as affiliated enterprises.

See Sect. 3.1.2 for further details.

Also translated as subsidiaries and parent enterprises.

See Sect. 3.1.3 for further details.

See Sect. 3.1.4 for further details.

See Sect. 3.1.5 for further details.

See Sect. 3.1.6 for further details.

See Sect. 3.1.1.1 for further details.

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 2; Schall, in: Spindler and Stilz (2015), Vor § 15 note 8; Windbichler, in: Großkommentar zum AktG (Hirte 2017), Vor §§ 15 ff. note 50 ff.

See Sect. 1.2.2.1 for further details.

See Sect. 1.2.2.3 for further details.

See Sect. 1.2.2.2 for further details.

See Sect. 25 for further details.

See Sects. 1.2.2.4 and 3.1.3 for further details.

See Sect. 7.1.3 for the application on closed corporations and Sect. 7.1.4 for the application on partnerships.

See Sect. 7 for further details.

Federal Court of Justice as of 13.10.1977 II ZR 123/76 (VEBA/Gelsenberg), BGHZ 69, 334, 335 = NJW 1978, 104; Federal Court of Justice as of 16.2.1981—II ZR 168/79 (Süssen) BGHZ 80, 69, 72; Federal Court of Justice as of 16.9.1985—II ZR 275/84 (Autokran), BGHZ 95, 330, 340 = NJW 1986, 188; Federal Court of Justice as of 17.3.1997 – II ZB 3/96 (VW), BGHZ 135, 107 = NJW 1997, 1855; see also Bayer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2016), § 15 note 12 ff.; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 2 II 1; Schall in: Spindler and Stilz (2015), § 15 note 10; Windbichler in: Großkommentar zum AktG (Hirte 2017), § 15 note 10 ff. all with further references.

Bayer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2016), § 15 note 14; Windbichler, in: Großkommentar zum AktG (Hirte 2017), § 15 note 31; see also Schall, in: Spindler and Stilz (2015), § 15 note 46 discussing an application of single rules on groups of companies.

Federal Court of Justice as of 13.10.1977 II ZR 123/76 (VEBA/Gelsenberg), BGHZ 69, 334, 335 = NJW 1978, 104; Federal Court of Justice as of 17.3.1997 – II ZB 3/96 (VW), BGHZ 135, 107 = NJW 1997, 1855; Bayer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2016), § 15 note 38 ff. Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 2 III 3 all with further references.

E.g. § 15 FMS-Beschleunigungsgesetz stating that contracts on contributions of the state to banks are not to be considered enterprise agreements of the state with the bank, therefore, explicitly excluding the application of all provisions on enterprise agreements.

Also translated as affiliated enterprises.

See Sect. 3.1.3 for further details.

See Sect. 3.1.4 for further details.

See Sect. 3.1.5 for further details.

See Sect. 3.1.6 for further details.

Bayer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2016), § 15 note 7; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 2 I.

See Sects. 3.2–3.4.

Also translated as subsidiaries and parent enterprises.

This is, for example, the case if the shareholder violated his duty to notify the corporation and the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority when he acquires 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 50 or 75% of the voting rights of a listed corporation (§§ 21, 28 German Securities Trading Act).

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 2 II 1; Hüffer and Koch (2016), § 16 note 11; Schall, in: Spindler and Stilz (2015), § 16 note 35; Windbichler, in: Großkommentar zum AktG (Hirte 2017), § 16 note 35; dissenting Bayer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2016), § 16 note 40; Koppensteiner, in: Kölner Kommentar zum AktG (Zöllner and Noack 2004), § 16 note 46 claiming that the shareholder can usually simply avoid the application of the exclusion of the voting rights by complying with the respective duties.

Hüffer and Koch (2016), § 16 note 11; Koppensteiner, in: Kölner Kommentar zum AktG (Zöllner and Noack 2004), § 16 note 43; dissenting Bayer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2016), § 16 note 41; Emmerich, in: Emmerich and Habersack (2016), § 16 AktG note 25.

See Sect. 3.1.3.

Bayer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2016), § 16 note 28; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 2 II 5.

Federal Court of Justice as of 15.12.2011—I ZR 129/10, NZG 2012, 1033 recital 16; Federal Court of Justice as of 26.3.1984—II ZR 171/83, BGHZ 90, 381, 395 f. = NJW 1984, 1893; Bayer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2016), § 17 note 29; Hüffer and Koch (2016), § 17 note 8; Windbichler, in: Großkommentar zum AktG (Hirte 2017), § 17 note 40 ff.; see also for a broader interpretation Schall, in: Spindler and Stilz (2015), § 17 note 20 ff.

Bayer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2016), § 17 note 73; Emmerich, in: Emmerich and Habersack (2016), § 17 note 26; Hüffer and Koch (2016), § 17 note 6; see also Mock, in: Mock et al. (2018), p. 311.

Bayer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2016), § 17 note 99; Emmerich, in: Emmerich and Habersack (2016), § 17 note 40; Hüffer and Koch (2016), § 17 note 2; Mock, in: Mock et al. (2018), p. 311.

Bayer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2016), § 18 note 28 ff.; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 4 III.1.; Hüffer and Koch (2016), § 18 note 8 ff.

See Sect. 1.2.2.1.

See Sect. 1.2.2.2.

See Sect. 11.4 for further details.

See Sect. 4.2 for further details.

See Sects. 3.1.4 and 3.1.5.

See Sect. 3.2.

See Sect. 3.3.

See Sect. 34 for further details.

See Sect. 3.1.4 for further details.

See Sect. 3.1.5 for further details.

See Sects. 3.1.4 and 3.1.5.

100

Baumert, in: Braun (2017), § 3e note 5.

101

See Sects. 3.1.4 and 3.1.5.

102

This is implied by the official statement of the German parliament, BT-Drucks. 18/407, p. 28 f.

See Sect. 3.1.3.

See Sect. 1.2.2.3.

See Sect. 3.1.5.

See Sect. 28 for further details.

107

See Sect. 27 for further details.

See Sect. 1.2.2.1.

See Sect. 1.2.2.2.

See Sect. 4.2.

See Sect. 6 for further details.

112

See Sect. 4.3.

113

See Sect. 22 for further details.

114

See Sect. 4.2 for further details.

115

See for further details Wöhe and Mock (2010), p. 179 ff.

116

See Sect. 1.2.1.

117

See Sect. 5.1 for the effects attached to these definitions.

118

See Sects. 1.2.1 and 1.2.2.

119

For an overview on the discussion see Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 29 with further references.

120

This is especially the case for sections 308-310 GSCL (see Sects. 10.1.2 and 16.1.2). So far unsettled aspects are, most notably, the majority requirements for the approving shareholders resolution (see Sect. 13.1.2) and the protection of minority shareholders (see Sect. 13.1.2). See also Beurskens, in: Baumbach and Hueck (2017), Anhang Konzernrecht note 94 ff.; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 32; Servatius, in: Michalski et al. (2017), Konzernrecht note 34 ff. for a detailed analysis.

121

Beurskens, in: Baumbach and Hueck (2017), Anhang Konzernrecht note 94 ff.; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 32; Servatius, in: Michalski et al. (2017), Konzernrecht note 34 ff.

122

See Sect. 30 for further details.

123

See Sect. 1.2.2.3 for further details.

124

Federal Court of Justice as of 5.6.1975—II ZR 23/74 (ITT), BGHZ 65, 15, 18 = NJW 1976, 191; Federal Court of Justice as of 16.9.1985—II ZR 275/84 (Autokran), BGHZ 95, 330, 340 = NJW 1986, 188; Federal Court of Justice as of 17.9.2001—II ZR 178/99 (Bremer Vulkan), BGHZ 149, 10, 16 = NJW 2001, 3622; see also Beurskens, in: Baumbach and Hueck (2017), Anhang Konzernrecht note 29 ff.; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 30; Servatius, in: Michalski et al. (2017), note 392 ff.

125

See Sect. 1.2.2.2.

126

Grunewald, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2015), § 319 note 8 ff.; Schmolke, in: Großkommentar zum AktG (Hirte 2013), § 319 note 3 ff.

127

See Sect. 1.2.2.4.

128

Grunewald, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2015), § 328 note 3 f.

129

Section 1.2.2.1.

130

For an overview on the discussion Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 34 IV; Mülbert, in: Münchener Kommentar zum HGB (Schmidt 2012), KonzernR note 30 ff.

131

Haar (2006), S. 268 ff.; Schmidt (1981), p. 477 f.; Schneider (1975), p. 265 ff.

132

Section 1.2.2.3.

133

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 34 III; Mülbert, supra note 130, KonzernR note 30 ff.

134

See Sect. 1.2.2.2.

135

Grunewald, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2015), § 319 note 8 ff.; Schmolke, in: Großkommentar zum AktG (Hirte 2013), § 319 note 3 ff.

136

See Sect. 1.2.2.4.

137

Grunewald, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2015), § 328 note 3 f.

138

See Sect. 28 for further details.

139

See Sect. 5.3 for further details.

140

See Sects. 5.2 and 6.

141

For a detailed discussion see Schürnbrand (2017), p. 357 ff.

142

Higher Regional Court Hamm as of 19.2.2001—5 U 217/00, BKR 2002, 958 stating that knowledge of the seller cannot be simply imputed to the bank financing the purchase when the seller and the bank are members of the same group of companies; see also Schubert, in: Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (2015a), § 166 note 61 with further references.

143

Schubert, in: Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (2015a), § 166 note 62; Schürnbrand (2017), 357 ff.

144

See also Sect. 1.2.2 for a general overview of these concepts.

145

See Sect. 1.2.2.1.

146

Altmeppen, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2015), § 308 note 5; Beurskens, in: Baumbach and Hueck (2017), note 94; Emmerich, in: Emmerich and Habersack (2016), § 308 note 9.

147

Mülbert, in: Münchener Kommentar zum HGB (Schmidt 2012), KonzernR note 237.

148

See Sect. 9.1.

149

See Sect. 1.2.2.3 for an overview of this concept.

150

See Sect. 10.3 for further details.

151

See Sect. 16.3 for further details.

152

See Sect. 1.2.2.4 for an overview of this concept.

153

Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf as of 7.6.1990—19 W 13/86 (DAB/Hansa), AG 1990, 490, 492; Higher Regional Court of Nuremburg as of 9.6.1999—12 U 4408/98, NZG 2000, 154, 155; Altmeppen, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2015), § 308 note 134 f.; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 23 IV 1; Hirte, in: Großkommentar zum AktG (Hirte 2013), § 308 note 40.

154

Altmeppen, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2015), § 308 note 101; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 23 IV 2; Hirte, in: Großkommentar zum AktG (Hirte 2013), § 308 note 37 ff.; Hüffer and Koch (2016), § 308 note 14.

155

See Sect. 19 for further details on related party transactions.

156

Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf as of 7.6.1990—19 W 13/86 (DAB/Hansa), AG 1990, 490, 492; Regional Court of Munich as of 5.4.2012—5 HK O 20488/11, NZG 2012, 1152; Altmeppen, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2015), § 308 note 119 ff.; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 23 IV 3; Hirte, in: Großkommentar zum AktG (Hirte 2013), § 308 note 42 ff.; dissenting Koppensteiner (1995), p. 96; Wellkamp (1993), p. 2156 f.

157

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 23 IV 3; Hirte, in: Großkommentar zum AktG (Hirte 2013), § 308 note 43; Hommelhoff (1984), p. 1112 ff.; see also Federal Court of Justice as of 17.9.2001—II ZR 178/99 (Bremer Vulkan), BGHZ 149, 10 = NJW 2001, 3622 (decided for a closed corporation).

158

Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf as of 7.6.1990—19 W 13/86 (DAB/Hansa), AG 1990, 490, 492; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 23 IV 3.

159

Higher Regional Court of Munich as of 11.7.1979 -15 U 1532/78 (Kolb Wohnungsbau AG), AG 1980, 272; Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf as of 7.6.1990—19 W 13/86 (DAB/Hansa), AG 1990, 490, 492; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 23 IV 3.

160

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 23 IV 3; Hirte, in: Großkommentar zum AktG (Hirte 2013), § 308 note 42.

161

See Sect. 16 for further details.

162

Beurskens, in: Baumbach and Hueck (2017), note 119 f.; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 32 II 8; Servatius, in: Michalski et al. (2017), note 121 ff.; see also Federal Court of Justice as of 24.10.1988—II ZB 7/88 (Supermarkt), BGHZ 105, 324, 332 = NJW 1989, 295 stating that the management board of the controlling enterprise has the power to give instructions to the manager of the closed corporation in the case of a control agreement without explicitly referring to section 308 GSCL.

163

Beurskens, in: Baumbach and Hueck (2017), note 120; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 32 II 8; Servatius, in: Michalski et al. (2017), note 129.

164

Beurskens, in: Baumbach and Hueck (2017), note 119; Servatius, in: Michalski et al. (2017), note 125.

165

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 32 II 8; dissenting Servatius, in: Michalski et al. (2017), note 124.

166

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 34 IV 2; Mülbert, in: Münchener Kommentar zum HGB (Schmidt 2012), KonzernR note 149.

167

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 34 IV 2.

168

See Sect. 10.1.

169

Grunewald, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2015), § 323 note 5 f.; Schmolke, in: Großkommentar zum AktG (Hirte 2013), § 323 note 2 ff.

170

See Sect. 12.1.1 for further details.

171

See Sect. 11.3.2.1 for further details.

172

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 34 III; Mülbert, in: Münchener Kommentar zum HGB (Schmidt 2012), KonzernR note 142 f.

173

See Sect. 11.1.1.2.1 for further details.

174

See Sect. 11.1.1.2.2 for further details.

175

See Sect. 11.1.1.2.1 for further details.

176

See Sect. 11.1.1.2.2 for further details.

177

Altmeppen, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2015), § 293b note 8; Mülbert, in: Großkommentar zum AktG (Hirte 2013), § 293b note 17 ff.

178

See Sect. 1.2.2.1.2.

179

See Sect. 1.2.2.1.

180

Federal Court of Justice as of 21.7.2003 – II ZB 17/01, BGHZ 156, 57 = NJW 2003, 3272; Hirte, in: Großkommentar zum AktG (Hirte 2013), § 304 note 69 ff.; Paulsen, in: Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (2015), § 304 note 75 ff.; see also European Company Law Experts (ECLE), A proposal for the Reform of Group Law in Europe, 18 EBOR 1, 16 (2017).

181

Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer (IDW), Grundsätze zur Durchführung von Unternehmensbewertungen (IDW S1); available under https://www.idw.de/idw/verlautbarungen/idw-s-1%2D%2Dversion-2008-/43030 (also in English).

182

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 21 IV 1.

183

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 22a V 1.

184

Constitutional Court as of 27.4.1999—1 BvR 1613/94 (DAT/Altana I), BVerfGE 100, 289, 305 ff. = NJW 1999, 3769.

185

Federal Court of Justice as of 29.9.2015—II ZB 23/14, NZG 2016, 139, 142; see also Hüttemann, in: Fleischer and Hüttemann (2015), § 1 for further details.

186

Federal Court of Justice as of 29.9.2015—II ZB 23/14, NZG 2016, 139, 140; see also Constitutional Court of Justice as of 26.4.2011—1 BvR 2658/10, NZG 2011, 869; Mock (2016), p. 1261.

187

See Sect. 19 for further details.

188

Altmeppen, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2015), § 293 note 41; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 16 III 3; Mülbert, in: Großkommentar zum AktG (Hirte 2013), § 293 note 60.

189

Official Statement of the German parliament on the Aktiengesetz 1965, BT-Drucks. IV/171, p. 229.

190

Emmerich (1991), p. 307; Martens (1979), p. 446; Timm (1987), p. 426 ff.

191

Regional Court Frankfurt/Main as of 21.2.2006—3/5 O 71/05, AG 2007, 48, 51 f.; Regional Court München I as of 4.6.2009—5 HK 591/09, AG 2009, 918, 920; see also Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 16 III 3.

192

See Sect. 11.1.1.1.

193

Federal Court of Justice as of 24.10.1988—II ZB 7/88 (Supermarkt), BGHZ 105, 324, 332 = NJW 1989, 295; Federal Court of Justice as of 30.1.1992—II ZB 15/91 (Siemens), NJW 1992, 1452; Servatius, in: Michalski et al. (2017), Konzernrecht note 67 with further references.

194

Federal Court of Justice as of 31.5.2011—II ZR 109/10, BGHZ 190, 45 = NZG 2011, 902; however, it must be noted that the court did not state explicitly that an approval of the majority is sufficient. Consequently, the majority requirement still remains unclear to a certain extent (Servatius, in: Michalski et al. (2017), Konzernrecht note 74 ff.).

195

Lutter/Hommelhoff, in: Lutter and Hommelhoff (2017), Anh. § 13 note 65 f.; Servatius, in: Michalski et al. (2017), Konzernrecht note 77 both with further references.

196

Beurskens, in: Baumbach and Hueck (2017), Anhang Konzernrecht note 106; Liebscher, in: Münchener Kommentar zum GmbHG (2015), Anh. § 13 note 716 all with further references. See also Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 32 II. 3.

197

See Sect. 11.1.2.2.

198

See Sect. 11.1.1.1.

199

Altmeppen, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2015), § 293a note 13 ff.; Beurskens, in: Baumbach and Hueck (2017), Anhang Konzernrecht note 104; Hüffer and Koch (2016), § 293a note 5.

200

See Sect. 11.1.1.2.1.

201

See Sect. 11.1.1.2.2.

202

See Sect. 11.1.2.1.

203

Beurskens, in: Baumbach and Hueck (2017), Anhang Konzernrecht note 118; Servatius, in: Michalski et al. (2017), Konzernrecht note 108, 118; see also Federal Court of Justice as of 5.11.2001—II ZR 119/00, NJW 2002, 822; Federal Court of Justice as of 31.5.2011—II ZR 109/10, BGHZ 190, 45 = NZG 2011, 902 leaving this issue undecided.

204

Beurskens, in: Baumbach and Hueck (2017), Anhang Konzernrecht note 118; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 32 II. 6.; Servatius, in: Michalski et al. (2017), Konzernrecht note 118 all with further references. See also European Company Law Experts (ECLE), A proposal for the Reform of Group Law in Europe, 18 EBOR 1, 17 (2017).

205

See Sect. 19 for further details.

206

See Sect. 11.1.2.1.

207

Altmeppen, in: Roth and Altmeppen (2015), Anh. § 13 note 39.

208

Higher Regional Court Stuttgart as of 29.10.1997—20 U 8/97 (Dornier), NZG 1998, 601, 603; unclear Federal Court of Justice as of 24.10.1988—II ZB 7/88 (Supermarkt), BGHZ 105, 324, 332 = NJW 1989, 295; Federal Court of Justice as of 31.5.2011—II ZR 109/10, BGHZ 190, 45 = NZG 2011, 902 stating that voting restrictions do not apply in the case of a termination of an enterprise agreement.; see also Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 32 II. 3.; Servatius, in: Michalski et al. (2017), Konzernrecht note 76 both with further references.

209

See Sect. 11.1.1.5.

210

See Sect. 11.1.2.

211

For an overview see Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 10 III.

212

See Sect. 12.3.1.1.

213

See Sect. 18.3.1.2.2.

214

See Sect. 12.3.1.1.

215

For a general critique see Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 26 with further references. See also European Company Law Experts (ECLE), A proposal for the Reform of Group Law in Europe, 18 EBOR 1, 23 (2017).

216

Higher Regional Court Frankfurt/Main as of 6.1.2003—20 W 449/93, NZG 2003, 224, 225 stating that also the content of the report cannot be requested by the shareholders in the shareholders meeting.

217

See generally Mock (2015), note 56.

218

See e.g. regarding a decrease of the stock price Federal Court of Justice as of 4.3.1985—II ZR 271/83, BGHZ 94, 55, 56 = NJW 1985, 1777; Federal Court of Justice as of 11.07.1988—II ZR 243/87, BGHZ 105, 121, 130 f. = NJW 1988, 2794; Altmeppen, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2015), § 317 note 81 ff.

219

See Sect. 19 for further details.

220

Federal Court of Justice as of 26.2.2012—II ZR 30/11 (HVB/Unicredit), NZG 2012, 1030; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 24 VI. 3; Hüffer and Koch (2016), § 243 note 40; Hüffer/Schäfer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2016), § 243 note 105.

221

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 24 VI. 3; see also European Company Law Experts (ECLE), A proposal for the Reform of Group Law in Europe, 18 EBOR 1, 31 (2017).

222

See Sect. 11.1.1.2.

223

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 28 IV.3.b); Müller, in: Spindler and Stilz (2015), vor § 311 note 35; Säcker (1987), p. 64.

224

See Sect. 12.3.4.

225

See supra note 124 with further references.

226

See Sect. 11.3.1.1.

227

See Sect. 11.3.1.2.

228

See especially the landmark decision Federal Court of Justice as of 5.6.1975—II ZR 23/74 (ITT), BGHZ 65, 15, 18 = NJW 1976, 191; see also Beurskens, in: Baumbach and Hueck (2017), Anhang Konzernrecht note 42; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 30 III. 1.

229

See Sect. 9.3.

230

Beurskens, in: Baumbach and Hueck (2017), Anhang Konzernrecht note 42; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 30 III. 2.

231

Liebscher, in: Münchener Kommentar zum GmbHG (2015), GmbH-Konzernrecht note 250 with further references.

232

Federal Court of Justice as of 5.6.1975—II ZR 23/74 (ITT), BGHZ 65, 15, 18 = NJW 1976, 191; Federal Court of Justice as of 1.3.1999—II ZR 312/97; BGHZ 141, 80, 84 ff. = NJW 1999, 1706; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 30 III. 4.

233

Federal Court of Justice as of 10.2.1977—II ZR 79/75, BB 1977, 465; Federal Court of Justice as of 30.11.1978—II ZR 204/76, NJW 1979, 2104; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 30 III. 4.

234

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 30 III. 4.

235

See Sect. 11.3.2.3 for further details.

236

Federal Court of Justice as of 16.9.1985 – II ZR 275/84 (Autokran), BGHZ 95, 330, 340 = NJW 1986, 188; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 30 III.1; Servatius, in: Michalski et al. (2017), Konzernrecht note 440.

237

See Sect. 11.3.1.2.

238

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 30 III. 1.

239

See Sect. 11.3.1.2.

240

See Sect. 19 for further details.

241

See Sect. 11.1.2.

242

See Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 34 II.1. for further details.

243

See also European Company Law Experts (ECLE), A proposal for the Reform of Group Law in Europe, 18 EBOR 1, 32 (2017).

244

See Sect. 10.1.1.1.

245

See Sect. 10.1.1.2.1.

246

See Sect. 14.1.1.1.3.

247

See Sect. 7.1.4.

248

See Sect. 9.1.

249

See the references in supra note 124.

250

See the references in supra note 133.

251

See supra note 232.

252

See supra note 234.

253

Altmeppen, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2015), § 308 note 358 ff.; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 25 IV. 1.; Hüffer and Koch (2016), § 311 note 38.

254

For a critique see Altmeppen, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2015), § 308 note 27; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 25 II.

255

See Sect. 16.1.1.1.2.

256

See Sect. 7.1.3 and especially the references in note 124.

257

See Sect. 11.3.2.1.

258

See Sect. 12.3.2.

259

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 30 III. 2.

260

Higher Regional Court Cologne as of 15.1.2009—18 U 205/07, AG 2009, 416, 419 ff.; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 28 II. and III.; Müller, in: Spindler and Stilz (2015), vor § 311 note 25 ff.; dissenting Altmeppen, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2015), § 317 Anh. note 14 ff.; Hüffer and Koch (2016), § 1 note 29; Koppensteiner, in: Kölner Kommentar zum AktG (Zöllner and Noack 2004), § 318 Anh. note 63 ff.

261

Higher Regional Court Cologne as of 15.1.2009—18 U 205/07, AG 2009, 416, 419; see also Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 28 III.2.; Hommelhoff (1992), 312 f.; Kropff (1993), p. 488.

262

See Sect. 21.1.

263

See the references in supra note 260.

264

Federal Court of Justice as of 16.9.1985—II ZR 275/84 (Autokran), BGHZ 95, 330, 347 = NJW 1986, 188; Federal Court of Justice as of 19.9.1988—II ZR 255/87 (HSW), BGHZ 105, 168, 183 = NJW 1988, 3143; Federal Court of Justice as of 23.9.1991—II ZR 135/90 (Video), BGHZ 115, 187, 200 = NJW 1991, 3142; see also Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 28 III.2.

265

See Sect. 21.2.

266

Dissenting Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 16 IV., claiming that such protection is necessary without stating the concrete criteria in which such a shareholder resolution should be considered void.

267

See Sect. 11.1.1.1.

268

See Sect. 13.1.

269

Federal Court of Justice as of 25.2.1982—II ZR 174/80 (Holzmüller), BGHZ 83, 122 = NJW 1982, 1703; see also Hirte (2016), note 3.224; Kubis, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette and Habersack 2013), § 119 note 31 ff. with further references.

270

Federal Court of Justice as of 26.4.2004—II ZR 155/02 (Gelatine I), BGHZ 159, 30 = NJW 2004, 1860; Federal Court of Justice as of 26.4.2004—II ZR 154/02, NZG 2004, 575 (Gelatine II); see also Hirte (2016), note 3.224; Kubis, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette and Habersack 2013), note 31 ff. with further references.

271

Regional Court Frankfurt/Main as of 15.12.2009—3-5 O 208/09 (Commerzbank/Dresdner Bank), NZG 2010, 391; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 9 IV.1.d).

272

Beurskens, in: Baumbach and Hueck (2017), Anhang Konzernrecht note 55 ff. with further references.

273

Mülbert, in: Münchener Kommentar zum HGB (Schmidt 2012), KonzernR note 78.

274

See Sect. 11.4 for further details.

275

For a general critique see Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 20 I.1 with further references. See also Sect. 14.1.1.1.4.

276

See Sect. 1.2.2.1.

277

See Sect. 1.2.2.1.

278

See Sect. 21 for further details.

279

See Sect. 16.1.1.1.2.

See Sect. 24.

See Sect. 21.

See Sect. 20.

See Sect. 14.1.1.1.3.

284

See Sect. 14.1.1.2.

285

Federal Court of Justice as of 5.2.1979—II ZR 210/76 (Gervais), NJW 1980, 231; Federal Court of Justice as of 16.9.1985—II ZR 275/84 (Autokran), BGHZ 95, 330, 340 = NJW 1986, 188; Federal Court of Justice as of 24.10.1988—II ZB 7/88 (Supermarkt), BGHZ 105, 324, 332 = NJW 1989, 295; Federal Court of Justice as of 11.11.1991—II ZR 287/90 (Stromlieferung), BGHZ 116, 37, 39 = NJW 1992, 505; see also Beurskens, in: Baumbach and Hueck (2017), Anhang Konzernrecht note 121 ff.; Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 32 II.9; Servatius, in: Michalski et al. (2017), Konzernrecht note 175 ff.

286

See Sect. 14.1.1.1.1.

287

See Sect. 14.1.1.1.2.

288

See Sect. 14.1.1.1.3.

289

See Sect. 14.1.1.2.

290

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 34 V.3.

291

See Sect. 21.

292

See Sect. 13.3.1.

293

The business judgment rule was only explicitly introduced by the German legislature in 2005. However, it was already before accepted in the case law (Federal Court of Justice as of 21.4.1997—II ZR 175/95 (ARAG/Garmenbek), BGHZ 135, 244 = NJW 1997, 1926). For a detailed analysis of the development see Hopt/Roth, in: Großkommentar zum AktG (Hirte 2015), § 93 note 18 ff.

294

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 23 VIII.6.

295

See Sect. 14.1.1.3.

296

See Sect. 16.1.1.1.2.

297

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 32 II.9; Servatius, in: Michalski et al. (2017), Konzernrecht note 152 ff.; partly dissenting Beurskens, in: Baumbach and Hueck (2017), Anhang Konzernrecht note 94.

298

For an overview see e.g. Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 35 III.

299

See Sect. 12.3.1.1.

300

See Sect. 11.3.1.2.

301

See Sect. 16.1.1.1.2.

302

See Sect. 12.3.1.1.

303

See Sect. 16.1.1.1.2.

See Sect. 11.3.2.1.

See Sect. 16.3.2.

See Sect. 10.1.

See Sect. 10.1.1.2.1.

308

See Sect. 17.1.1.

309

See references in supra note 124.

310

See Sect. 11.3.2.1.

311

See Sect. 11.3.3.

312

See Sect. 14.1.1.1.3.

See Sect. 21.

See Sect. 12.3.1.2.

See Sect. 21.

See e.g. Spindler, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette and Habersack 2008), § 93 note 18 ff. with further references.

317

Federal Court of Justice as of 25.5.2002 – II ZR 196/00, BGHZ 150, 61, 68 = NJW 2002, 1803; see also Spindler, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette and Habersack 2008), § 93 note 20 with further references.

318

Fleischer, in: Spindler and Stilz (2015), § 93 note 116 ff.; Spindler, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette and Habersack 2008), § 93 note 20.

319

See Sect. 28.

320

Zöllner/Noack, in: Baumbach and Hueck (2017), § 46 note 50 with further references.

321

See Sect. 18.1.

322

Federal Court of Justice as of 1.12.2008—II ZR 102/07 (MPS), BGHZ 179, 71 recital 21.

323

See Sect. 9.3.

324

See Sect. 11.3.2.1.

325

European Company Law Experts (ECLE), A proposal for the Reform of Group Law in Europe, 18 EBOR 1, 23 (2017).

326

Available under www.dcgk.de.

327

328

For the presumably necessary changes of German company law see Habersack (2016), p. 691 ff.; Fleischer (2014), p. 835 ff.

329

For an overview see Mock, in: Michalski et al. (2017), § 29 note 237 ff. with further references.

330

See Sect. 19.4.

331

Hirte, in: Kölner Kommentar zum WpÜG (Hirte and Bülow 2010), § 27 note 27; Wackerbarth, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette et al. 2017), § 27 WpÜG note 13.

332

Spindler, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette and Habersack 2008), § 93 note 48 ff., 79 ff. with further references on the impact of (external) legal opinions on the duty of care of the members of the management board.

333

Federal Court of Justice as of 25.2.1982 – II ZR 174/80 (Holzmüller), BGHZ 83, 122 = NJW 1982, 1703; see also Hirte (2016), note 3.224; Kubis, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette and Habersack 2013), § 119 note 31 ff. with further references.

334

Federal Court of Justice as of 26.4.2004—II ZR 155/02 (Gelatine I), BGHZ 159, 30 = NJW 2004, 1860; Federal Court of Justice as of 26.4.2004—II ZR 154/02 (Gelatine II), NZG 2004, 575; see also Hirte (2016), note 3.224; Kubis, in: Münchener Kommentar zum AktG (Goette and Habersack 2013), note 31 ff. with further references.

335

See Sect. 19.1.

336

See Sect. 19.3.

337

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 20 IV. with further references.

338

See Sect. 20.2.

339

Federal Court of Justice as of 8.5.2003—IX ZR 334/01, NZG 2003, 725, 726; Federal Court of Justice as of 8.5.2006—II ZR 94/05, NZG 2006, 543; see also Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 20 IV. with further references.

340

For an overview see e.g. Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 31.

341

See Sect. 14.1.1.1.3.

342

Federal Court of Justice as of 17.9.2001—II ZR 178/99 (Bremer Vulkan), BGHZ 149, 10, 16 = NJW 2001, 3622; and later Federal Court of Justice as of 16.7.2007—II ZR 3/04 (Trihotel), BGHZ 173, 246 = NJW 2007, 2689.

343

For an overview see e.g. Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 31; Fastrich, in: Baumbach and Hueck (2017), § 13 note 57 ff.; Lieder, in: Michalski et al. (2017), § 13 note 331 ff.

344

Federal Court of Justice as of 17.9.2001—II ZR 178/99 (Bremer Vulkan), BGHZ 149, 10, 16 = NJW 2001, 3622.

345

Federal Court of Justice as of 16.7.2007—II ZR 3/04 (Trihotel), BGHZ 173, 246 = NJW 2007, 2689.

346

§ 826 German Civil Code states:

A person who, in a manner contrary to public policy, intentionally inflicts damage on another person is liable to the other person to make compensation for the damage.

347

Hirte (2008), p. 213 ff. discussing an introduction of a general substantive consolidation in corporate groups’ insolvencies. See also Sester (2005), p. 2099 ff. arguing against the introduction of a substantive consolidation.

348

Federal Court of Justice as of 6.6.1994—II ZR 292/91, BGHZ 126, 181 = NJW 1994, 2220 denying liability of a manager of a closed corporation despite the fact that the manager personally provided collateral for a loan of the closed corporation.

349

See Sect. 20.

350

See Sect. 1.2.2.1.

351

Federal Court of Justice as of 12.7.2011—II ZR 58/10 (HVB), NZG 2011, 950 denying a voting restriction for the sole shareholder in this case. See also Mock, in: Spindler and Stilz (2015), § 147 note 120 for a detailed discussion.

352

Federal Court of Justice as of 11.6.2013—II ZR 80/12 (BKN), NZG 2013, 939; for an English translation of this case see Ventoruzzo et al. (2015), p. 534 ff.

See Sect. 3.1.3.

See Sect. 3.1.3.

See Sect. 26.2.

See Sect. 26.1.

See Sect. 26.1.

See Sect. 26.1.

See Beck (2017), p. 726 ff. for a detailed discussion.

360

See only ECJ as of 15.9.2005 T-325/01 (DaimlerChrysler AG. vs. Commission) [2005] ECR II-3319; Emmerich (2014), § 3 V.7 with further references.

361

Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), OJ L 24 as of 29.1.2004, p. 1 ff.

362

Emmerich (2014), § 3 V.7.

363

Emmerich (2014), § 3 V.7.; Fleischer (1997), p. 498 ff.

364

Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1 as of 4.1.2003, p. 1 ff.

365

Emmerich (2014), § 3 V.7 b) with further references.

366

See Sect. 22 for further details.

367

For a critique see e.g. Bosch (2013), p. 454; Emmerich (2014), § 3 V.7.; Kellerbauer and Weber (2011), p. 214.

368

See Sect. 8.1.

369

Federal Labor Court as of 13.6.2002—2 AZR 327/01, BAGE 101, 321 = NZA 2002, 1147; Federal Labor Court as of 5.11.2009—2 AZR 383/08, NZA-RR 2010, 325.

370

See Sect. 3.1.5.

371

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 3 V. for a detailed analysis of the provisions on the managerial co-determination (unternehmerische Mitbestimmung).

372

Kohler, in: von Staudinger (2010), § 1 UmweltHG note 89; Nitsch, in: BeckOGK (Gsell et al. 2017), § 1 UmweltHG note 85.

373

Kohler, in: von Staudinger (2010), § 1 UmweltHG note 89; Nitsch, in: BeckOGK (Gsell et al. 2017), § 1 UmweltHG note 85.

374

Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 1 IV. for a detailed discussion.

375

See Sect. 1.2.2.3.

376

For a critique see Rödder (2007), p. 380 ff.; Schön (2004), p. 629 ff.; Schön (2007), p. 409 ff.; see also Emmerich and Habersack (2013), § 1 IV.1.

377

ECJ as of 6.9.2012 - C-18/11 (The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs vs. Philips Electronics UK Ltd) [2012] ECR I-532.

378

See Sect. 30.1.

379

Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf as of 14.3.2012 – I-15 U 122/10, PharmR 2012, 354; dissenting Rieckers (2004), p. 706.

380

Spickhoff, in: Beck (2017), § 4 ProdHaftG note 20.

381

Federal Court of Justice as of 13.3.2003—VII ZR 370/98 (Überseering), BGHZ 154, 185 = NJW 2003, 1461; Kindler, in: Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (2015b), Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht note 427 ff. with numerous further references.

382

Federal Court of Justice as of 13.10.2004—I ZR 245/01 (Gedios), NZG 2005, 44; Kindler, in: Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (2015b), Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht note 426.

383

Federal Court of Justice as of 27.10.2008—II ZR 158/06 (Trabrennbahn), BGHZ 178, 192 = NJW 2009, 289 stating that the real seat theory still applies to Swiss corporations. For an English translation of this case see Ventoruzzo et al. (2015), p. 92 ff.

384

Federal Court of Justice as of 13.12.2004—II ZR 256/02, NZG 2005, 214, 215 (applicable law for the piercing of the corporate veil [see Sect. 21]); Federal Court of Justice as of 5.6.1975—II ZR 23/74, BGHZ 65, 15 = NJW 1976, 191 (implicit); Federal Court of Justice as of 15.6.1992—II ZR 18/91, BGHZ 119, 1 = NJW 1992, 2760 (implicit); Federal Court of Justice as of 4.3.1998—II ZB 5/97, BGHZ 138, 136 = NJW 1998, 1866 (implicit); Kindler, in: Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (2015b), Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht note 681 ff.

385

See Sect. 1.2.2.1.

386

Regional Court Munich I, ZIP 2011, 511; see also Federal Court of Justice as of 5.10.1981—II ZR 203/80, NJW 1982, 1817; Federal Court of Justice as of 15.6.1992—II ZR 18/91, BGHZ 119, 1 = NJW 1992, 2760 (implicit); Federal Court of Justice as of 4.3.1998—II ZB 5/97, BGHZ 138, 136 = NJW 1998, 1866 (implicit) all implying the application of that principle; Kindler, in: Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (2015b), Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht note 699 ff.

387

Kindler, in: Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (2015b), Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht note 701 ff.; Schall, in: Spindler and Stilz (2015), vor § 15 note 35 ff. with further references.

388

Kindler, in: Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (2015b), Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht note 712; Schall, in: Spindler and Stilz (2015), vor § 15 note 37 with further references.

389

Federal Court of Justice as of 13.12.2004—II ZR 256/02, NZG 2005, 214, 215; Higher Regional Court Stuttgart as of 30.5.2007—20 U 12/06, ZIP 2007, 1210, 1213; see also Kindler, in: Münchener Kommentar zum BGB (2015b), Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht note 713 ff.; Schall, in: Spindler and Stilz (2015), vor § 15 note 38 with further references.

390

Insurance law provides the mutual insurance company (Versicherungsverein auf Gegenseitigkeit) which, however, is mainly based on the general law of associations and other legal forms. Nevertheless, it constitutes a separate legal form.

391

Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 176 of 27.6.2013, p. 1 ff.

392

Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 based on the Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts, OJ L 193 of 18.7.1983, p. 1 ff.

393

See Sect. 34.1.

394

See Sect. 6.

395

For a detailed analysis see Benedict/Gehle/Schmidt, in: Münchener Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrecht – Band 7 (Born et al. 2016), § 146 note 7 ff.

396

Benedict/Gehle/Schmidt, in: Münchener Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrecht – Band 7 (Born et al. 2016), note 19 ff.; see also Federal Court of Justice as of 29.3.1996—II ZR 124/95 (Schiedsfähigkeit II), BGHZ 132, 278 = NJW 1996, 1753.

397

Federal Court of Justice as of 6.4.2017—I ZB 23/16 (Schiedsfähigkeit III), NZG 2017, 657.

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Titel: National Report on Germany
verfasst von: Sebastian Mock
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Groups of Companies
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-36696-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-36697-1

Copyright-Jahr: 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36697-1_13

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